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Abstract 
The changing climate of vulnerability, aid and governance in Malawi 
Dylan Wayne Malcomb, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
Supervisor:  Kelley A. Crews 
 
By year 2020, Developed Countries pledged to mobilize USD100 billion per year towards 
mitigation of greenhouse gases and strategies of adaptation. This redistribution from Annex I 
(developed) countries to developing countries represents a near doubling of current official 
development assistance levels, yet future strategies of adaptation remain nebulous. Definitions, 
opinions and agendas of adaptation have evolved into new global development strategy, but will 
externally-designed strategies threaten an adaptive process that should be community-led and 
environmentally-contextual? Little empirical research has been conducted on adaptation as an 
international development strategy that consists of massive earmarking of funds to institute and 
later demonstrate that projects are related to climate change.  Through semi-structured interviews 
with international  and development organizations, national and local governments, civil society 
and community focus groups, this research chronicles Malawi's polycentric response to climate 
change vulnerability. Using site-visits to numerous active adaptation projects in Malawi as case-
studies, this research examines who the stakeholders are in this process, what adaptation looks 
like and how the overall concept of this new development strategy can be improved. 
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Introduction 
 Recent decades have provided convincing evidence that discrete events can affect human 
and biophysical systems around the world.  Through political, economic and social networks, 
events can quickly spread across diverse landscapes through complex processes that are not well 
understood.  However, in many cases it is the organized responses to such events that can cause 
them to become regional, continental or even global in disposition. In 2001, actions planned in 
remote villages of Central Asia shocked the world when New York City and Washington D.C. – 
paragon cities of Western strength - were attacked.  The response was a Global War on Terrorism 
with allies and operations linked to every continent and a combined cost of $1.2 trillion USD 
(Congressional Research Service, 2011).  In 2008, collapse of the U.S. credit and housing markets 
sent much of the world into recession.  By 2009, leaders from the top 20 economies (G20) agreed 
to a global response to recession concerns by quadrupling funding to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2009).  They stated, “turning around global growth will depend critically on more 
concerted policy actions to stabilize financial conditions as well as sustained strong policy support 
to bolster demand” (IMF, 2009).  In 2010, protests originating in Tunisia catalyzed uprisings 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  During this 'Arab Spring', dynastic regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iran and Bahrain felt the pressure of democracy movements 
of disenfranchised people now demanding global recognition.  When out-of-favor despots did not 
succumb to domestic pressure, they were eliminated by international coalitions (The Guardian, 
2012).  Across the latter half of the decade, government spending in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 
Italy and Spain sent the European Union into a sovereign debt crisis that will test the structure and 
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integrity of a unified Europe.  Goldman Sachs was accused of helping Greece to mask its 
government debt, furthering criticism of the role of banks in the global economic downturn 
(Featherstone, 2011).  Most recently, a handful of protesters in New York City challenging the 
notion of corporate greed and unequal wealth became a platform for social movements across the 
United States and in places as disparate as London, Denmark and Lithuania (Occupy, 2011).  
Even Durban, South Africa mimicked the occupy movement as diplomats from some developing 
countries "occupied" the United Nations climate negotiations over the lack of urgency in 
mounting an adequate response (The Guardian, 2011).   
 In a period marked by increased sociopolitical discontent, economic hardship and 
officious international involvement, it is no surprise that a human dimension of environmental 
change was another important issue to emerge.  In 2007, a Nobel peace prize was awarded jointly 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Albert Gore Jr. for "their efforts to 
build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change and lay foundations 
to counteract such change" (Nobelprize.org, 2007).  Al Gore, in receiving the award, stated, "we 
face a true planetary emergency.  The climate crisis is not a political issue; it is a moral and 
spiritual challenge to all of humanity" (Gore, 2007).  Human activities and impacts at the global 
environmental scale have captured the attention of academia and influenced research trajectories 
of scholars, researchers and policy-makers seeking to observe, account and explain such 
phenomena.  The once natural and environmental issue of macroclimate has evolved into a vast 
body of literature, research, politics and development strategies worldwide with a resurgent focus 
on social-ecological interfaces. 
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 Efforts to address climate change through international strategies of development could 
prove to be one of the most immediate and extensive global responses to date.  Based on evidence 
that the climate is changing and that such shifts may affect societies over many decades, 
adaptation has materialized as an international strategy for responding to climate change and 
protecting existing development (Schipper, 2007) through “practical steps to protect countries 
and communities from the likely disruption and damage that will result from effects of climate 
change” (Levina and Tirpak, 2007, p. 6).  This impact-oriented response is partly reaction to 
frustrations over the lack of progress and effectiveness in reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
(Burton et. al., 2006).  In addition, it is partly in response to societies already struggling to meet 
the challenges of existing climatic variability (Adger and Brooks, 2003; Schipper, 2007).  In both 
cases, international pressure is mounting on developed countries to commit more resources, 
finances and technologies toward addressing climate vulnerability (Schipper, 2007; McGray, 
2007, Brooks et. al., 2011).  Based on indications from the most recent proceedings of the 
Conference of Parties (in 2009, 2010, and 2011) foreign aid will be the primary mechanism to 
address climatic impacts in developing situations. Despite numerous - and sometimes 
contradicting - notions, definitions, and examples of adaptation, this new approach to developing 
world vulnerability is being integrated into the business of foreign aid where finances and 
strategies translate into projects and outcomes.  As climate-related development becomes a 
crowded field with fragmented strategies, there are some unresolved conceptual challenges that 
deserve attention.  
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 First, as developing countries to play a contributing role in responding to climate change 
in developing countries, capital must be collected and redistributed to those in need.  Contrary to 
Mr. Gore‟s proclamation (Gore, 2007), these efforts have indeed been political.  To achieve 
global scale results, four funds were established under the United Nations Framework Committee 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to provide financial resources for assessing, planning, and 
implementing adaptation measures in developing countries: Special Climate Change Fund, Least 
Developed Countries Fund, Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund (Fussel, 2009).  The World 
Bank reported that almost 2.5 billion in adaptation finance has already been committed (World 
Bank, 2010) with an expected $30 billion in fast-start funding pledged in Copenhagen (2009) on 
its way.  Developed countries have also promised to nearly double their current commitments of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) by $100 Billion in order to support these funds by 2020 
(Weaver and Peratsakis, 2010).  If all of these promises were kept, climate-related finance would 
grow by 4000% over the World Bank's current estimates and represent a 'big push' approach to 
development (Easterly, 2006).  In light of these figures, the process of collecting and accounting 
for this money is important and spending adaptation money wisely is critical.  Early reports in this 
process suggest that climate finance is becoming a complex economic and political problem of 
resource allocation (Frankhauser and Burton, 2011), one built around theoretical intentions and 
promises of financial backing.  Meanwhile, effective communication and coordination of climate-
related projects is one of the major challenges to development in general and adaptation in 
particular (Brooks et. al., 2011). 
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 Second, despite recognition that increased funding should be well spent, there are 
concerns that development aid will simply be re-labeled as climate change in a process known as 
green-washing (Hicks, et. al., 2008).  Poor countries are hoping to receive climate aid finance as a 
new stream of investment, and they do not want to see existing development funds diverted as a 
result (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007).  As the details of how climate finance will be 
accounted, some question whether developing countries can afford to wait for donors to organize 
to address climate vulnerability (World Bank, 2010), especially since majority of donor countries 
have failed to reach ODA targets of .7% Gross National Income (GNI) first set in 1979 (Riddell, 
2008, OECD, 2010) - excepting the Nordic countries (McGray, 2007).  This track record for 
disappointment makes the future of climate aid fraught with uncertainty.  Climate change funding 
is supposed to effectively represent 'new and additional' aid - reaching $100 Billion beyond the 
current $150 Billion that developed countries collectively commit - but there are no agreed upon 
mechanisms to track and measure climate funding separately (McGray, 2007; Weaver and 
Peratsakis, 2010).  There is also a concern that governments and development organizations lack 
the capacity to effectively absorb these funds and direct them to the best activities (Frankhauser 
and Burton, 2011). Instead, there is serious danger that instead of tackling the urgent tasks of 
adaptation, developed countries will become embroiled in debates about governance, monitoring 
and targets of funding (Frankhauser and Burton, 2011).  There is a growing recognition that 
vulnerable countries cannot wait for the developed world to address the local effects of climate 
change, but there is little research to suggest how developing countries view the problems of 
climate change and how they are already organically dealing with existing and anticipated effects. 
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 Third, adaptation is a complex human and natural process with multiple characterizations 
that make effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of such a progression at any scale a major 
conceptual challenge. Sources of climate-related finance are extremely broad and include not only 
the new United Nations funds discussed but also multiple private channels of delivery and shifts 
in existing development toward climate-resilient solutions (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 
2012).  Each group involved in this process brings a unique set of ideas toward addressing climate 
change through their projects.  Adaptation strategies are already embedded in policies and 
projects related to food security, rural livelihoods, sustainable development, poverty alleviation 
and natural resource management; often referred to as „mainstreaming‟ (World Bank, 2012).  
Based on this trend, it is important to determine if adaptation represents a new and innovative 
approach to vulnerability or if it is  a continuation, relabeling or green-washing of existing 
strategies.  This verdict is especially important in the context of southern Africa where foreign aid 
has had questionable success in alleviating poverty, disease and food security despite six decades 
of international involvement (Maren, 1997; Booth et. al., 2006; Easterly, 2006; Conroy, 2006; 
Moyo, 2009).  An exploration of strategies of adaptation at multiple levels is required to 
determine what activities organizations are promoting and how they are incorporating 
communities into this response.   
 Fragmentation, rapid spending and disparate strategies will make tracking adaptation 
finance to meet aid targets difficult, but determining which strategies are effective across multiple 
temporal scales could prove to be impossible.  As new projects are implemented with short-term 
goals, interventions run the risk of superseding empirical evidence that such actions are 
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appropriate in the long-term (Brooks, et. al., 2011).  Development organizations are expected to 
demonstrate to their stakeholders the results or outcomes of their projects, but how can adaptation 
- a process thought to take decades (Levina and Tirpak, 2006) - be measured in just a few years? 
"Evaluation of adaptation is fraught with difficulties.  Prominent among these are 
the long timescales over which many aspects of climate change [and hence much 
adaptation] will unfold and a problem of how to evaluate the impacts of 
adaptation interventions on development outcomes in the face of rapidly evolving 
stresses and risks that change the contexts in which development takes place [the 
sliding baseline theory]" (Brooks, et. al., 2011, p. 5). 
In addition, how does the need to demonstrate the effectiveness of their strategies present a 
conflict of interest between development organizations and project beneficiaries at the community 
level? Are pre-conceived frameworks that International Organizations (IOs) are using to 
implement their strategies what developing countries need? For example, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID, 2012) is promoting a new Low Emissions 
Development Strategy as part of their new climate change framework.  Should Africa be held to a 
same or lower emissions level given that they are currently the lowest producers of carbon on the 
planet (IEA, 2009)? Is this international framework beneficial to the millions of people living on 
less than a dollar per day? External strategies might ignore solutions that lie with the people 
considered most vulnerable and least capable (Carr, 2011).  Developing countries may be better 
able to cope with or adapt to climate change as a result of their sustained exposure to climate 
hazards (Kelly and Adger, 2000), but this ability is contingent on their participation in  the 
adaptation process.   
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 Finally, adaptation conducted under a foreign aid model may contribute to an environment 
where policies and decisions are orchestrated by external organizations.  While there is consensus 
that solutions must come from within affected countries ( Turner, et. al., 2003; Blair, 2005; World 
Bank, 2006; Moyo, 2009) or directly from villages and communities (Ellis, 1998; Adger and 
Kelley, 1999; Allen, 2006; Blanco, 2006; Smucker and Wisner, 2008), this research will 
demonstrate that decentralized project planning and multilevel decision-making is not the case.  
In a foreign aid approach to adaptation, donor countries want to give money, poor governments 
want to receive it and organizations that deliver climate change interventions (such as Non-
Governmental Organizations) want more projects, but is everyone a winner under this paradigm 
(O'Brien et. al., 2000)?  Studying historical theories of development is key to understanding the 
theoretical eclecticism (Carr, 2008) that has led to emerging and reemerging strategies in climate 
change development. 
 For those involved in the business of aid (Maren, 1997), keeping the issue of adaptation 
global has many advantages, such as drawing from larger pools of resources, spreading the 
burden of development coverage, and building consensus on future policies of energy and 
mitigation – efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.  However, globalizing the problem of climate 
change and the solution of adaptation has created opportunities for people to manipulate the 
financial mechanisms (Transparency International, 2012), evade national responsibility in 
addressing internal vulnerability (Hicks et. al., 2008; McGray, 2008) and lose trust in the overall 
global process (Frankhauser and Burton, 2011; World Bank, 2012).  Deciding where the money 
will come from and ensuring that it is carefully distributed - whether utilitarian or egalitarian in 
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approach - will inevitably slow the global process.  Whether adaptation projects are too slow to 
address existing vulnerability or too hasty to be enduring and positive changes at the community-
level are issues that have been unexplored. Evaluating the sustainability of existing and emerging 
climate development is an area where researchers and academics can have a profound effect on 
the overall process. A global response, tantamount to 'throwing money at the problem', will not in 
itself decrease vulnerability.  While most development organizations know firsthand the complex 
process of addressing vulnerability in developing counties, an increase in funding may exacerbate 
and destabilize governments at all levels and externalize the process of adaptation.  There is an 
alarming permanence to the use of development finance to address climate change well into the 
future, and the promises by developing countries may already be creating misdirected hope as the 
'Occupy Durban' movement suggests. The goal of IOs should be to develop solutions that 
eventually come from countries and communities affected and that do not rely on donor 
governments? 
 This empirical research explores how manufactured global strategies are impacting a 
multifaceted and protracted human process of adaptation.  Determining the extent of national and 
community-level integration into these international strategies requires a thorough multilevel 
analysis that is not always possible in the sociopolitical environment of most developing 
countries.  However, using a mixed methods approach, this research captures perceptions of 
vulnerability, climate change, adaptive strategy, foreign aid and governance at international, 
national and subnational in Malawi.  Research spanned one of the most dynamic periods of 
sociopolitical unrests in the country since independence - much of it stemming from issues of 
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foreign aid, governance and vulnerability.  Vulnerability to climate change is a growing concern 
in Malawi (Brooks et. al., 2005; Maplecroft, 2011) due to persistent droughts, flooding, dry-spells 
and overall food insecurity.  With over sixty years of direct global engagement, it is also an 
appropriate example of international involvement in local communities to address issues of 
vulnerability.   
  The goal of this research is complementary to the goals of researchers and international 
organizations that seek to develop meaningful and lasting solutions to end preventable suffering 
in the world.  However, for adaptation to be effective as a global development strategy, it must 
effectively address a local and contextual vulnerability to climate change (Adger and Kelley, 
1999). It must be well coordinated between development organizations and local governments to 
prevent strategy fragmentation (Brooks, et. al., 2011) and climate- finance must be spent on 
effective interventions that provide long-term results rather than short-term indicators 
(Frankhauser and Burton, 2011; World Bank, 2012). It must empower governments at many 
levels and allow the national government to assume the role of leader, coordinator and entity 
accountable to the people (World Bank, 2006; Ostrom, 2010).  Finally, all of these objectives 
should be done with the goal of an aid-independent end state (Moyo, 2009). Development 
organizations should be working to put themselves out of a job by improving the situation in 
developing countries.  To evaluate these conditions in Malawi, this researcher uses multilevel 
interviews, vulnerability mapping and project mapping to assess the location and appropriateness 
of adaptation activities.  Using interviews with development organizations and project-level 
ground-truthing, this research evaluates the level of coordination and integration of these projects.  
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Finally, using multi-level interviews, questions of leadership and aid-dependency in constructing 
a national strategy are highlighted and evaluated.   
 Evidence will illustrate how strategies of aid and development have produced varying and 
often disappointing results within Malawi (Booth et. al., 2006; Conroy, 2006).  In addition to 
addressing conditions that make adaptation development strategy effective, this thesis will also 
explore broader questions of:  1) What are the perceptions of vulnerability, climate change, 
foreign aid, and governance at different scales in Malawi? 2) What are the observations of climate 
change and where are the perceived most vulnerable areas in Malawi? 3) Are adaptation 
interventions directed to the most vulnerable areas in Malawi (an egalitarian approach) or are they 
implemented to benefit the largest possible number of people in urban areas (a utilitarian 
approach)?   
 This thesis will seam together the answers to these research questions to develop 
contextual recommendations for future research and policy.  Each concept - from vulnerability to 
and effects of climate change to the effectiveness of foreign aid in addressing it - will be 
examined using broad and thorough research, extensive fieldwork, interviews at every level of 
society and government (in a multilevel approach), and innovative applications of data and 
technology to arrive at a confident conclusion.   
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Chapter 1- Research setting 
MALAWI 
 Malawi is an appropriate study location for the intersection of social and ecological issues 
that are converging on many developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a country that does 
not usually stand out on a map, being half the size of the United Kingdom and dwarfed by many 
of its neighboring countries. Malawi also does not stand out in indicators of health development 
or hotspots of vulnerability or biodiversity, yet it is an apposite example where crisis compounds 
crisis and where poverty alleviation, sustainable development and now adaptation are now 
common axioms of development. With an 85% rural population, most households are highly 
dependent on rain-fed agriculture and limited nearby natural resources.  This combination has led 
to one of the highest deforestation rates in Africa- 2.8% annually (New York Times, 2005) and 
tremendous biodiversity loss to an essential ecosystem in the region, Lake Malawi, due to 
overfishing (Magrath, 2009).  Malawi is ranked 171/187 in the United Nations Human 
Development index (2011).  It ranks 18/104 (opposite scale) in Oxford's Multi-dimensional 
poverty index (Alkire, 2011); 90% of Malawians live on less than $2 per day and 75% on less 
than $1.  Malawi ranks 14th for most overall cases of HIV/AIDS (WHO, 2008) with twelve 
percent of the adult population living with the disease.  Finally, Malawi's population of 14 million 
is expected to double by 2018 (World Bank, 2010) meaning the amount of arable land per person 
is quickly shrinking. The urbanization rate in Malawi is the seventh highest in the world (CIA, 
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2012) and the population density is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.  Figure 1 (next page) offers 
a poignant contrast of Malawi's density to its neighbors. 
 These social factors are compounded by many environmental issues. Malawi has endured 
numerous climatic hazards in the past two decades.  These include dry spells, seasonal droughts, 
rainfall variability, and flooding.  When natural shocks are merged with manmade and other 
vulnerabilities in the country such as land degradation, disease, population density and 
socioeconomic disturbances, many segments of Malawi's population lack the adaptive capacity 
needed to recover from these hazards that are often operating simultaneously. With a population 
living on the edge of survival, these events become shocks (McGrath, 2009) and it takes very 
little to create a crisis that requires international assistance (Conroy, 2006).  As this section 
illustrates, natural disasters and climate variability have been common in Malawi's recent history, 
but the complex interaction of these identified stressors suggests that stability within the country 
is not being compromised by one unique susceptibility to climate change (or variability), but 
through intersecting vulnerabilities that include natural disasters, environmental uncertainty, land 
degradation, socioeconomic issues and food insecurity.  
 
14 
 
  
 Figure 1:  Map of Malawi and neighbors showing gridded population density. 
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Natural Disasters 
 Malawi lies in the rift valley between Tanzania to the north and east and Zambia to the 
west (Figure 1).  Mozambique is a disaster-prone neighbor that shares many of Malawi's same 
environmental vulnerabilities and borders the southern portion of Malawi on three sides.  Malawi 
is routinely threatened by natural hazards that include floods, droughts and dry spells.  These 
events combine to make it one of the most vulnerable countries in Africa with floods present 
every year, droughts occurring on average every 3 to 5 years and persistent dry spells becoming 
more common in many southern parts of Malawi (EM-DAT, 2012).  Between 1979 and 2008, 
natural disasters in Malawi affected nearly 21.7 million people and killed approximately 2,596 
(World Bank, 2010).  While Mozambique often tops indices of climatic vulnerability (Brooks et. 
al., 2005; Brenkert and Malaone, 2005; Raleigh and Jordan, 2008; Levy et. al., 2008), the 
southern portion of Malawi experiences a comparable frequency and magnitude of exposure to 
such events. Despite its relatively low recognition for vulnerability related to climate change, 
Malawi was the country that had the largest percentage of the population affected by disasters 
between 1991 and 2000 (Brooks and Adger, 2003).  Moreover, disasters in Mozambique often 
lead to refugees coming into Malawi, which results in added stress to southern districts.  
 Flooding is a major concern for many areas in Malawi. There are six river basins in 
Malawi that regularly experience severe flooding (SADC, 2012), which include the Ruo/Shire 
basin which flows into the Zambezi River in Mozambique, the Likangala/Thondwe, 
Limphasa/Luweya, Linthipe and Bwanje/Livulezi basins that dominate the central region and the 
Songwe basin on the northern border with Tanzania.  The number of people affected by flooding 
16 
 
each year fluctuates, but over the last 15 years there are an average 285,000 people per year 
affected.  The latest major flooding events occurred in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2005 (EM-
DAT, 2012).  In one flood event in 2000, half of the districts in Malawi (14 of 28) experienced 
major flooding and over 500,000 people were affected (EM-DAT, 2012).  In 2005, nine districts 
and another 200,000 people were affected by a single flood event. 
 In April 2011, heavy rains throughout the northern region caused the North Rukuru River 
to overflow its banks and collapse a major dike on the river.  Extensive flooding in the Karonga 
district was spread across 105 villages.  Over 500 homes, built of brick and weak sand mortar, 
were damaged or washed away and over 28,000 people were affected in this latest example of 
flooding disasters in Malawi (Government of Malawi, 2012).  Beyond destroyed homes and 
displaced people, there was also extensive damage to crops in the regions inundated with water.  
Disasters, such as this recent example, continue to have tremendous negative effects on the 
harvest and lean seasons where food becomes scarce.  In addition, the physical loss of assets that 
include livestock and stores of food will further destabilize this region of Malawi for years to 
come.  Each flood has a lasting and negative effect on the resilience and adaptive capacity that 
extends beyond individual households and communities.  
 While flooding usually presents an immediate and visible threat, droughts and dry spells 
tend to be characterized as slow-onset disasters.  Occurring over several years, dry conditions in 
Malawi have been, at times, extremely devastating.  Malawi's population is resource poor, 
overwhelmingly rural and highly dependent on the rain sensitive crop of maize (Conroy, 2006).  
Over 80 percent of subsistence farmers grow maize as their primary crop and Malawi is the 
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country that receives the highest percentage of nutritional intake from maize (FAO, 2011).  In 
Malawi, the expression "maize is food" is not an understatement.  The intensification of maize 
cultivation has been the leading strategy of the Government of Malawi (GoM) and IOs to combat 
food security- an initiative that grew tremendous popularity following the drought in 2005.  
During this event, over 4.2 million people - or 34 percent of the population - were unable to meet 
their food needs and much of the country required some form of humanitarian assistance (FAO, 
2005).  However, this event highlighted the fact that droughts are sometimes compounded events 
that expose previous and existing vulnerabilities.  In 2005, the cereal crop production fell 30% 
short of the previous year (2004), which had also been a deficit year.  Closely following a severe 
drought that had occurred in the same region in 2002- affecting 2.8 million people and resulting in 
over 500 - 1000 hunger-related deaths (Menon, 2007) - the 2005 drought greatly reduced the 
resilience of many households already operating at reduced capacity.  2002 marked the sixth year 
that Malawi experienced a food shortage in the country and by 2005 it would mark Malawi's 
worst decade for food security (Cromwell and Kyegombe, 2005).    
Climatic Variability or Climate Change 
 Does this pattern of natural disasters in Malawi suggest that the climate has changed?  A 
report from climate scientists at the University of Oxford indicates that the mean annual 
temperature in Malawi increased by 0.9
o
C between 1960 and 2006 (McSweeney et. al., 2008).  
This change includes an increase in the frequency of 'hot days' and 'hot nights' in all seasons and a 
decrease in the frequency of 'cold days'.  Based on these projections, by 2100 Malawi will likely 
face a temperature increase of at least 2.5 C but possibly as high as 4.5C.  However, rainfall 
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models are far less definitive.  Malawi's inter-annual variability is strongly influenced by Indian 
Ocean sea surface temperatures and the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which can lead to 
differences between various models that predict precipitation.  The IPCC models (A2, A1B and 
B1) indicate that there is not a statistically significant pattern of more or less rainfall in the future.  
Mean rainfall will remain about the same but with heavier rain activity in the wet season, 
balanced by decreases in the dry season.  This situation will potentially lead to increased floods 
and droughts that stress crops like maize- vulnerable to either extreme.  The three IPCC climate 
models were used to create the projections depicted below (A2 shown in red, A1B  in blue and B1 
in green). These three models are based on IPCC working group one's fourth assessment report.  
All models predict increasing temperatures and greater precipitation anomalies in the future 
(Figures 2 & 3).   
 
Figure 2: Mean Annual Temperature for Malawi - all values shown are anomalies, relative to the 1970-
1999 mean climate. Black curves show the mean of observed data from 1960 to 2006, Brown curves show 
the median (solid line) and range (shading) of model simulations of recent climate across an ensemble of 
15 models. Colored lines from 2006 onwards show the median (solid line) and range (shading) of the 
ensemble projections of climate under three emissions scenarios. Colored bars on the right-hand side of the 
projections summarizes the range of mean 2090-2100 climates simulated by the 15 models for each 
emissions scenario  (McSweeney et. al., 2008). 
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Figure 3:  Mean Annual Precipitation for Malawi - all values shown are anomalies, relative to the 1970-
1999 mean climate. See Figure 2 caption for details (McSweeney et. al., 2008). 
 Based on the IPCC definition that "climate change is a change in the state of the climate 
that can be identified (e.g., using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of 
its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer" (IPCC, 2007, 
p. 667), then Malawi currently lacks sufficient evidence to suggest that hydrometeorological 
events are due to global climate change. Instead they reflect the more appropriate definition of 
internal variability linked to interactions with the ENSO cycle (IPCC, 2007).   
 On the other hand,  the failure of rains for more than 1 month in the rainy season can 
adversely affect agricultural production and the economy of Malawi (Jury and Mwafulirwa, 
2002).   For Malawi, climate change predictions may translate into even greater agricultural 
uncertainty, while food and water security are already manifest problems in Malawi.  While the 
future impacts of climate change cannot be stated with a high level of confidence, there is at least 
some expectation that natural disasters will occur in greater frequency and magnitude 
(Government of Malawi, 2006; McSweeney et. al., 2008).  Malawi is particularly vulnerable to 
erratic rainfall because majority of the population depend on rain-fed agriculture. Flooding can 
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also lead to land degradation where households are farming on marginal lands.  While predictions 
suggest that southern Africa will face some of the most extreme changes in the climate (Boko et. 
al., 2007; IPCC, 2007; Lobdell, 2008; Busby et. al., 2010; World Bank, 2010), scientists have also 
determined based on climate models that there will be a serious negative impact on the production 
of maize in southern Africa in the future (Lobdell, 2008).  While these fluctuations in rainfall and 
natural disasters may or may not have linkages to global climate change, for Malawians, these 
events present serious and dangerous consequences to livelihoods in the present.  In Malawi, use 
of the term climate change in development literature (Government of Malawi, 2006; Magrath, 
2009, FAO, 2011, SADC, 2012) generally does not differentiate between climate variability or 
climate change.     
Land Degradation 
 One of the most conspicuous indicators of land degradation in Malawi is deforestation.  
When crops fail and farmers look toward other means of income, Malawi's natural resources 
become accessible targets (Fisher, 2010).  The main driver for deforestation is the practice of 
turning forestry products into charcoal to be sold in market.  The extraction of charcoal from 
virtually every unprotected source across the nation has led to a 13% decline in forest cover in the 
past 20 years (Magrath, 2009). Consequently, measures put in place to protect forest preserves 
have further destabilized the communities in close proximity to these once open resources.  
Studies indicate that when there are income shocks in Malawi (such as through failed crops), 
deforestation is a natural coping mechanism (Fisher, 2010).  Many development projects in 
Malawi are targeting communities near forest preserves.  The end goal of these projects is to 
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protect the natural resource while helping communities adapt to a changing climate.  The Mulanje 
Mountain Conservation Trust is an example of this initiative, where the World Bank, Norway, 
Japan and Global Environmental Fund (among other donors) are all working to improve the 
sustainability of biological resource use and to enhance the value of the Mulanje Mountain 
ecosystem to local communities (Nangoma and Nangoma, 2008). Mulanje Mountain is just one of 
many regions that the Government of Malawi (GoM) describes as hotspots for vulnerability to 
climate change (Government of Malawi, 2006).  
 To highlight the areas in Malawi of high vulnerability, the GoM and United Nations 
Development Program(UNDP) constructed a map (Figure 4) for the drafting of the 2006 National 
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA). The NAPA is submitted to the UNFCCC to initiate 
adaptation funding and Malawi was one of the first countries to apply.  This initiative represented 
a preliminary step by the GoM to open the door to climate finance, but the map highlights the 
conflation of issues of land degradation, rainfall variability and natural disasters in order to access 
funding for climate change adaptation funding.  Unfortunately, this map also represents the most 
detailed analysis of Malawi's vulnerability to climate change up until this point and it is largely 
based on historical record of disasters rather than indicators of future climate change or impacts 
on livelihoods.   
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Figure 4: Malawi Vulnerable Districts and UNDP Programs  
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 The NAPA identified vulnerable districts include Salima, Karonga and Mangochi districts 
along Lake Malawi that are prone to flooding and drought.  The Zomba district with the Upper 
Shire river running through it and the Chikwawa and Nsanje with the lower Shire River are areas 
that experience flooding.  Heavy deforestation is seen as a contributor to soil erosion, siltation of 
the rivers, and flooding that destroys crops (Booth et. al., 2006),  despite lack of scientific 
evidence linking widespread deforestation to flooding (FAO, 2005), Malawians also viewed 
deforestation within the country as being a primary cause for climate change (Magrath, 2009).  
While these assertions lack scientific consensus,  the intent of this research is to highlight 
perceptions of vulnerability and observations of climate change by local definitions rather than 
advance scientific claims which also lack consensus. Therefore, interactions of disasters and 
natural resource management are important themes for exploration in Malawi's contextual climate 
change adaptation strategy.  
Socioeconomic Issues 
 Poverty is a serious challenge to building adaptive capacity and resilience.  When 
households struggle on a daily basis to meet their family's basic needs such as nutrition, water and 
health care, then the slightest disturbance can become devastating.  To this end, climate shocks 
and poverty work in insidious ways toward creating even greater instability through exploitation 
of reduced adaptive capacity.  When other stressors compound poverty, the crisis can become 
even more pronounced.  One of the most subtle links to poverty and climate change is HIV/AIDS.  
This disease directly impacts much of the middle-age population in Malawi who are traditionally 
the breadwinners, planters and harvesters for their families.  Loss of productivity can lead directly 
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to hunger and poverty and indirectly to degraded health and well-being. An estimated 20,000 
children are born each year with HIV, and over 800,000 children are orphaned in Malawi due to 
the disease (National Aids Commission, 2003).  The human health sector is often indirectly 
impacted by the added stress of climate variability.  Rain variability can lead to missed planting 
windows, poor harvests, malnutrition and poverty (Magrath, 2009).  In these circumstances of 
extreme poverty, men are reported to leave the house to seek wage labor and only return when 
food production resumes.  For women left behind, adaptation means securing nutrition, providing 
for their children and often looking after orphans.  In the worst of circumstances it can mean 
resorting to transactional sex and exposure to HIV/AIDS by the husband or wife (Conroy, 2006; 
McGrath, 2009).
 
 
 Another serious problem is malnutrition.  Cultural resistance to crop diversification has 
resulted in an alarming trend of stunted mental and physical development in over half the children 
(World Bank, 2006).  Chronic malnutrition in children is an impending disaster in Malawi.  
Cultural perceptions that maize is food and that children are resilient enough to survive on this 
mono-crop diet has led to serious implications for the next generation.  What will this mean for 
Malawi's future?  Malawi‟s government reports that infant malnutrition and chronic ailments 
associated with malaria, cholera and diarrhea are a result of increasing droughts and floods 
(NAPA, 2006).  Malaria is expected to increase based on the predicted warming models described 
earlier (McSweeney, et. al., 2008).  When climate shocks occur, a population already destabilized 
by health issues can present additional challenges to maintaining adaptive capacity.      
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 A rapidly growing and densely populated population is another factor that will exacerbate 
Malawi's existing development problems: 45% of the population is under the age of 15, and at the 
current population growth rate of 3.2% per year Malawi's population is expected to double by the 
year 2018 (UNDP, 2005). This rapid population growth poses additional stress on the country‟s 
limited resources and capacity.  With the amount of arable land per person quickly shrinking, 
Malawi must develop an adaptation strategy that addresses issues related to food security, poverty 
and health to ensure the sustainability of its resources and development efforts.  
Food Security 
 Following the drought and resultant famine in 2005, President Bingu Wa Mutharika 
declared a national state of disaster as an estimated 50,000 malnourished children were brought 
food aid through various international organizations.  This disaster more than any other in recent 
memory stands out in the minds of Malawians and has dominated discourse on how best to 
respond to natural disasters and food security (Conroy, 2006).  Prior to the 2005 drought, Malawi, 
on the advice of the international community, cut its program to provide free seeds and fertilizer 
to vulnerable communities.  Following this disaster, there was a reinvigorated commitment to 
food security 'at all costs.'  The 2005 drought led to the president's reestablishment of a Farmer 
Input Subsidy Program that many scholars and academics would later credit as 'Malawi's Green 
Revolution' (Denning et. al., 2009; Sachs, 2012). 
         Food insecurity is a measurable effect of hazards that is most often tied to droughts and dry 
spells. Small-scale fluctuations in precipitation can negatively impact farms and crops (Jury and 
26 
 
Mwafulirwa, 2002).  In Malawi, even in good years, farmers may not be able to self-sustain 
themselves (Conroy, 2006). While food security is highly connected to the natural environment, 
this condition has not prevented the processes of achieving food security from becoming 
tremendously political, especially between the international community and the national 
government.  The Farmer Input Subsidy Program (FISP) was introduced in the wake of the 2005 
famine by the president of Malawi and accounted at the time of this research (2011) for 80% of 
the Ministry of Agriculture's budget and as much as 30% of the total government budget (Malawi 
Ministry of Finance, 2011).  The FISP was the flagship project of the Government of Malawi and 
it keeps the government in power.  The basic idea is that the government gives subsidized seed 
and fertilizer to the poorest households in the country.   
 The FISP has been widely considered a success in terms of food security by many 
international experts (Denning et. al., 2011; Doward and Chirwa, 2010; Sachs, 2012).  Since 
implementation, yields have risen, Malawi has become a maize exporter, and the president is 
using this strategy as a platform for future elections. However, in a report by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute about the FISP (2002), one major finding was that farmers 
receiving maize seed and fertilizer subsidies have extended their maize fields at the expense of 
other crop varieties.  This trend has tremendous climate relevance, since the crops farmers now 
forgo are typically more resilient to future climatic shocks.    
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Complex Vulnerability and Social Instability  
 Existing problems of natural disasters, climatic variability, land degradation, 
socioeconomic issues and food insecurity combine to create a complex vulnerability in Malawi 
where intersecting processes drive social instability.  Recent studies have linked reliance on 
agriculture to poverty (Magrath, 2009), poverty to natural resource exploitation (Scherr, 2000; 
Fisher, 2010) and poverty to the incidence of HIV and AIDS (Gillespie, 2006).  These linkages 
suggest that there are complex processes in Malawi that foreign aid has either not solved or is 
potentially exacerbating (Booth et. al., 2006). However, many of these issues have been around 
for years.  
 Following independence from Britain in 1964 and the establishment of a multiparty 
democratic government, Malawi quickly found its power consolidated under the tenacious and 
influential president, Professor Hastings Banda (Conroy, 2006).  Banda established a one-party 
state that placed him firmly in control over the country for the next thirty years.  In 1993, internal 
and widespread protests coupled with international pressure forced Banda to abandon his 
dictatorship and he allowed democratic elections.  Since this brief, but turbulent period leading to 
democracy, Malawi had experienced marked peace.  Often considered the warm heart of Africa or 
Africa for beginners based on its political and social stability, Malawi received favorable and 
continuous support from a variety of international organizations.  However, a recent clash 
between officious donor behavior and autocratic leanings of the president stood to compromise 
Malawi's relative peace.   
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 Vulnerability, governance and international involvement became palpable issues of social 
unrest on July 20, 2011, when Malawians filled the streets in the major urban areas of Mzuzu, 
Lilongwe, Zomba and Blantyre in an act of peaceful solidarity.  The most obvious explanation 
was that the events were in response to the disagreeable policies of President Bingu Mutharika 
and his Democratic People's Party (DPP) (BBC, 2011).  Groups organized by civil society 
organizations (both foreign and domestic) sought to challenge the President's recent actions that 
limited press freedom, challenged academic freedom, criminalized homosexuality, and persecuted 
those that opposed his policies.  Headlines in the local newspapers (both U.K. free press and state-
controlled) evidenced a gradual decline in social wellbeing, increasing signs of corruption, 
political disenfranchisement and a reversal of the favorable support that Mutharika once garnered 
among citizens and donors.  Evidence surfaced that he had spent over US$200 million on a new 
French-made private jet (Reuters, 2010).  More money was spent on an armored convoy for his 
presidential procession and cabinet ministers were provided with Mercedes SUVs (BBC, 2011).  
This expenditure seemed unjustifiable in a country where 70% of the population survives on less 
than $1 per day and as new taxes were introduced on salt, flour, cooking oil, bread and milk 
(Zeleza, 2011).  Shortages of gasoline contributed to prices over $10 per gallon and black market 
trade.  Scarcity of foreign exchange further impacted the country, despite efforts and advice of the 
IMF to restructure the currency.  Mutharkia began firing and arresting members of parliament 
(MPs) that opposed him (Reuters, 2010).  He relieved his Vice President of all of her duties and 
dissolved his cabinet, assuming their duties for himself (Zeleza, 2011).  He expelled the British 
Consulate after remarks surfaced that he thought the Malawi president was becoming increasingly 
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autocratic and intolerant of criticism (BBC, 2011).  The universities in Malawi closed in protest to 
his close monitoring of what was taught (BBC, 2011).  These are but a few of the issues that were 
represented last summer on the streets of Malawi, a country that experienced relative peace since 
independence in 1964.   
 As people poured onto the streets wearing red T-shirts (in contrast to DPP's blue color), a 
local man commented to this researcher that this color dispute was like their version of Bloods 
versus Crips (a reference to two notorious Los Angeles street gangs).  Police were ordered to 
prevent the protests and DPP youth (called 'cadets') patrolled the streets in advance with machetes 
in hand to discourage any public participation (Nyasa Times, 2011).  On the morning of the 
protests, police apprehended and in some cases beat citizens wearing red.  What was intended to 
be a large peaceful protest quickly turned into a scene of uncharacteristic violence.  Reports 
would later reveal that 18 people were shot dead in Mzuzu and Lilongwe with dozens more 
injured across the country (BBC, 2011).  The events were downplayed by President Mutharika, 
who had ordered all of his MPs and cabinet chiefs to attend an all-day lecture on the day of the 
protests.  This was the third day of this researcher's fieldwork in the peaceful country known as 
the 'warm heart of Africa'.   
 Fallout from this event was extensive.  UNHRC, U.K. Foreign Office, U.S. State 
Department, Amnesty International, and even Madonna were all quick to condemn the violence 
and actions to thwart the peaceful assembly of Malawians (BBC, 2011; Nyasa Times, 2011; 
Zeleza, 2011).  The Millennium Challenge Corporation, a major U.S. bilateral aid agency, 
suspended a US$350 million project to expand and renew the country's ailing electrical grid 
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(BBC, 2011).  The U.K. Department for Foreign Investment and Development (DFID) and 
German government retracted direct budget support to the Malawi government costing the 
country an additional US$400 million (BBC, 2011).  
 Beyond foreign exchange, fuel shortages and the corrupt actions of an increasingly 
autocratic president, July 20th represented a tipping point where the issues of social vulnerability, 
international involvement and governance collide.  On the surface, the events of this day appear 
unrelated to the issue of climate change.  However, as this thesis will illustrate, there is a 
nefarious connection between the drivers of vulnerability, ascendancy and an ability to address 
socio-environmental issues in an aid dependent country like Malawi.  Malawi would go from 
being a donor-darling on the verge of an agricultural green revolution and achieving enduring 
food security to becoming the next Zimbabwe under a Mugabe-like leader with a similar and 
dangerous disregard of local and global opinions (Berger, 2011).  On April 5, 2012, President 
Bingu Wa Mutharika died suddenly of a heart attack, and after some tenuous days of political 
uncertainty, Vice President Joyce Banda assumed office as Malawi's fourth president and the 
second female president in Africa's history (BBC, 2012).  This singular event would have 
tremendous positive effect on Malawi's image as a stable democracy. It demonstrated the maturity 
of Malawi's constitution and offered new hope for Malawi's future.  This event is also likely to 
repair relations with many international organizations that are content to continue their work in 
Malawi.    
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INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
The recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report 
(FAR) makes clear that “adaptation will be necessary to address impacts resulting from the 
warming which is already unavoidable due to past emissions” (IPCC, 2007, p. 18).  Adaptation 
has now been embraced not only by the climate change community, but also by the development 
assistance community (OXFAM, 2009; World Bank, 2012; DFID, 2011; USAID, 2012; UNDP, 
2012).  In the case of global climate change, developed countries are presupposed to be the 
problem and the solution (Parry et. al., 2007; Busby et. al., 2010).   
 At the global scale, the issue of climate change, like many others, appears insurmountable.  
USAID (2012) calls it one of the century's greatest challenges.  The World Bank (2012) has 
expressed concerns that climate change will reverse the progress of decades of development 
assistance.  There are outspoken claims that if the developed world does not curb industrial 
activities and its use of non-renewable fossil fuels worldwide then the world could reach an 
“unrecoverable state of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (IPCC, 
2007).  Researchers have written about climate change as a challenge to governance (Liverman et. 
al., 2004; Adger, 2006; Brondizio et. al., 2009), security (Brown et. al., 2007; Raleigh and Urdal, 
2007; Raleigh and Jordan, 2009; Busby et. al., 2010) and well-being (Blanco, 2006; Allen, 2009; 
Carr, 2011).  The IPCC FAR suggests that recent regional climate changes, particularly 
temperature increases, have already produced evidence of effects on many physical and biological 
systems as well as effects on human systems (Parry et. al., 2007).  Science and policy are 
converging on the conviction that human activity through the production and release of 
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greenhouse gasses (GHG), especially in the Global North, is a key stimulus of global-scale 
climate change (Downing, 1997; Pielke, 1998; Smit et. al., 2000; Chapin et. al., 2009; Head, 
2010).  Many positions view the deleterious rise of developed countries as enacting a high cost on 
poorer nations. This viewpoint is now synthesizing with discontents of globalization and free-
trade policy, but research should cautiously determine if a global scale response is a desirable 
outcome for developing countries.  
 Global responses to climate change have already taken into account extensive - yet not 
well understood (Adger and Brooks, 2003) - impacts on hydrology and water resources, 
agriculture and food security, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, coastal zones and marine 
ecosystems, human health, human settlements, energy and industry, and insurance and other 
financial services (Parry et. al., 2007).  Contemporary solutions offered in response to climate 
change are mitigation (activities to reduce greenhouse gasses) and adaptation (activities to reduce 
vulnerability to the physical impacts of climate change) almost as a binary (Head, 2010).  
However, adaptation is far less evolved in the international and development strategies.  The 
nascence of adaptation will not last for long.  By 2020, advanced industrial signatories to the 
conference of the parties Copenhagen Accords pledged to mobilize USD100 billion per year 
towards climate change financing (Weaver and Peratsakis 2010), which includes mitigation of 
greenhouse gases and emerging strategies of adaptation.  The UNFCCC has established funds 
under the Kyoto Protocol to provide resources for adaptation measures in developing countries, 
but the UNFCCC does not provide operational definitions for key concepts, including the 
identification of “particularly vulnerable” countries (Schipper, 2007).   
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 Global solutions are at Malawi‟s doorstep.  Climate change is still a relatively new 
discussion in Malawi, particularly when compared with other countries in the region such as 
Mozambique with recurrent cyclonic events or Kenya and Ethiopia with persistent regional 
droughts.  Despite the novelty, information about climate change and strategies to adapt are being 
transmitted down to the household level in Malawi through radio broadcasting (Fisher, 2011).  In 
a set of household interviews by the International Food Policy Research Institute, climate change 
ranked the second highest fear behind hunger in Malawi (Fisher, 2011).  This perception is 
originating from the national government that is only starting to respond with policies and 
activities and from a foreign aid community that permeates virtually every aspect of Malawian 
life.  From this localized view, the integration of climate funding through existing channels of 
multilateral and bilateral assistance may complicate and externalize the process of adaptation 
(Burton et. al., 2006) - a process that should be tangibly focused and evident at community level 
vulnerability (Kelly and Adger 2000). This commitment to nearly double the amount of aid 
currently redistributed from developed to developing nations will pass through the same financial 
channels that have proven contentious and questionably successful over the past five decades.  
Processes utilized to implement infrastructure projects, educational reforms and health sector 
policies may be redirected or modified to implement someone's idea of adaptation.  One widely 
acknowledged lesson is that adaptations are rarely undertaken in response to climate change 
effects alone, and certainly not to variables that may be most important to local decision-makers 
(Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Local initiatives to enhance livelihoods and build adaptive capacity 
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may be constrained or even nullified by broader social, economic and political forces (Smit and 
Wandel, 2006).   
 From a development standpoint, the provision of funds and technical assistance for 
climate change adaptation has become a crowded field, fraught with risk of donor fragmentation, 
redundancy, and lack of transparency (Newell et al., 2008).  Little consensus exists on the most 
appropriate way to utilize all of the money that is proposed to flow from developed to developing 
nations (Levina and Tirpak, 2006; Michaelowa, 2007; Newell et. al., 2008; Frankhauser and 
Burton, 2011).  Additionally, seminal concepts of adaptation are now lost in a literature rife with 
disparate conceptualizations (Schipper, 2007), temporal discontinuities (Head, 2010), and policy-
oriented contradictions (Levina and Tirpak, 2006).  Few organizations can provide evidence that 
their policies and strategies are the most appropriate way to move forward, yet adaptation has 
moved well beyond the theoretical and is very much intertwined with development and 
environmental activities around the world (Schipper, 2007).   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
  Adaptation activities are a dominant development strategy by international organizations 
operating in Malawi to ostensibly countermand the immediate and observable effects of the 
climate.  This research examines adaptation projects in Malawi in a multilevel approach.  
Drawing from a rich and extensive literature review, the fieldwork portion of this thesis had three 
primary objectives conducted over three phases of research.  
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1. Qualitatively study the perceptions of vulnerability, climate change, foreign aid, 
governance and effective adaptation at different scales in Malawi. 
2. Identify - based on first-person accounts - the processes that cause vulnerabilities to 
climate change in order to locate the most vulnerable areas in Malawi. 
3. Determine if climate change adaptation projects are focused in the most climatically 
vulnerable regions of Malawi and if these projects are effective at the village level. 
These objectives are achieved through over 75 interviews of international organizations, 
government officials at the national, district and community level, non-governmental 
organizations, local university environment and development experts, civil society organizations 
and community leaders. This was a multi-level approach to capture perspectives across Malawi‟s 
polycentric governance structures. Semi-structured interviews in the capital of Lilongwe were 
conducted in March 2011.  In July through August 2011, a second trip was conducted to Malawi 
to conduct semi-structured interviews with organizations operating in the urban center Blantyre 
and rural settlements in the Blantyre, Chikawawa and Nsanje districts. 
 In addition, 30,000 household surveys (of which 16,000+ are women) from  Demographic 
and Health Surveys conducted in 2004 and 2010 are used to explore Malawi's unique and 
contextual vulnerabilities that include lack of assets and wealth, lack of access to basic goods and 
service, and livelihood sensitivity to market and environmental stimuli. These data are paired with 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) data sets on Flood and Drought exposure to 
arrive at a composite index of Malawi's subnational vulnerability.  
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 Finally, using over 900 original-source project documents collected through this fieldwork 
and in cooperation with the Malawi Ministry of Finance, this research represents one of the most 
robust and thorough analyses of foreign aid flows and effectiveness in a developing country. This 
research is now in collaboration with colleagues at The College of William & Mary, Brigham 
Young University, Development Gateway and The Robert Strauss Center at the University of 
Texas to transform project documents into an open database of project-level activities, identify 
project locations and an assess each project's climate-relevance. As a core-researcher in this 
process that acquired the original documents, this thesis uses the shared methodology, but the 
work presented in this thesis was an individual effort of geo-coding and climate-coding projects 
that will likely differ from future analysis. 
These objectives seek to better understand how adaptation activities will be implemented 
(Kelley and Adger, 2000; O‟Brien et. al., 2000; Smucker and Wisner, 2008), who will be 
implementing them (Ostrom, 2009), and how they can be most effective to those needing it the 
most (Brooks et. al., 2011; Frankhauser and Burton, 2011).  Putting these phases of research 
together, this mixed-methods and multi-level approach has the potential to determine why 
adaptation activities are selected, how villages are engaged by external agencies to participate in 
projects, what governance structures manage future viability of projects and if this design-and-
delivery mechanism is effective and innovative. As this research will illustrate, these issues 
present differently at each authoritative level and can lead to incongruent goals and perspectives.  
Better understanding these relationships can identify perceptual conflicts that can compromise the 
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success of this development strategy or inform solutions that improve livelihoods and well-being 
in Malawi.  
SIGNIFICANCE 
 Most empirical research on adaptation can be divided among vertical levels of authority.  
Researchers construct narratives of local and community participatory development (Smucker and 
Wisner, 2008; Prabhakar, et. al., 2009), case-studies of civil society organizations and national 
government responsibilities (Allen, 2006; Warner and Ore', 2006) and discourses on the role of 
international organizations as top-down benefactors (Blanco, 2006; Liverman, 2007).  Only 
recently are some geographers looking at the broader implications of adaptation activities 
(O'Brien et. al., 2003; Carr, 2010).  However, few studies have sought to conduct a multilevel, 
multi-perspective assessment of climate-related development projects.  
 Academically, this research responds to Brondizio et. al.'s (2009) call for multi-level 
analysis in environmental governance and Ostrom's (2010) call for a complex multi-level systems 
approach incorporating GIS technology to respond to complex multi-level problems.  Research 
techniques introduced in this project can lead to a replicable appraisal of adaptation as an 
international development strategy.  This research was a well-timed investigation in an 
understudied region of Southern Africa.  Malawi's vulnerabilities are carefully examined in this 
thesis as they are the impetus for an increased response to observed and expected climactic 
changes by governmental and donor agencies.  The opportunity to empirically study the 
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formulation of Malawi's polycentric response to climate change and the effect of fragmented 
strategies at multiple scales will fill numerous gaps in the existing literature.  
 Another reason that this research is timely is that Malawi recently adopted the Aid 
Management Program - a transparency initiative where participating governments are able to 
manage, coordinate and direct development assistance from donors by requiring them to report 
monthly on their contributions and projects (Development Gateway, 2008).  This researcher was 
given granted access to this information from the Malawi Ministry of Finance as an associate 
researcher with the Robert Strauss Center for International Law and Security at the University of 
Texas.  As a primary source, this information is instrumental to better understanding the role of 
donors in shaping the concept of climate change and adaptation that will resonate at the 
community level. 
 Adaptation in the context of development may represent a departure from a reactive and 
autonomous process once studied by anthropologists and ecologists into a manufactured strategy 
by multiple organizations working in disharmony.  Better understanding the network of 
organizations can help identify challenges that compromise the success of this development 
strategy.  With adaptation projects from the Government of Malawi and donors already in place, 
Malawi was in a prime position for empirical investigation.  Tracking aid flows continues to be a 
difficult task and tracking adaptation aid separate from other forms of aid remains operationally 
infeasible.  If the processes presented in this thesis can be operationalized and institutionalized, 
then this innovation could transform the process of foreign development by creating new and 
informed access points for stakeholders, especially at the community level.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 This thesis examines a broader literature related to understanding vulnerability, 
development, and adaptation in the specific context of adaptation aid as a development strategy to 
address climate change vulnerability. The first section follows development in Africa through a 
decadal approach to highlight, with caution, the path forward for adaptation.  The second section 
focuses on an answer to Smit et. al.'s (2000) question of who or what adapts? by looking at some 
early constructions of the terminology and definitions. The third section examines the contextual 
and complex network of vulnerabilities to answer, adapt to what?  Finally, the last section 
examines the contextual linking of adaptation and development to cover the timeliest issues that 
include food security and natural resource management to answer the question, how will 
adaptation occur?  
DEVELOPMENT AND AFRICA 
 Does foreign aid work and is it a good model for responding to climate change? This 
question is critical to determining the future viability of climate adaptation through aid and 
development.  Over the past sixty years through organizations such as the World Bank, United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), World Food Program and the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD-DAC) - just to name a few -  more than US$2 trillion of foreign aid and 
development assistance has been transferred from rich countries to poor countries around the 
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world (Riddell, 2007). Over US$1 trillion has gone to the countries of Africa, but how much aid 
effectively reaches those in need is uncertain (Moyo, 2009).  The commitment to nearly double 
the amount of aid currently redistributed from rich to poor nations will pass through mostly the 
same financial channels that have proven contentious (Peet, 2003) and questionably successful 
(Booth et. al., 2006; Moyo, 2009; Carr, 2011) for the past six decades. With so much money, 
involvement and attention, in what way is Africa better off today than when such ideas started? It 
is against this back drop that an investigation of development for development's sake begins.  
Post-war Development 
 Foreign aid and development can be traced to Harry Truman who stated "the aim should 
be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more 
clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens" 
(Truman, 1949, Inaugural Address). The formation of the UN charter in 1945 committed all 
countries to work for the promotion of higher living standards, full employment, development, 
and economic and social progress by working cooperatively. It is within this setting that aid 
expanded rapidly to the colonies of Europe, through the British Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 and expansion of French aid to include funding for Universities 
(Riddell, 2007).  In 1948, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall spoke at Harvard University to 
outline his ambitious plan (later dubbed the Marshall Plan) to aid the reconstruction of war-torn 
Europe and Japan (Marshall, 1948).  In 1949, President Harry Truman would echo this strategy in 
his inaugural address to the nation by outlining how it was necessary for governments to provide 
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aid to poor countries (Riddell, 2007).  The transition from a plan to rebuild Europe to giving aid 
to Africa was obvious, as Africa appeared ripe for aid (Moyo, 2009).  
  The return of thousands of teachers and students to college classrooms that had fought in 
World War II spawned a global curiosity that included Africa, the Pacific and other global tropics 
where soldiers had spent time (Power et. al., 2004). Increased funding also became available in 
the postwar economy and advances in transportation through air travel made regional studies on 
distant continents more feasible.  In the United States, regional interest in tribal and 'seemingly 
backward' places translated into grand theorizing about the stages of development, with the U.S. 
and Europe thought to be at the pinnacle of such achievement to date (Barnes, 2001). Amidst 
decolonization of the 1950s, modernization was an early development theory to emerge in the 
postwar United States (Barnes, 2001).  In a period marked by geographic models of innovation 
and diffusion, development was studied as a linear process of stages that all countries must go 
through.  Education and technology were paradigms to this approach, thought to be enough to 
spur economic growth in developing countries.  The core principle in modernization theory is that 
by increasing the number of interactions between developed and underdeveloped countries it 
would promote and increase productive transfer.  
Geographers played a unique role in the formulation, evaluation and critique of 
development theory since the 1950s.  Early giving of foreign aid was underpinned by intellectual 
theorists such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) who would advocate a „big push‟ approach now 
reemerging among economic theorists (Sachs, 2005) and Walt Rostow, a prolific author of some 
34 books and who theorized that countries went through stages of development (Rostow, 1960).  
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Following these theories of modernism, a quantitative revolution in geography would usher in 
widespread use of formal statistical techniques and a focus on theoretical and technical skills on 
planning issues both domestic and further afield (Barnes, 2001).  From planning postwar 
transportation infrastructure to describing parts of the world using novel vocabularies, the 
supposed revolution was actually a retraction from the regional study of poor and developing 
countries. Critical theorists would later call this a period of deskbound geographers that preferred 
to study quantitative and statistical indicators of development (Barnes, 2001). 
The stages of development approach was in sync with the United Nations proclamation of 
the 1960s as 'the Development Decade' (Riddell, 1997), where progress was thought to be best 
achieved through a series of large-scale industrial projects believed to produce longer-term pay-
offs (Moyo, 2009).  From the end of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s growth rates in most 
developing countries actually rose significantly in what was the glory years of aid giving (Riddell, 
2007), but this trend would not continue. What was clearly a success in restoring infrastructure, 
political stability and hope in Europe and Japan would eventually be less successful in Africa that 
had started with little of each. As African nations gained independence from European nations, 
their dependence on aid and European structure grew (Bauer, 1981). The fact that the Marshall 
Plan is hailed as a success is an idea that is still rarely questioned (Moyo, 2009), but a shift in 
development theory followed quickly when development in Africa slowed.  
Post-Modernism Shift 
 Based on the inadequacy to properly predict the stages of development and the failure to 
account for the growing gap between rich and poor societies, structuralists emerged with a new 
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theory of development.  Offering criticisms of modernist development as an exploitation of the 
poor by the rich, these 1960s theorists presented the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" 
of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense 
of the former (Bromley, 1990).  This new way of thinking came to be known as Dependency 
Theory.  Structuralist explanations focused on the causes of underdevelopment and rejected the 
modernist conception of development as economic growth.  Radical critiques sought to locate the 
production of dependent relations within the nature of the capitalist world economy. 
 Advocates of the postwar aid model responded with a report in 1969 (Pearson Report) at 
the direction of Robert McNamara who was president of the World Bank (Riddell, 2007). This 
report would set the tone for future policies and statements as the future of foreign aid was at a 
turning point. The report warned donors to be careful in invoking policies and projects with local 
governments and it was critical of the politicization of foreign aid (Pearson, 1969). The report was 
also the first mention of a .75% Gross National Income for foreign aid to be reached by 1975. 
When this target was not met, it would be the first in a series of broken commitments to an 
increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA).   
 Once modernism was less accepted, the floodgates were open to alternative theories and 
open criticism of what was perceived to be a Western construction of development tied to the 
legacies of colonialism (Barnes, 2001). In retrospect, it appears astonishing that up to this point in 
history, discourse about aid and development could take place without the explicit mention of 
poverty (Riddell, 2007). By the 1970s, there were a series of shifts in both public policy and 
academia where the concepts of poverty and basic human needs took center stage.  Little analysis 
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had been undertaken focusing on poverty incidence, location, causes and persistence, but leading 
development institutions concluded that growth was important but alone insufficient. Direct 
targeting of the poor was to become a new development paradigm.  The impact that this 
refocusing would have on aid-giving was dramatic (Riddell, 2007) and donors would 
continuously shift between strategies of direct and indirect intervention (Bauer, 1981).  
 Following the shifts in development theory, there was an academic environment ripe for 
critical and radical development theories: post-colonialism, post-modernism, post-structuralism, 
post-development and feminism. These critics had profound impacts on a number of geographers 
(Barnes, 2001), and particularly after the founding of the radical journal Antipode (which soon 
began publishing articles about geography and development) there were numerous geographers 
transitioning from theories aimed at improving the quality of development to theories that sought 
to redefine paradigms of development (Bebbington, 2000; Peet, 2003) or remove development 
altogether (Escobar, 1991). The weakness and controversial character of existing theories 
highlighted the lack of high-quality research and fieldwork addressing major issues in developing 
regions of the world (Bromley, 1990).  One geographer stated, "this then is an appeal for 
geographers who work in less-developed countries to return to the grassroots; to reassert the 
"tradition" and core of the discipline as a field subject, not simply a data manipulation subject; in 
this fashion I believe we can contribute" (McGee, 1974, p. 42). 
 Development organizations shifting to „integrated rural development‟ projects now 
required an expanded cache of technical skills to design, implement and evaluate projects 
(Riddell, 2007).  Donors began reaching out to academics, health experts and farmers.  The UN 
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General assembly (despite the shift in focus) proclaimed the 1970s as the „second decade of 
development‟.  However, the cataclysm of the student demonstrations in May 1968, the 1973 
Yom Kippur War, the 1973 embargo on Oil by Arab states, and the 1973 Pinochet Coup 
contributed to tremendous upheaval in developing and developed countries and negatively 
impacted giving for the rest of the decade.  During this period, Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) began to emerge as churches could no longer 
afford to provide much of the school and hospital services.  Students that travelled to poor 
countries as volunteers under development organizations began to return to establish many of the 
NGOs (Riddell, 2007).  
 Based on the experience of the Asian Tigers, the 1980s saw the rise of laissez faire 
thinking and policies which argued that governments should liberalize their economies in favor of 
free trade and acknowledged the importance of private markets (Bauer, 1981; Peet, 2003; Moyo, 
2009).  If the 1970s were the decade focused on poverty, the 1980s were nearly the eclipse of 
poverty from the new neoliberal development paradigm (Riddell, 2007).  The shift from direct 
interventions to the impediments of growth put governments in the crosshairs as an obstacle of 
progress.  According to Peet (2003), aid became conditional based on adherence to a free-trade 
agenda that had spread from domestic politics in the U.S. and U.K. into the World Bank and IMF.  
Interestingly, two reports written in the defense of foreign aid  at the time (Brandt, 1980; Brandt, 
1983) give little mention of a neoliberal agenda in their attempt to address criticisms of aid.  As 
aid retracted, NGO presence expanded rapidly to fill gaps in provision of services.  Despite these 
challenges and some would say in response to their outcomes (Riddell, 2007), aid began to rise in 
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the last half of the decade, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) would actually double for 
the second time since the 1960s.  
 During the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa begins to emerge in high profile reports detailing 
the plight of this region based on climatic themes and proposing a doubling of the amount of aid 
given to these countries (World Bank, 1981; McNamara, 1985).  During this period, there was yet 
another expansion in the number of human resource experts required to design, implement and 
evaluate projects (Riddell, 2007).  A World Bank report (1989) described the problems of this 
region as a function of donor and external actor involvement. It stated that solutions must come 
from Africans: a message that would be echoed in the new millennium.    
 In the 1990s, there was some abandonment of the strict structural adjustment policies 
introduced under the free-trade agenda and aid giving began to decrease based on the emerging 
perception that aid created dependency.  There was also a round of academic studies that 
criticized the use of foreign aid (Boone, 1994; Boone, 1996).  However, while ODA contracted, 
humanitarian and disaster assistance - often in response to natural disasters - doubled and NGOs 
continued to expand across all development sectors (Riddell, 2007).  
 In the new millennium, 2000s, the UN and World Bank were instrumental in reintroducing 
the focus of poverty and promoting a „big push‟ for foreign aid (Riddell, 2007). The notion was 
that a big push was required if countries like Malawi were to break out of their „poverty trap‟. 
According to Sachs (2005), with focused attention by both African countries and the international 
community, Africa could achieve a takeoff in rural-led growth.  
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"Ending poverty in Malawi will require a coherent and comprehensive program of 
debt relief. It will also require an honest delivery of the commitments made at the 
many high-level meetings - Rio [1992], Monterrey [2002] and Gleneagles [2005]- 
of new funding" (Conroy, 2006, p. 230).  
International organizations, building on years of experience since the Pearson Report (1969) are 
seeking once again to raise ODA levels and promote immediate action in sub-Saharan Africa 
(UN, 2011).  The creation of the Millennium Development Goals add to the momentousness of 
this new development paradigm as a multivariate approach to vulnerability, introduced to tackle 
poverty, hunger, education, equality, health, HIV/AIDS and the environment.  
 In 2005, the Commission for Africa headed by Tony Blair echoed the need for a „big 
push‟ approach focused on aid, trade and debt relief.  The report would state that prerequisites for 
poverty elimination are governance, peace and security.  Policies must support the recipient 
African countries and channel aid to the areas most in need while reducing conditionality (Blair 
et. al., 2005).    
 As this brief history highlights, development remains infinitely more complex than one 
theory suggests. Just as development theories have promoted academic discourse, the use of 
foreign aid to address the issues in Africa has been no less contentious (Downing, 1991; Moyo, 
2009). The very concept of aid in Africa rose out of a desire to increase economic growth and 
decrease poverty.  However, between 1970 and 1998 when foreign aid transfers were at their 
highest, the poverty rate in Africa rose from 11 percent to 66 percent (Moyo, 2009).  The 1960s as 
the Development Decade, failed to deliver lasting growth. The 1970's focus on the poor failed to 
reduce poverty. The 1980's focus on structural adjustments and economic stabilization failed to 
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stabilize the markets. The 1990's focus on dependency and governance failed to gain traction in 
an era of despots and dictators.  In the last decade, there has been a revolving door of ideas that 
have culminated in big projects (Millennium Challenge Account), poverty reduction (U.N. 
Millennium Development Goals), good governance and democracy (USAID) and market 
stabilization (IMF). With seemingly limitless energy, theories die, are resurrected, and spawn new 
hybrids of old ideas (Annis, 1988).  How can there be such resurgence of failed ideas when the 
fact that development didn't achieve its objectives is so obvious?  
 Leading economists have fragmented between those calling for more aid in what is called 
another 'big push' and those seeking to discontinue aid and allow Africa to develop home-grown 
solutions without the incentive of Western money to continue an aid dependent path. Despite 
these disparate opinions of the past or proposals for the future, most pundits agree that aid - under 
the current model - is not very effective.   
“The world of aid is not a single unified system. There is not and has never been a 
master plan or even a rough blueprint for delivering aid and ensuring it is used 
efficiently and effectively” (Riddell, 2007, 51). 
Therefore, should international development resulting in adaptation strategies be a model for the 
future?  
ADAPTATION: WHO OR WHAT ADAPTS? 
 To establish adaptation within the intersecting literature used to define it, an investigation 
must include disciplines of political science, economics, ecology, environmental science, 
psychology, archaeology and mathematics (Jansen et. al., 2006).  Scholarly work on adaptation in 
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the social sciences can be traced back to early 1900s research in anthropology, but it was not until 
the 1990s that most researchers began to use adaptation in the context of global environmental 
change (Smit and Wandel 2006).  Most empirical research on adaptation to date has been 
concentrated on food security, sustainable development and political ecology (Carr 2008).  Only 
recently are themes emerging surrounding environmental governance and the commoditization of 
nature through Liverman (2004), adaptation in the context of vulnerability and resilience by Smit 
(2000) and Turner  (2003) and reframing these concepts in the growing purview of global 
environmental change (Turner et al. 2003; Smith and Wandel 2006; Chapin et al. 2009,). 
 However, lack of definitional consensus permeates even a narrow set of subfields that 
focus on human-environment systems.  Brooks (2003, p. 8), describes adaptation as "adjustments 
in a system‟s behavior and characteristics that enhance its ability to cope with external stress". 
Smit and Wandel (2006), in the context of climate change, refer to adaptation as "adjustments in 
ecological-socio-economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli, their effects 
or impacts."  Pielke (1998, p. 159), also in the climate context, defines adaptations as the 
"adjustments in individual groups and institutional behavior in order to reduce society‟s 
vulnerability to climate." Chapin et al., (2009, p. 8) use the definition of adaptation in its most 
general sense, "an adjustment to change in environment."   
 These seemingly small definitional differences can lead research and applied development 
in varied directions of coping , socio-economic and ecological system adjustments, institutional 
responses to vulnerability or over-generalized bewilderment, respectively. Numerous definitions 
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of adaptation found in climate change literature are mostly variations on a common theme (Smit 
and Wandel, 2006), but these disparities still complicate empirical research.   
 The social-ecological approach to adaptation represents decades of coupling disciplines 
with contrasting epistemological traditions into a common approach centered on community, 
household and nature.  This reputation of consensus in research should be replicated among the 
disciplines and communicated to policy and development practitioners.  Diane Liverman in a 
lecture at the University of Texas (2011) stated that her preference for researching adaptation 
projects was with a political-ecology framework, but there is difficulty in communicating these 
findings to policy-makers unfamiliar with P-E jargon.  She had to reach out to policy-makers on 
their terms. If each entity continues to operate within the bounded rationality of their definitions 
and agenda it may prevent the exchange of ideas, lessons learned and best-practices.  
 Just as O'Brien and Holland (1992) indicated that definitions of adaptation in the 
evolutionary-biology literature are "so numerous that they would easily fill the space taken up by 
this paper", definitions in the context of climate change are no exception.  Schipper (2007) 
highlights 10 variations in a broad review of climate adaptation foundations and progressions.  
Levina and Tirpak (2006) highlight four disparate definitions currently in use by global policy-
makers.  Roberts and Peratsakis (2009) identified 19 variations from 15 official sources in their 
efforts to identify and track adaptation activities.  A bibliometric analysis by Janssen et. al. (2006) 
reveals that the true extent of adaptation and related knowledge domains of resilience and 
vulnerability include 2,286 publications between 1967 and 2005.  A review on these themes is 
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organized to generate a conceptual framework for adaptation and synthesize some the earlier and 
most relevant works into a usable social-ecological context.  
Resilience 
 First introduced by Holling in 1973 in the field of ecology, resilience is a measure of the 
ability of a system to absorb change of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still 
persist (Jansen et. al., 2006).  Walker et. al. (2002) would later define resilience as the potential of 
a system to remain in configuration and to maintain its feedbacks and functions.  These 
definitions are indicators of strength and flexibility.  Resilience is stated by Smit and Wandel 
(2006) and Chapin et. al. (2009) as having a very similar meaning to adaptive capacity.  The 
relationship between adaptive capacity and vulnerability depends crucially on the timescales of 
the hazards concerned (Brooks et. al., 2005). 
Vulnerability 
 Vulnerability is a pivotal issue in climate change and often the dependent variable in risk 
analysis and adaptation development models.  It is also often used as a probability metric in the 
disaster communities to measure the degree to which a system is likely to experience harm due to 
exposure or sensitivity (Schipper, 2007).  However, research has demonstrated that vulnerability 
is not just an issue of exposure to hazards but also sensitivity and resilience of the system 
experiencing such hazards (Turner et. al., 2003).  Vulnerability analysis has become a popular 
initiative in climate research to determine where humans and environments are most exposed to 
52 
 
climatic changes and where social and biophysical breakdowns create sensitivity to such exposure 
(see Brooks et. al., 2003; Busby et. al., 2010; Transparency International, 2011, p. 16).   
 In Figure 5 Turner et. al. (2003) place resilience within the domain of vulnerability as a 
useful way using resilience to moderate vulnerability and affect exposure and sensitivity to reach 
an outcome of adaptation according to appropriate scales.   
Figure 5: Vulnerability Framework (Turner et. al., 2003)  
Adaptation 
 Adaptation has best been defined by the IPCC as adjustments in natural or human systems 
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects and that moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities (Parry et. al., 2007).  Various types of adaptation can be 
distinguished, including anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation (Smit et. al., 2000).  
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This well-formed definition based on historical references and scholarly integration of a social-
ecological context is likely a result of the heavy geographer influence in the IPCC (Head, 2010).  
The second sentence clearly draws on the Smit et. al.‟s (2000) and Smit and Wandel's (2006) 
formative analysis that there are many forms and levels of adaptation that can be classified by 
timing relative to stimulus (anticipatory, concurrent, reactive), intent (autonomous, planned), 
spatial scope (local, widespread) and form (technological, behavioral, financial, institutional, 
informational).   
 It is especially important to note that 'interactions of hazards' tend to be observed at a 
'place' (locally), before they affect 'region' or 'world'.  Therefore, the impacts of climate cannot be 
measured globally until they are first observed locally.  Additionally in this framework, responses 
and adaptations are first determined locally (consciously or unconsciously), before they are 
applied to the macro scale on the human and environmental dimensions through feedback loops.  
Adaptation is an area demanding critical attention to questions of scale (Adger et al., 2003), and 
Head (2010) has stated that it is important that the valorization of the local and the individual in 
adaptation policies does not go unexamined.  Figure 5 uniquely places resilience within a 
vulnerability continuum (perhaps as an opposing force to sensitivity).  This model could be 
improved by incorporating Chapin et. al.'s (2009) spectrum of adaptive responses that more 
intuitively includes coping, adaptation and transformation as degrees of change.   
 The social-ecological approach to adaptation strategy unfortunately does not currently 
provide needed clarity on strategy.  Adaptations can fall on a spectrum of adaptive responses as 
outlined by Chapin et al. (2009, p. 66).  Coping (a short term adjustment to minimize hazard 
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risks) is more of a reactionary response, adaptation (a change in a system that reduces hazard 
risks) is more proactive and transformation (a beneficial conversion to a new system with new 
feedbacks) is most enduring.  However, applied adaptive strategies should go beyond basic 
coping strategies (e.g. food relief) to enact the systematic changes required to reduce exposure to 
hazards.  Providing immediate assistance to people suffering from complex vulnerability is 
perhaps a 'sure-thing' from a development standpoint, but research must be done to determine if 
coping is a viable development strategy in the context adaptation because evidence suggests that 
it does little to aid people past the next hazard, season or harvest (Kelley and Adger, 2000).  
 There are now numerous social-ecological models worth consideration (Chapin et. al, 
2009, p. 7, 21; Collins et. al, 2011).  Exploring foundations of resilience, vulnerability and 
adaptation in a literature reveals how impacts and observations of climate change are local before 
they are global.  It also demonstrates how improving feedback mechanisms through important 
connections among scales (Slocum, 2004) are essential to an adaptation process.  They are what 
adapt.  This body of work displays how scholars have successfully sought to bridge the gap 
between human and environmental systems in a logical and coherent manner.  Turner's model 
highlights the essentiality of observations and solutions being derived at 'place' before 'world'.  
This is who adapts.  In Malawi, where dependence on subsistence agriculture and natural 
resources are near the highest in the world (Collier et. al., 2008), solutions must increase 
resilience by increasing options, decrease exposure and sensitivity, and they must improve 
process dynamics and feedbacks.  
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VULNERABILITY: ADAPT TO WHAT? 
 When planning adaptation as a response to climate change, it is widely acknowledged that 
activities are rarely going to address climatic hazards alone (Smit and Wandel, 2006; Schipper, 
2007; Head, 2010); adaptation tends to be a more cross-cutting issue.  The objective of adaptation 
is to reduce vulnerability, yet this goal is a similar central tenant to a number of strategies that 
include poverty reduction, AIDS, hunger and biodiversity conservation.  For adaptive responses 
to be effective in the future, they will have to move beyond a climate-only stimulus or sensitivity 
(Head, 2010).  A comprehensive vulnerability analysis accounts for the total system and research 
must be cognizant that "vulnerability rests in a multifaceted coupled system with connections 
operating at different spatiotemporal scales and commonly involving stochastic and nonlinear 
processes" (Turner et. al., 2003. p. 8076).  What Turner et. al. (2003) describes is what this 
researcher posits as complex vulnerability.  When one of the components is stressed, the many 
failures in addressing other vulnerabilities, such as poverty, is easily highlighted (Schipper, 2007).  
 Illustration 1 shows this complex network as a web of vulnerability pathways commonly 
attributed in research to the social-ecological environment in southern Africa.  This analysis is not 
a categorical statement of southern Africa but illuminates broader connections of vulnerability 
analysis with other fields already active in discussions of climate.  
 Hypotheses attributed to each of these connections are listed below, where references 
represent a start-point for future systematic research.  These hypotheses of overlapping and 
interacting vulnerabilities represent the most relevant and timely research in these knowledge 
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domains.  The hypotheses are not statements of fact, but explored linkages that have exhibited 
initial trends and evidence.  They are grouped by letters that correspond to linkages in Illustration 
1 at the end of this section.  
A. Poverty and Hunger- 1) If a person is poor, then he/she may be less likely to have 
sufficient arable land and agricultural inputs for subsistence. 2) If a person does not have 
enough food to subsist, then he/she may not have food to sell in a market to gain income.  
(Conroy, 2006). 
B. Poverty and AIDS- 1) If a person is in extreme poverty, then he/she may be more likely to 
engage in transactional sex leading to HIV and AIDS (Magrath, 2009). 2) If a person is 
suffering from AIDS, then the resultant loss of productivity or loss of a breadwinner may 
result in individual or household poverty  (Gillespie, 2006). 
C. Hunger and AIDS- 1) If a person is suffering from extreme hunger, then she  may engage 
in transactional sex to feed her family or herself - leading to HIV and AIDS. (Magrath, 
2009) 2)  If a person is suffering from AIDS, then a resultant loss of productivity on the 
farm and family members’ loss of productivity to care for them may result in insufficient 
crop yields and hunger  (McMichael et. al., 2008). 
D. 1) Malaria to Hunger- If a person contracts malaria during a critical planting  or 
husbandry period, then  it could result in a poor harvest and household malnutrition. 
(Conroy, 2006). 2) Malaria to Poverty- If a person contracts malaria then the resultant 
loss of productivity or loss of a breadwinner may result in individual or household 
poverty. (Conroy, 2006).  
E. Malaria and AIDS- 1) Pregnant women that are HIV positive may have a higher density 
of peripheral and placental parasitaemia (McMichael et. al., 2008). 2) People with HIV or 
AIDS suffer from an immune deficiency that leaves their body susceptible to external 
attack (Conroy, 2006) 
F. Hunger to Mortality- Severe and moderate malnutrition may be a contributing factor in 
more than 50 percent of child deaths.  (Conroy, 2006; Magrath, 2009).  
G. Malaria to Mortality- Malaria is responsible for almost 20 percent of deaths of children 
in Africa. (World Health Organization, 2009). 
H. AIDS to Mortality- Every day in every Traditional Authority in Malawi there is a funeral 
due to AIDS (Conroy, 2006).  
I. AIDS and Orphan Care- Children are especially vulnerable as orphans that lose both 
parents to AIDS. They are less likely to be educated, immunized, well-fed or protected 
from poverty or exposure to transactional sex. (Conroy, 2006).  
J. Poverty and Livelihoods- 1) If a person is poor, then he/she is likely to seek alternative 
livelihoods or diversify their livelihood activities (Specialist to Generalist) (Fisher, 2010). 
2) If a person's livelihood is disrupted, then he/she is likely to experience income shocks.  
(Ellis, 1998) 
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K. Hunger to Livelihoods- 1) If a person experiences a bad harvest, he/she will likely seek 
alternative livelihoods to buy food.  2) If a person's livelihood is disrupted, then he/she is 
likely to experience hunger.  (Fisher, 2010). 
L. Hunger to Environment- If a person experiences a bad harvest, he/she may extract 
natural resources (legally or illegally) as income to buy food. (Magrath, 2009). Forests 
act as safety nets—forest foods help the rural poor survive famine, and forest resources 
are important sources of cash earnings which help cope with weather-related crop failure. 
(Fisher, 2010) 
M. Poverty to Environment- Without a solution to the pervasive poverty, further 
catastrophic decline in natural resources is inevitable. (Scherr, 2000).  
N. Environment to Hunger- Depletion of soil fertility, along with the concomitant problems 
of weeds, pests, and diseases, is a major biophysical cause of low per capita food 
production in Africa. (Downing, 1997; Sanchez, 2002) 
O. Environment to Climate Change- Environmental degradation interacts with climatic 
change at the local level, notably deforestation, agricultural expansion on marginal lands, 
loss of soil fertility and wild fires (Magrath, 2009) 
 
 
Illustration 1: Vulnerability Web (Malawi) 
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 Understanding the complexity of these relationships is imperative to understanding how 
climate change may not be a vulnerability unto itself, but a vulnerability enhancer that will work 
through an intricate and multifaceted network of suffering.  Many of these climatic relationships 
have already been observed:  
X1.  Climate Change to Infectious Disease (and AIDS) - Academics in 
cooperation with UNEP and UNAIDS (McMichael et. al., 2008) have a rich 
literature review that highlights the link between climate change and infectious 
disease.  Additionally, they echo the hypothesis that there is increased likelihood 
of HIV/AIDS (unmarked dotted arrow) through the vulnerability pathways of food 
insecurity, infectious disease and social disruptions affected by climate change.  
X2.  Climate Change to Food Insecurity- Lobdell et. al. (2008) completed an 
analysis of crops in 12 food-insecure regions globally based on 20 local circulation 
models projecting the climate in 2030.  This intense statistical analysis of crop 
vulnerabilities finds that based on such models, Southern African maize is in the 
greatest danger agriculturally and in the most need of adaptation interventions.  
X3.  Climate Change to Threatened Livelihoods-  Brown et. al. (2007) highlight 
several conditions in which livelihoods will be susceptible to climate change  that 
include resource scarcity, declined quality of life, restriction on survival strategies 
that include charcoal  production and wild food collection and displacement.  
Numerous studies (Allen, 2006; Blanco, 2006; Brown et. al., 2007; Schipper, 
2007; Carr, 2010) have now advocated a sustainable livelihoods approach that 
includes diversification of livelihoods, co-management of natural resources and 
new agricultural technologies to cope with future scenarios.  
X4.  Climate Change to The Environment- Climate changes impact on the 
environment is well documented in the fourth assessment report of the IPCC 
59 
 
(Parry et. al., 2007).  These include biological changes in range, abundance, 
phenology, and species decoupling.  In Southern Africa, a .6
o
C rise in temperature 
has been documented along with projections for increased frequency and intensity 
of precipitation events (Collier et. al., 2008; Busby et. al., 2010).  
 Water resource connections is included in Illustration 1 (as dotted lines), but the concept 
is not explored in this review and represents an opportunity for future research.  Some of the most 
evidentiary impacts of climate change are observable through variations in water resources (Parry 
et. al., 2007).  Additionally, the nexus of climate change and conflict is not explored in this 
review (or Illustration 1), but numerous studies (Brown et. al., 2007; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; 
Raleigh and Jordan, 2008; Busby, 2009) are dedicated to this notion.  What remains clear, even 
with these unexamined issues, is that climate change interacts through a web of contextual 
vulnerability pathways, or 'interaction of hazards' from Turner et. al. (2003) Figure 5.  
 The web of vulnerability pathways (Illustration 1) touches upon cross-cutting issues of 
health, livelihood, food security and the environment or what can neatly be regarded as well-being 
or quality of life.  Once it is better understood how perceived climatic changes intersect with 
existing vulnerabilities, this knowledge can lead to better development through an adaptation 
process that more holistically approaches quality of life issues.  Given this rationale, places to 
examine adaptation interventions and activities are in development, agriculture and the 
environment (explored in section IV).  These are distinct sectors of research where the timeliest 
issues of climate change vulnerability have manifested.   
60 
 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:  HOW WILL ADAPTATION OCCUR? 
 Adaptation to climate change is not as simple as designing projects, drawing up lists of 
possible adaptation measures and implementing, but concepts set out in policy-oriented academic 
literature have provided scarce practical guidance for policy makers (Schipper, 2007). It may be  
difficult to determine how IOs intend to help people adapt (Brooks et. al., 2011), but development 
projects will continue to be the dominant mechanism with which the international community 
provides assistance to less developed countries.  IOs are once again conducting pilot studies, 
hiring new expertise and collecting evidence on which strategies demonstrate the best results. 
Moreover, adaptation has become a powerful tool in the arsenal of these organizations and it is 
now embedded in the lexicons of nearly every development agency and international 
organization. That said, these organizations offer few suggestions as to what adaptation actually 
looks like at the project and village level.  Majority of the development literature is pushing 
forward the concept that existing forms of development strategy and activities are serendipitous to 
helping people adapt, where adaptation is a co-benefit to existing strategies, such as sustainable 
development (Schipper, 2009).  Other literature proposes that mainstreaming - a popular term 
used to describe the integration of adaptation activities (nebulous) with existing strategies - be a 
way forward (USAID, 2011).  Despite this intention to move forward with this new strategy, there 
appears to be little consensus within and between international organizations on what adaptation 
is. An OECD study by Levina and Tirpak (2006) looked at the differences and complexity of key 
terms used by development organizations to inform climate policy.  Within their research, four 
definitions of adaptation were included:  
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Adaptation - Actions taken to help communities and ecosystems cope with 
changing climate conditions, such as the construction of flood walls to protect 
property from stronger storms and heavier precipitation, or the planting of 
agricultural crops and trees more suited to warmer temperatures and drier soil 
conditions (UNFCCC Secretariat). 
Adaptation - Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, 
including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and 
autonomous and planned adaptation (IPCC 2001).  
Adaptation is a process by which strategies to moderate, cope with and take 
advantage of the consequences of climatic events are enhanced, developed, and 
implemented. (UNDP 2005).  
Adaptation – The process or outcome of a process that leads to a reduction in 
harm or risk of harm or realization of benefits associated with climate variability 
and climate change.  (UK Climate Impact Program 2003). 
 These definitions offer even more complexity to those previously discussed in Section II.  
The impetus for the OECD study was to develop a common understanding of the terms and 
concepts that are widely used to define the scope of adaptation work and funding expectations. 
Another UNDP definition from their website of key terms offers a poignant example of agenda-
setting embedded in definitions. 
Adaptation- Changing existing policies and practices and adopting new policies and 
practices so as to secure Millennium Development Goals in the face of climate change and 
its associated impacts (UNDP 2006). 
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 As funding increases for climate related projects, these definitions will be key to the 
tracking of 'new and additional' funds.  While it is acknowledged that adaptation defined too 
narrowly may exclude some positive interventions, defined too broadly adaptation may introduce 
unintended activities that do not properly address complex vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, with so 
many organizations -sometimes operating in a vacuum from each other - any lack in coordination 
can potentially perpetuate disparities in implementing strategies.  At this early stage, a mix of 
ideas and concepts could prove beneficial to the experimental stage of this strategy, but in the 
long term, strategies should converge on those that are most appropriate and effective.   
 In terms of up-scaling adaptation to a more robust national or global strategy, adaptation 
can be egalitarian - targeting the people with the greatest vulnerability to climate change - or 
utilitarian - targeting the largest number of people in need.  However, as discussed earlier, 
adaptation is not easily measurable by outcome and it is unclear what approach to climate 
vulnerability and adaptation development organizations will take.  One way advocates robust, 
climate-relevant projects that address vulnerability to long-term climate change (Kelly and Adger, 
2000; Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Schipper (2009) argues that vulnerability must first be reduced 
through targeted climate-aware development practice („climate proof‟ development) in order for 
natural adaptation to take place.  These variations will have meaningful impacts on the how and 
who of adaptation. 
 Sustainable development is an emerging theme in development that seeks to implement 
projects in a way that meets the needs of present and future generations and includes parameters 
of social, economic and environmental well-being (Chapin et. al., 2009).  Numerous examples 
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exist where adaptation activities are viewed as being synonymous with sustainable development 
(Allen, 2006; Blanco, 2006; Schipper, 2007; Carr, 2010).  Another multisectoral approach to 
well-being and development are the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which 
represent a departure from previous strategies by setting tangible goals in sectors of poverty, 
education, equality, health and environment (United Nations, 2011).  Realizing these development 
goals will require a multi-scale commitment to public service, integrity and dedication (Conroy, 
2006).   However, Carr (2008) highlights some important conceptual challenges to the 
implementation of the goals and the experiment of Millennium Village Projects: 1) They will 
have difficulty accounting for the impacts of pre-conceived frameworks and identification of local 
problems and solutions, 2) addressing the diversity of people and problems at the village scale 
cannot be achieved through treatment as an undifferentiated group,  3) failure to identify complex 
linkages of local problems and solutions across sectors, and 4) sustaining project interventions.  
These challenges were incorporated into the necessary conditions for effective adaptation strategy 
highlighted in the introduction.  Finally, poverty reduction strategies and income diversification 
strategies (Fisher et. al., 2010) represent yet another shift in the nature of development assistance.  
All of these strategies are contingent on community participation and buy-in.  Therefore, they still 
represent top-down initiatives, but communities are a key stakeholder with some say.  Ideally, 
adaptation would represent a bottom-up process where governments and development 
organizations would stand ready to provide assistance where and how requested.  There is little 
evidence to support this conclusion.  
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 Adaptation is likely to overlap and intersect with many of these emerging strategies as it is 
mainstreamed by development organizations into existing project portfolios (UNDP, 2004; 
UNFCCC, 2007).  Whether adaptation comes under the purview of existing strategies, becomes a 
discrete development paradigm or is relabeled and green-washed is a source of heated debate that 
appears dominated by negotiations of international and bilateral governments (Michaelowa, 2007; 
McGray, 2009).  These approaches to well-being are an evident shift in development strategy that 
can truly change the nature of how adaptation will occur.  Therefore, future research must 
adequately engage development policy and literature, and academics must continue to close the 
gap between globalized theory and practice with feedbacks of observations and solutions from the 
community and household level. 
 In addition to these development strategies, there is a lot of evidence to support adaptation 
as a food security activity (Downing, 1997; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2000; Burton et. al., 2006; 
FAO, 2011).  Farming is an investment into the environment, whereby farmers hope that time, 
labor, capital, and technology will yield in return food and income.  There is also considerable 
risk and uncertainty imposed by temperature, precipitation, soil fertility and pests (Sanchez, 
2002).  The climate - in the form of temperature and precipitation - has the potential to 
dramatically impact the farmer's investment and alter well-being.  It is to this end that farmers are 
much attuned to biophysical changes affecting their livelihoods (Fisher et. al., 2010).  Climate, 
agriculture and well-being are shrewdly connected in a way that leaves little opportunity for 
farmers to escape the extremes of nature without tremendous modifications to livelihoods.  
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 Perhaps nowhere is this relationship more poignant than in Southern Africa (Downing, 
1997; Busby et. al., 2010).  Here, extremes in precipitation in the form of droughts and floods are 
expected to occur with greater intensity and frequency (Collier et. al., 2008; McSweeny et. al., 
2008).  Lobdell et. al.'s (2008) research further demonstrates that subsistence farmers, especially 
those growing maize in Southern African, will face some of the most significant risk if climate 
models are accurate.  It is in this context that an evaluation of two recent and dichotomous social-
ecological paradigms rooted in themes of global environmental change and agriculture is so 
timely.  
 Perfecto et. al. (2009) advocates a matrix approach to agriculture and land conservation 
under a social framework that promotes food sovereignty and preservation of indigenous 
livelihoods.  Another approach (Grau and Aide, 2008; Grau et. al., 2008) promotes land-sparing 
through agricultural intensification and a departure from indigenous livelihoods through rural to 
urban migration.  These two paradigms are evaluated as potential adaptation strategies.   
 Of the two approaches, the matrix appears to be the better fit for southern Africa where 
maize accounts for 60% of cropped area (Conroy, 2006) and Perfecto's paradigm seeks to 
improve the investments of farmers in the environment.  Subsistence farming is a dominant 
activity (Collier et. al., 2008) and Perfecto's small-holder approach to agriculture does not 
represent a disruptive shift in livelihood strategies.  Many of the activities advocated, such as crop 
rotations, crop diversification, fallowing, intercropping, agroforestry and use of organic fertilizer 
(Perfecto et. al., 2009, p. 183) are currently being employed through an adaptation strategy called 
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conservation agriculture - widely acknowledge as a paradigm in its own right (Dumanski et. al., 
2006; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; FAO,  2011). 
 Perfecto's pillar of biodiversity conservation does not represent a radical shift in the 
livelihoods of most Southern Africans (Perfecto et. al., 2009, p. 122-123).  However, Perfecto's 
imperative for social movements to challenge free market trade policies seems less suited for a 
southern African smallholder farmer. 
 Where Perfecto's strategies appear to breakdown, Grau et. al.'s (2008) theories appear to 
be strong in contrast.  Many of the countries in southern Africa are growing and urbanizing 
rapidly (Boko et. al., 2007) and there is increased pressure to feed a rapidly growing population 
(Conroy, 2006).  The large rural populations of southern Africa (as much as 85% in Malawi) put 
tremendous demand on resources and have led to notable land degradation, deforestation, soil 
erosion and soil infertility (Magrath, 2009).  While Perfecto et. al.'s (2009) approach seeks to 
correct many social-ecological issues through agronomic changes, land revaluing and community 
participation, many smallholder farmers in Southern Africa will not have the available arable land 
to perform fallowing rotations, nor income to gain and maintain livestock for organic fertilizer.  
This challenge highlights the need for and the potential of land-sparing.  If even some of the 
population could find opportunities in urban areas, the outmigration and intensification could 
result in more arable land available per farmer.  
 Just as conservation agriculture represents efforts where Perfecto's paradigm is connected 
to adaptive strategy, Malawi is undergoing a food security revolution through intensification of 
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agriculture.  The Farmer Input Subsidy Program is considered by many to be Malawi's green 
revolution and a paragon for neighboring countries seeking to decrease reliance on food aid and 
international assistance (Dumanski et. al., 2006; Conroy, 2006).  This subsidy-based program 
represents a nationalized approach to Grau and Aide's (2008) long term investment in the efficient 
use of agricultural lands.  In the face of adverse donor reactions, and after heated parliamentary 
debate, the Malawi government used discretionary budget funds and support from the UN to 
import fertilizer and procure improved maize seed (hybrid) for distribution to farmers (Denning 
et. al., 2009).  However, a key impediment to the growing of hybrid maize is the need to apply 
fertilizer to achieve yield gains over local varieties of maize (Fisher, 2010).  This additional cost, 
in addition to greater need for pesticides, puts a heavy financial burden on poverty stricken 
families.  Therefore, more research is required to determine how this approach could be an 
effective local-scale adaptation strategy.  
 While the two explored strategies never coalesce, they represent powerful new paradigms 
in addressing how food challenges in Southern Africa can be improved. A conflation of these two 
opposing paradigms into one adaptive strategy requires activities operating at different scales.  
Who will decide is a balance between the livelihood strategies of smallholder farmers and national 
level productivity that reduces international dependency. 
 Africa's environment has been threatened for a long time due to deforestation, soil erosion, 
biodiversity loss and soil infertility (Downing, 1997; World Bank, 2006, Boko et. al., 2007).  
These are pressing issues that, like other complex issues, create vulnerability dynamics in the 
environment and unfavorable feedbacks in ecological services.  The impacts of environmental 
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degradation and change are most severe in the developing world, especially among people living 
in poverty who have the least means to cope (World Bank, 2006).   The IPCC's report on Africa 
(chapter 9) cites significant biophysical changes in range, abundance, phenology, and species 
decoupling.  Impacts are reported and expected across an array of strata that include mountain 
ecosystems, marine coastal systems, increased sensitivity for African mammals (observed in 141 
national parks) with accompanied range loss and complex effects on birds and grasslands.  
However, the report acknowledges that changes are not solely attributable to climate (Boko et. al., 
2007, p. 439), but ecosystem change may be induced by complex land-use and climate 
interactions, including the migration of species, fire and a number of other feedbacks or „knock-
on‟ impacts.  
 Currently, there are a number of adaptation strategies that do seek to integrate 
environmental projects and climate change considerations in a meaningful and coherent manner.  
Conservation agriculture is an example that was explored in the last section.  Perfecto et. al. 
(2009) provides an equally viable matrix framework to biodiversity conservation where 
agricultural systems intersect with stands of informally protected natural land.  Unfortunately, 
deforestation and expansion of agriculture onto marginal land are minimizing this amount of 
reserved space for fallowing and protection.  Preventing these losses is a sociopolitical issue that 
thus far proven ineffective (Fisher et. al., 2010).  Recent efforts have sought to connect observable 
changes in the environment with the local effect of degradation in an effort to create buy-in for 
conservation and protection initiatives (Nangoma and Nangoma, 2008; Carr, 2008).  New 
strategies seek to incorporate community participation, increase local valuing of natural resources 
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and promote co-management of forests (Allen, 2006; Blanco, 2006; Nangoma and Nangoma, 
2008; Chapin et. al., 2009; Brondizio et. al., 2009).    
 Another approach is when adaptation becomes a co-benefit (or added activity) to existing 
biophysical or environmental projects.  In Malawi, what began as a biodiversity conservation 
project in Mulanje Mountain Forest Reserve later expanded to include local conservation of 
forests, livelihood diversification and adaptation through irrigation projects (Nangoma and 
Nangoma, 2008).  This integration of strategies could become a common and viable trend, where 
environmental NGOs and communities seek to increase receive benefits from sustainable 
extraction programs or gain access to an increasing supply of adaptation funding.  
 What is just as important for the environment are activities of mitigation that have the 
potential to alter the physical landscape of developing countries and add barriers for vulnerable 
populations dependent on natural resources (Transparency International, 2011).  However, unlike 
adaptation projects, mitigation activities do not require much buy-in or community participation 
(Pielke, 2008), and these two categories of climate-relevant projects can sometimes work against 
each other.  Despite the challenges of employing mitigation projects in a low carbon-emission 
country like Malawi,  there are many examples where afforestation, reforestation and REDD 
activities have been integrated into natural resource management and forestry co-management 
programs (Blanco, 2006; Nangoma and Nangoma, 2008). These projects, while providing carbon 
benefits, are more important because of how they are tackling Malawi's deforestation issues.  
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 When it comes to the environment, the how is a complicated mix of policy prevention and 
community revalorizing of the landscape.  With decreased pressure on the amount of arable land, 
Perfecto's paradigm would represent a logical and non-disruptive pathway towards resource and 
biodiversity protection.  However, just as social vulnerability is complex, environmental 
feedbacks and services are equally multifaceted.  External designs of conservation and mitigations 
represent a concerning dynamic in who gets to decide.  Adaptation represents a non-disruptive 
strategy to add environmental sustainability to social projects and more beneficial ecological 
services to environmental projects.  
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Chapter 3 - Multi-level Interviews 
Objective 1: Qualitatively study the perceptions of vulnerability, climate change, foreign 
aid, governance and effective adaptation at different levels in Malawi 
 Multi-level interviews are critical for understanding an aid process that is reported to 
function dissimilarly at different levels and will illuminate positions of power, understanding, 
commitment and cohesion related to adaptation as a development strategy.  The focus of these 
interviews in addition to perceptions of climate change, adaptation, governance, vulnerability and 
foreign aid was on understanding local economic and agricultural practices in the context of 
environmental uncertainty.   Community implementers of several adaptation projects were also 
interviewed to assess perceptions of externally designed adaptation at the point of implementation 
and discover internally resolved solutions.  Community level interviews were then interpreted 
with semi-structured interviews of International Aid Organizations, Government Ministries and 
Non-Governmental Organizations.  Multilevel interviews help elucidate the goals and perceptions 
of adaptation as a unique social-environmental project.  Process tracing interviews with experts 
constructs a baseline of the Government of Malawi‟s (GoM) institutional capacity and the level of 
coordination present among stakeholders to respond to climate change with the hope that both 
will improve over time.   
 Malawi‟s response to climate change is characterized by a complex array of interacting 
institutions and organizations with overlapping and varying objectives, levels of authority and 
strengths of linkages.  Within this complexity is the need to understand how vulnerability is 
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measured, how climate policies are conceived, who key actors are in pushing what policies and 
how these strategies are transmitted and received down to the lowest levels in Malawi.  It 
becomes evident that at least some of these questions can be answered by exploring climate 
adaptation as a process from the designer and funder to the policy maker and project implementer. 
As Oisin Tasney states in a 2007 political science journal, “process tracing provides a crucial 
method for the analysis of complex political phenomena.”  Process training has been popularized 
in disciplines of political science and international relations, but this research is also geographic in 
nature and benefits immensely from understanding processes working at various levels and scales.  
PROCESS TRACING 
The goal of process tracing (Tansey, 2009) is to uncover obscured information and 
illuminate critical details that are embedded with the experts, key actors and -in the case of 
Malawi- the products of such policies and strategies. Understanding unique perspectives within 
and about Malawi‟s polycentric reaction to climate change is paramount to a discussion of 
adaptive strategy in the context of vulnerability, development and governance.  In process tracing, 
it is necessary to examine histories, archival documents, and other sources to identify the causal 
processes, decision chain and independent variables, but interviews serve as one of the central 
tools in this process (George and Bennet, 2005).  In this thesis, these steps were partially met 
through an extensive literature review of existing climate policy and careful research of 
documents from international organizations, the GOM, civil society organizations and donors. 
However, interviews are the critical component that adds qualitatively to the narrative of 
Malawi‟s climate scenario and will create a foundation for future empirical research. 
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The process in Malawi that this thesis is tracing is the development side of climate policy 
in the form of adaptation projects.  To understand the process, research must uncover 1) who 
designs policy and strategy, 2) who financially backs policy and strategy, 3) who implements 
these ideas and 4) who are the beneficiaries of such conceptions.     
EXPERT SAMPLING 
To achieve such an understanding, purposive expert sampling is methodologically the best 
approach to unraveling some of this complexity. Expert sampling is well suited in process tracing 
because is not centered on the acquisition of statistical data to create a representative sample of 
the populations to use as a basis of generalizations (O‟Leary, 2004). Random sampling is not 
always the best methodology to reveal the process behind a complex phenomenon.  In fact, 
random sampling is counter-productive to process tracing since it can potentially exclude 
interviews with „information rich‟ individuals (Tansey, 2009).  In this type of qualitative study, 
the goal is actually variation among a range of variables rather than generalization to better 
understand each factor that adds to the complexity of a process (Trost, 1986). In Malawi's case it 
could be the influence of funders on policy-makers, the relationship of project implementers and 
beneficiaries or numerous other variations.  
Expert interviews can assist to accomplish four simultaneous objectives as outlined by 
Tansey (2009):  First, they can corroborate what has been established from other sources. Second, 
they can establish what a set of people think and identify meta-themes. Third, they infer about a 
larger population‟s characteristics and decisions. Finally, expert interviews can help reconstruct 
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an event or set of events. In the context of this research, all of these objectives are relevant and 
important.  
An excellent example of using process tracing in a development is Corrine Glesne‟s 
seminal article “The impossibility of Doing Good”. Focused on a USAID project on the Island of 
St. Vincent in 1982-1983, she conducted interviews with various stakeholders to this project. Her 
interviews illuminated positions of power, misunderstandings, and varying degrees of 
commitment and cohesion (Glesne, 1984).  This research reveals that each person comes to a 
situation with a different perspective and suite of knowledge that is critical to informing the larger 
context.   
Critics have raised valid questions concerning the credibility of such a method that allows 
a researcher to select interviewees. These include unwitting bias and erroneous assumptions 
(O‟Leary, 2004), vague and unsystematic sampling methods (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) or 
limitations of representativeness and generalization of the greater population (Tansey, 2009).  All 
of these points are valid considerations incorporated into the methodology and selection process 
outlined below. Bias was limited based on the fact that not all requests for interviews were 
acknowledged and referrals (through a process called snowballing where interviewees provide 
additional contacts to the researcher) led to some interviews that would not have otherwise been 
arranged.  In addition, opportunistic sampling (a process of interviewing random acquaintances) 
added the potential for a broader audience to be interjected into the overall narrative. The 
introduction of this new material, while not in itself unbiased, can serve as a launching pad for 
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future empirical research tied to more statistically rigorous methodologies such as random 
controlled sampling. 
INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
Stratified subgroups- As a means of organizing the positions and opinions on vulnerability, 
adaptation, development, capacity and coordination, interviewees must be organized by subgroup.  
This process created a first challenge in the research.  As stated above, this thesis is attempting to 
identify designers, funders, implementers and beneficiaries to various climate policies and 
projects. However, three examples below provide evidence of how such a categorization may 
make this a poor way to stratify the groups. 
1. The Managing Adaptation to Climate Change Project, which seeks to improve rural 
livelihoods through the use of conservation agriculture was designed and implemented by a 
regional NGO (Total Land Care), funded by a bilateral donor (Norway) with the beneficiaries 
as rural small holders  spread across many villages in two neighboring districts. 
2.   The Community-based Adaptation for Rural Livelihoods and Agriculture Project seeks to 
decrease vulnerability of rural population through implementation of adaptive strategies and 
alternative livelihoods. It is designed by the Global Environmental Facility, funded by the 
World Bank Least Developed Countries Fund, Implemented by the African Development 
Bank and Malawi Environmental Affairs Department with beneficiaries currently in three 
pilot-study villages in three separate districts.   
3.  The National Programme for Managing Climate Change is a governance and capacity 
building project aimed at promoting strategy formulation and policy implementation within 
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the national government. It  is designed, funded and implemented by members of the Joint 
Resilience Unit (a conglomeration of donors in Malawi that now include U.K., Norway, 
Spain, EU, and UN) with beneficiaries consisting of various national level ministries.  
 This would be a perplexing method of grouping and organizing expert interviews since in 
any given project, actors take on different roles. Tracing policy and strategy from design to 
implementation requires a thorough investigation of the existing development aid process.  
Therefore, subgroups were formed with the understanding that on various projects actors will fall 
into different roles of designer, funder, implementer and beneficiary, but their fidelity to an 
organizational agenda is likely principal to roles of function. 
The subgroups include: 
 National Government- Ministries whose mission is to oversee the broad policy, funding 
and regulation within sectors of government.  
 Multilateral and Bilateral Donors- Multilateral donors include international 
organizations such as the World Bank, European Commission, United Nations and 
African Development Bank. These agencies usually represent multiple countries 
working with Malawi on a set of issues.  Bilateral Donors are usually development 
representatives of one individual country (e.g. USAID, DFID, JICA) that has worked 
contractually with the government of Malawi to provide financial assistance.   
 Local Government- Bureaucracies below national government that include district 
executive committees, ministry extension offices or city officials.  
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 International Non-Government Organizations- Extra-governmental organization (e.g. 
Red Cross) to which Malawi is but one program country.  
 Regional and Local Non-Government Organizations- Extra-governmental organizations 
that work only within East Africa, Malawi or one district or village.  
 Village leaders and representatives-  Generally leaders elected or enduring from 
traditional tribal systems that speak on behalf of and represent the interests of a 
conglomeration of households 
Semi-structured interviews were the basis for qualitative information gathering in most 
interviews.  Questions and prompts were designed ahead of time, but pace and question ordering 
was flexible, depending on the discussion and respondent.  Interviewees were encouraged to 
expand on answers and express new information that the interviewee thinks is important.  
Interviewees were asked a set of questions that was unique to their level of agency and 
organization‟s role in shaping an organized response to climate change.  In cases where 
interviews were combined with project site-visits (local NGOs and village leaders), then 
unstructured interviews and focus groups were employed.  
After establishing a baseline of expert interviewees in each stratified subgroup, snowball 
sampling was employed to better access NGOs, local government officials and village leaders 
with more practical knowledge of household vulnerability and adaptive strategy at the points of 
project implementation.  Snowball sampling is particularly useful in accessing populations that 
would otherwise be unreachable (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). In Malawi, where most contacts 
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and connections are undocumented, chain referrals are essential to tracing activities down to the 
lowest scale.   
Non-probabilistic samples are usually conducted when representativeness or generality are 
not a concern within the research design (O‟Leary, 2004).  While the goal of this section is 
expressively not centered on statistical outcomes, this section argues that there is some degree of 
representativeness within and among stratified subgroups.  Nearly every emerging and historical 
department of the Malawi National government with a role in the new National Program on 
Climate Change was selected to interview.  Ten of the top eleven donor organizations (based on 
FY2009 contributions to the Government of Malawi) were selected.  Of the 24 international, 
regional and local non-governmental organizations that have formed the Civil Society Network 
on Climate Change, 14 were opportunistically selected.  While such attempts at 
representativeness cannot lead to scientifically based generalizations, the benefits of such broad-
based and strategic sampling should be apparent.  Where no degree of representation can be 
claimed is among lower hierarchical levels of government, tribal leaders and households where 
only selected districts, traditional authorities and villages were explored. 
The sample size of each sub-group was relatively small. However, this researcher 
generally continued interviews within each group until a satisfactory level of saturation – point at 
which no new information or themes are observed- was reached. This procedure was done on the 
basis that saturation generally occurs within the first 12 interviews and meta-themes are 
established in the first 6 (Guest, et al., 2006).  Because of the institutionalized lack of 
homogeneity within stratified subgroups, sampling size was more contingent on achieving a 
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majority or significant proportion of the total population when it came to development 
organizations and government ministries.  This idea is expressed above in representativeness, 
where a majority of each subgroup was intended to be interviewed in a quota sampling model.  
Following a loose hierarchical model within the existing governance structure, more interviews 
were sought at the lower-level stratified groups.  However, the worlds of aid and policy are not 
stagnant environments waiting for observation.  They are very much fluid and dynamic and 
numerous policies and projects have emerged since and during this research. Therefore, 
representativeness and sampling size are really only justifiable during one episodic snapshot.  
The capacity of interviewees was an important consideration in this purposive sampling 
process.  Within each organization, country directors or program managers were sought based on 
their overall expertise over a range of issues.  Within more complex organizations or at lower 
hierarchical levels, interviewees with more specialized knowledge on climate change 
development or project details were selected. Just as Corrine Glesne did in 1984, this thesis 
sought to illuminate the positions of power, misunderstandings, and varying degrees of 
commitment and cohesion while drawing on the unique perspectives and knowledge that each 
stakeholder brings to the process.    
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 Table 1: Multi-level Semi-structured Interview Design 
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INTERVIEW RESULTS 
 Interviews were conducted by this researcher in Malawi over two visits. Semi-structured 
interviews of international aid organizations, government ministries and non-governmental 
organizations were conducted in Lilongwe, Malawi from March 12-25, 2011. On a second 
extended visit, semi-structured interviews at the local government and community levels were 
conducted in Blantyre, Chikwawa and Mulanje districts from July 10 - August 8, 2011.  The 
breadth of this fieldwork includes over 71 interviews with government and development officials 
conducted over the two research trips.  Development organizations were a central component to 
this research and were selected based on their overall significance to climate and environmental 
projects as well as policy decisions and formulation.  This determination was largely based on the 
total amount of development assistance contributions given by organizations to Malawi as 
determined by the Malawi Ministry of Finance (2010).  Of the top 11 contributors to Malawi's aid 
portfolio, ten agreed to meet with the researcher (or CCAPS team in Malawi) and were 
interviewed.  See Table 2 for the list of the top donors that were selected for interviews.  
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Aid Disbursements to Malawi by Donor 2007/08FY – 2009/10FY 
  2007/08FY 2008/09FY 2009/10FY 
EU $70,727,387  $138,817,040  $154,841,150  
World Bank $66,397,059  $67,171,809  $139,566,116  
DfID (UK) $138,554,449  $109,891,647  $108,281,168  
USAID $57,083,594  $76,741,380  $99,758,097  
United Nations $65,704,563  $91,363,203  $60,717,080  
Norway $69,119,855  $59,194,569  $57,810,857  
AfDB $25,807,143  $70,854,678  $36,368,272  
Global Fund $0  $111,770,649  $29,428,797  
Japan $14,627,943  $22,746,613  $29,191,253  
GIZ (Germany) $15,581,281  $21,273,495  $28,158,152  
Ireland $0  $9,488,284  $15,289,905  
* Researcher was unable to secure an interview with AFDB 
Table 2: Malawi Ministry of Finance- Aid Atlas (2010) 
 What follows is a full list of the interviews conducted. This list is included as an indicator 
to the reader of the diversity, expertise and range of backgrounds of people working on the issue 
of climate change in Malawi.   
Multilateral Development Organizations 
1. European Commission - Head of Rural Development and Food Security 
2. United Nations Development Programme - Assistant Resident Representative: Environment, 
Energy and Climate Change 
3. United Nations Development Programme - Programme Analyst for Climate Change, 
Environment, Energy and Climate Change Cluster,  
4. United Nations Environmental Programme - Policy Strategist for Climate Change Adaptation 
& Development  
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5. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS - Country Coordinator 
6. World Bank - Irrigation & Water Specialist  
 
Bilateral Development Organizations 
1. Irish Aid - Head of Development  
2. Irish Aid - Second Secretary: Finance 
3. United States Agency for International Development -Democracy and Governance Officer 
4. United States Agency for International Development Outreach and Communications Specialist 
5. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation -Second Secretary: Agriculture & Climate 
Change 
6. German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) - Country Director 
7. Japan International Cooperation Agency - Senior Program Officer and Assistant Resident 
Representative 
8. United Kingdom Department for International Development - Climate Change Advisor 
9. Millennium Challenge Account - Coordinator and Point of Contact and Environmental and 
Social Assessment Specialist 
 
Malawi National Government 
1. Ministry of Finance - Economist and Coordinator for Aid Management Platform 
2. The Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services - Department Chief 
Meteorologist  
3. Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee- Technical Advisor, Ministry of Development, 
Planning and Cooperation  
4. Malawi's National Programme for Managing Climate Change - Programme Manager- Climate 
Change, Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation 
5. Environmental Affairs Department (August 8, 2011), Principal Environmental Officer – 
Environmental Affairs Department, Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and 
Environment  
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Malawi Local Government Agencies 
1. Blantyre City Assembly - Director of the Department of Town Planning and Estate Services 
2. Blantyre District Forestry Office - Community Vitalization of the Middle Shire (COVAMS) 
Project Manager 
3. Lower Shire Agricultural Development Division - Chikwawa Crops Officer 
4. Lower Shire Agricultural Development Division - Division Agricultural Development Officer 
for Chikwawa and Nsanje  
5. Chikwawa District Forestry Office - District Forestry Officer 
6. Chikwawa Environmental Affairs Office - Environmental District Officer- Chikwawa 
7. Mulanje Agricultural Development Division - Division Agricultural Development Officer  
8. Mulanje Agricultural Development Division - Agricultural Crops Officer 
 
Civil Society Organizations 
1. CARE - Regional Program Coordinator and Programs Director for Food Security/Economic 
Development 
2. International Food Policy Research Institute - Research Fellow: Development Strategy and 
Governance 
3. Innovations for Poverty Action - Country Director 
4. Total Land Care  Project Manager of Management for Adaptation to Climate Change 
(MACC) 
5. Total Land Care - GIS Specialist 
6. Kickstart UNDP/ATMS Project - Impact Evaluation and Monitoring 
7. Coordination Unit for the Rehabilitation of the Environment - Programme Officer  
8. Civil Society Network on Climate Change - Chair of CISONECC & Director of Churches 
Action in Relief and Development (CARD) 
9. Civil Society Network on Climate Change - Secretariat of CISONEEC & Director of Center 
for Environmental Policy and Advocacy (CEPA) 
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10. Danish Church Aid - Humanitarian Response Officer 
11. Civil Society Agriculture Network - Coordination Officer  
12. Center for Environmental Policy and Advocacy (CEPA) - Communications Officer  
13. Action Aid - Program Officer 
14. Farmers Union Malawi - Program Officer 
15. Evangelical Association of Malawi - Program Officer 
16. Norwegian Church Aid- Program Officer 
17. Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust - Senior Projects Officer 
18. Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust - Programme Officer: Biodiversity Research and 
Monitoring 
19. Sustainable Rural Growth and Development Initiative – Director 
Community and Village Stakeholders 
 Many of the interviews conducted at this level were with Community leaders and village 
stakeholders with a close working knowledge of the development, environmental and climate 
change projects present within their communities.  Village-level stakeholders included village 
leaders and council members and interviews focused discussion on aid projects and general 
household vulnerability related to natural events.  The names of specific interviewees are withheld 
to protect the identity of individuals and remain within the bounds of non-human subjects 
research.  The results of these interviews are included in Chapter 5 under Project Ground-
Truthing Results.   
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Key Findings by Interview Sub-Group 
 What follows is a list of key findings from the interviews conducted - arranged by 
subgroup and following the order delineated above.  
Multilateral Development Organizations 
 Interviews in this sector were mostly comprised of the World Bank, European 
Commission and United Nations (UN).  All of these interviews were conducted in Lilongwe 
where these organizations are headquartered.  The focus of these interviews was on international 
involvement in the formulation of climate change policy and activities, but meta-themes of 
government capacity and donor coordination were also covered.  
 Interviews revealed that there is currently no clear broker for the climate funds that are 
anticipated to start flowing into Malawi.  One UN official stated that they very much want this 
function, but there is a lot of competition for this advisory role from the World Bank.  UNDP's 
major objective is to be an important advisor to the government in the future on climate change 
and they are bringing in a consultant on climate finances, which would help this effort.  The 
World Bank expressed frustration over this competition.  In speaking about the National Climate 
Change Program (NCCP), one official stated "nothing gets done at these meetings because 
everyone wants to be part of these limited funds".  The World Bank at the time of the interview 
(March, 2011) was no longer attending these meetings.  Interviews also converged on current 
tensions between the Environmental Affairs Department (EAD) and Ministry of Development 
Planning and Cooperation (MoDPC) in Malawi‟s government.  The EAD reportedly sees climate 
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change as an environmental issue rather than a social development concern.  The UNDP has an 
embedded support unit in the MoDPC (the focal point for the new NCCP program).   
 In terms of vulnerability, many interviewees felt that the country is barely equipped to 
deal with the current issues (rainfall and drought) of vulnerability that it faces. There is already a 
dry season where absolutely no rain falls, so if the rainy season is then delayed it puts huge 
burdens on farmers that accumulate over time.  However, it is not just climate change. 
Deforestation is a major problem and in terms of electrification, Malawi is the worst country in 
Africa (Interview with MCC, 2011).  Malawi is actually tied with Uganda as the worst in Africa, 
with Uganda having a larger population without electricity (IEA, 2009).  These issues compound 
other problems in Malawi. Without trees, heavy rains will wash away the soil that is already poor 
because of mono-cropping maize.  Flying over Malawi, visitors can see the contrast with other 
neighboring countries –in Malawi most of the forests are gone.  On the other hand, Malawi is full 
of poor people who live on 80 cents a day – can the government tell a farmer that they can‟t feed 
their family because they aren‟t supposed to cut down the remaining trees? 
 All interviewees were confident that climate change is real and is impacting Malawi, but 
that strategies to address these impacts are not always sincere and some skepticisms were raised 
over the notion of addressing climate issues through development.  One multilateral organization 
stated that most ministries in Malawi do not necessarily understand or have a definition for 
climate change, but they are using the rhetoric of climate change more and more.  Ministries are 
now just using “the lingo of climate change” to address the issues that the country already faces. 
Another donor stated that climate change in Malawi has been an issue for about a hundred years, 
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and it is only now that people are talking about climate change and initiatives addressing 
vulnerability are now being called adaptation.  This conflation of issues is an example where 
discussions of climate variability are often merged with those of climate change and these terms 
become used interchangeably.  
 On the coercive power of donors, one multilateral representative that did not want to be 
quoted said that the donors are using their financial leverage to influence how things in Malawi 
play out.  During the period of interviews (March-August, 2011), donors in Malawi threatened to 
pull direct budget support and funding as a result of governance issues.  The donors are drawing 
lines and want Malawi to change its ways.  Malawi is very aid dependent - 40% of the GoM 
budget is international aid- but due to scarce natural resources, Malawi‟s development needs 
cannot be met without aid.  The country's long-term national financial stability is questionable.  
Multilateral development organizations in Malawi stated that they see it as their role to advise the 
government and influence strategy.  They have the financial backing to do so, but when they are 
at contention with the government it becomes obvious that one strategy to induce compliance is to 
threaten to pull out their money.   
Bilateral Development Organizations 
 The nine organizations interviewed in this sector are all headquartered in Lilongwe and 
consist mostly of country development agencies that work in sync with or for their local 
ambassadors.  Countries represented by these organizations include the United States, Ireland, 
Japan, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway.  These organizations represent the largest 
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bilateral aid contributors to Malawi (see Table 2 above).  They are agencies that represent 
powerful countries and that have tremendous influence on Malawi's government.  Similar to the 
authoritative multilateral organizations, the focus of these interviews was on international 
involvement in the formulation of climate change policy and activities; meta-themes of 
government capacity, donor coordination and addressing vulnerability were also covered. 
 Climate change adaptation is a new strategy among many of these donors and they are just 
now having to grapple with the how, where and what of such an approach.  Norway has been the 
consistent leader of climate change issues in Malawi for over a decade.  They were heavily 
involved in agriculture in Malawi and it was an easy and logical transition to issues of climate 
change.  To a large degree, the in-country focus is directed and formulated by the agencies at 
home.  Ireland is another country interested in agriculture and believes that organizations cannot 
just focus on CC because everything is related and contributes to the challenges of coping with 
CC.  At the end of the day, adaptation responses are about allowing people resources to survive. 
Therefore it makes sense to focus on crop diversification, irrigation and rural livelihoods.  Irish 
Aid stated that dealing with CC in this context is all about food security. 
 For bilateral donors that do less with adaptation and climate change, project aims can be 
limited based on funding availability - as in the case of USAID - or perceptions of addressing 
climate change - as in the case of Germany.  One bilateral organization official stated: 
 "Education, water, and health all seem more practical and they are easier to sell back 
home.  It‟s more tangible than something like conflict mitigation.  Maybe conflict 
mitigation is more important than education, but it‟s easier to show that our support has 
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led to one hundred new teachers.  So that‟s where reality diverges from what we are 
writing in our pamphlets. Donors want to give, and the government wants to receive." 
 In addition, direct budget support - an issue that was controversial in Malawi during the 
period of these interviews- is under scrutiny worldwide.  It has many positive aspects, such as 
country ownership, channeling money more easily, and enabling the government to set their own 
priorities.  Direct budget support also prevents donors from overlapping agendas and projects, but 
there are also many perceived problems.  With budget support, money is directly supporting the 
government, but organizations must determine if the government acting on behalf of the people.  
Is the government‟s agenda set towards development principles?  Will the money get diluted 
through corruption?  This set of reasoning is the unique perspective of the bilateral donors that 
want to do well by the people, help the government, and build capacity but face a myriad of 
challenges in the process. 
 Some donors stressed that the level of transparency in the government is low.  One 
bilateral representative stated, "I am not being updated on where this money is going, so why am I 
still giving all this money. [Shrug]. Rome wasn‟t built in a day!”  He continued by saying that 
they have a reserve of money from headquarters and they are not put under any pressure to spend 
this money.  He stated, “I won‟t spend this money until I know where this will go.”  The funding 
comes via Fast Start Finance [projects that carry that title rather than an explicit title of Climate 
Change Adaptation]. This funding started a year ago and there is a set of guidelines as to what can 
be done with this money. There is currently a review of funds going on in London where the 
people in charge are deciding on the amounts that are a priority for the different countries. “I am 
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not jumping to get that money because I am skeptical of the capacity of Malawi to use it. There is 
no point in spending fast.”  Much like the multilateral organizations, the bilateral donors are 
embroiled in a game of capacity and coordination.  However, even among themselves, there are 
many problems.  Another bilateral official stated:  
"There is an understanding that there is a need for better coordination, more effectiveness 
and more country ownership, but there are lots of hidden agendas and difficulties in the 
implementation processes.  It seems easy on paper, but we all have an agenda.  We agree 
we should consult other donors, but we are under pressure from our governments or we 
have agreements with consulting partners.  These are practical issues – we want to 
coordinate but in reality we have our own procedures, agendas and regulations." 
 Like the multilateral organizations, bilateral donors have tremendous leverage and they are 
using it to propel Malawi's policies on climate change.  DFID and Norway have worked 
aggressively to build Malawi's national capacity to start addressing climate and adaptation 
strategies, while DFID has also created a separate pool of money to give directly to civil society 
organizations conducting climate-related projects.  Unsurprisingly, one aspect of controlling the 
national government that is difficult for Malawi is keeping track of the programs, projects and 
activities of its various ministries and especially those of development organizations.  Bilateral 
donors appeared unapologetic that their projects and activities were difficult for the government 
to track. Many organizations countered with a familiar stance on the GoM's lack of capacity as an 
issue rather than donor coordination.  During the period of these interviews, tension was starting 
to build between donors and the president of Malawi, Bingu Wa Mutharika.  
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Malawi National Government 
 Five organizations in the national government that work with or are closely related to 
climate change or adaptation policy were interviewed. The Ministry of Finance (MoF), while an 
exception to the direct work on climate change, was a tremendous resource for information on 
multilateral and bilateral foreign assistance and documents related to active projects.  Therefore, 
this section begins with an investigation into government perceptions of aid.  
 In terms of aid, Malawi does receive a large portion of aid as budget support; last year 
30% of all aid was given as budget support - meaning 70% was used by donors to implement their 
own projects.  As stated earlier, this direct budget support (30% of total aid) represents over 40% 
of Malawi‟s overall budget.  Budget support began in Malawi in 2002 with only a few donors but 
since then it has been increasing as a share of aid.  However this aid is built on trust and can come 
with conditions.  Donors in a committee called CABS (Common Approach to Budget Support) 
meet twice a year to discuss the level of budget support to give to Malawi using the IMF 
assessments (also completed semi-annually). The IMF does an economic fiscal management 
assessment – they go through the balance of payments, foreign exchange and exchange rate 
management.  They are trying to get the government to devalue its currency since it is currently 
fixed with the US dollar and is massively overvalued.  The CAB evaluates the government based 
on economic performance and adherence to human rights, anti-corruption, economic governance, 
transparency and accountability.  CABS donors would possibly cancel budget support if the IMF 
indicators were not met, but the World Bank and African Development Bank would not because 
they do not give budget support based on economic and governance indicators. 
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 However, budget support is sometimes a problematic process.  Last year the government 
budgeted a certain amount for the health sector based partly on aid that was supposed to come 
through the Global Fund (GFATM).  This money never came and thus the government missed 
some of its IMF targets. The MoF official stated that the government now waits for donor funds 
to come through to begin implementation instead of “pulling out its credit card” while waiting for 
donor funds to come through. This delayed funding created problems for project implementation 
since projects cannot be implemented until the funding is received. It becomes a slower process of 
implementation but is an important step in the eyes of GoM to decrease aid dependency.  
 Other issues can also disrupt government funding. Last year DfID and Germany gave less 
aid when the President of Malawi bought himself a private jet (Reuters, 2010).  A MoF official 
explained how this was not effective because other donors actually increased their aid that year 
and Malawi ended up receiving more aid than it had expected.  This outcome was in part based on 
the lag between development organizations headquarters in home-nations responding to 
information in time to affect funding.  Often this process takes a while and highlights the fact that 
the donors rarely work in unison.  Therefore, decreasing aid is rarely effective in terms of 
bringing about governance changes.   
 In terms of climate change, four organizations with intricate ties to adaptation policy and 
implementation were interviewed.  Malawi's National Programme for Managing Climate Change 
is situated within the Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation (MoDPC).  This 
ministry is the new focal point for climate change policy after several donors felt that the 
Department of Environmental Affairs had done a poor job in establishing the National Adaptation 
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Programme of Action.  The role of this national program is to coordinate between the various 
ministries and donors.  The MoDPC is the directorate for the program and the Environmental 
Affairs Department is the secretariat.  Together they serve as the steering committee that meets as 
needed.  Various ministries and donors also work on a technical committee that meets monthly. 
The Donor Working Group (different from the Joint Resilience Unit that is made up of donors to 
discuss climate change) meets once a year officially.  The government‟s program director - who is 
paid and supervised by UNDP - did not see a problem with committee members from the MoDPC 
and EAD (whose offices are separated by 3km) working separately on the program.  Support for 
this program is starting to wane as donors, such as the UK, are stalling now on funding and 
implementing their own programs targeting civil society and district governments administering 
small-scale projects.  Despite the fluctuating interest by bilateral donors, the government's 
program with the help of UNDP is expanding and creating an investment plan.  Donors are doing 
their own projects while the government builds capacity, but these projects are supposed to be 
tracked by the program and considered a part of the program.  All donors are supposed to report 
their activities through the program‟s office, but few apparently do so.  
 Also within the MoDPC is the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee.  The 
committee was set up in 2002-03 in an effort to group vulnerability data across southern Africa 
after the 2001-02 food crises.  There are only two dedicated members that work on vulnerability 
assessments daily.  The rest are volunteers or temporary workers from other ministries that help 
when they can.  The committee consists of members from the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, 
Disaster Management, National Statistics, UN, OXFAM, Concern and World Vision.  The 
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vulnerability assessments produced by MVAC are not just meteorological, but include household 
surveys that gather a tremendous amount of information housed at the National Statistics Office 
in Zomba. They used a 'Household Economy Approach' developed by Save the Children (an 
NGO) for a baseline survey conducted in 2002, which was again revised in 2004.  While the 
methodology had originally intended to lead to robust surveying,  the results of this study 
culminated with very few interviews per livelihood zone and not all zones were evaluated.  In 
September 2011 the MVAC sought to conduct a new baseline based on selected updated 
variables.  The new assessment started with livelihoods and then modeled hazards (droughts, 
floods, pests, crop disease and even inflation) over this baseline.  They also sought to assess how 
people react to hazards, whether it is selling assets or migrating, etc.  When food is gone, people 
use labor as piecework to fill in the gap.  This new baseline is supposed to get at acute 
vulnerability because it is updated every few years. After an assessment is conducted and findings 
are made, it goes through a vetting process between the various ministers that sit on the 
committee and some donor and NGO organizations. The results of this September study have not 
been released.    
 At the time of the interview in the summer of 2011, there were 250,000 people that were 
food insecure and MVAC reported that districts in the southern portion of the country were going 
to require 4.8 thousand metric tons of food aid to provide relief (Interview with MVAC, 2011).  
Assessments like this are produced quarterly and reported to the GoM and the NGOs who figure 
out how to strategize and deal with the issue.  Food security is a measurable hazard that is mostly 
tied to floods, droughts and dry spells and the MVAC official stated that in Malawi one cannot 
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separate the food security from vulnerability.  In terms of climate change, he stated that there is 
evidence that the rain is erratic.  Farmers used to plant the first week in November, and now it 
might be as late as the end of December.  They are diversifying their crops and are building assets 
in preparation for the next disaster.  
 This perception was substantiated by a senior meteorologist at the Department of 
Meteorological Services and Climate Change in Malawi.  The National Program on Climate 
Change is the government's way of championing climate change issues in the future, but they 
created a division for climate change within the meteorological department under the Ministry of 
Natural Resources MoMNRE to evaluate Malawi's observable climatic changes.  Malawi 
currently has 26 weather stations and 73 rainfall gauges, although the official felt this network 
was severely lacking and provided sparse coverage over Malawi's diverse topography.  Like most 
climate reports, he did confirm that there was an observed increase in temperatures (on par with 
global increases) and that the intensity of rainfall  has increased, although there was no observable 
shift in mean averages. Like many parts in Africa, the historical data on climate is lacking and the 
infrastructure to effectively monitor changing conditions is limited (Jury and Mwafulirwa, 2002; 
McSweeney et. al., 2008).   The meteorologist was asked by a supervisor while studying for his 
Masters in 1991 to look at Malawi's rainfall records for changes. When he looked up the tables he 
noticed some changes in the climate.  Part of his research was to develop normal parameters  or 
mean values and in recent years most studies have shifted to analyzing absolutes in terms of 
temperature and rainfall. He stated that droughts are easily felt by the population as he recalled 
severe droughts in 1981-82, 1994-95, 2004-05.  There was also a dry-spell in the 2010-11 seasons 
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(during the period of interviews).  He stated that the ENSO cycle usually operates in a 3-10 year 
cycle and appeared to be occurring on the short end recently.   
 One of the aims of the new climate change component within the meteorological 
department is to address the capacity to observe climate change in the future.  The department is 
currently 100% funded by the government and there was uncertainty over the use of international 
funding in the future to improve the monitoring capability in the country.  The department does 
not contribute to the vulnerability assessments but the meteorologist concluded that Karonga 
(most northern district) and Nsanje (most southern district) came to mind as most vulnerable- but 
he added that everything in between is vulnerable as well. 
 Many of the government officials converged on the major drivers of vulnerability in 
Malawi as deforestation and land-use change.  Malawi may be more vulnerable than a country 
like Mozambique (a country regarded by many studies as the most vulnerable) because it is long 
and narrow and there are huge variations in climate and topography from north to south. The 
variations that Mozambique experiences with cyclones easily affect the southern portion of 
Malawi.  There was near consensus that the southern region of Chikwawa and Nasanje is the most 
vulnerable due to persistent floods and droughts, while Karonga was also mentioned often. 
Local Governments in Malawi 
One of the best opportunities for learning about the dimensions of response to climate 
change came from the perspectives of local government officials and extension officers in the 
departments of agriculture and forestry that serve as the true bridge between policy-makers and 
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vulnerable communities.  This level of intervention appeared to be the backbone of any effective 
program to address issues of social vulnerability, health, education or food security.   However, 
the large segment of civil workers in Malawi is a controversial issue between donors and the 
national government. Donors who control a large portion of the government‟s budget continually 
express that the civil workforce in Malawi is bloated.  Unfortunately, for many villages, the only 
contact with a resource-based organization comes from an extension worker who travels by 
bicycle or motorcycle to as many as 70 rural villages.  Having met with officials across four 
districts, the sentiments on resources and support were unanimously negative.  Travelling to the 
most vulnerable regions described in the literature and early interviews, this section includes 
interviews from local government officials from The Lower Shire River Valley (Chikwawa and 
Nsanje Districts), Mulanje District, Blantyre District (rural traditional authorities) and Blantyre 
city. 
 Chikwawa and Nsanje lie on the lower stretch of the Shire River Valley and below the 
escarpment to Blantyre neighboring to the north.  The elevation drops off in the Shire River 
Valley where temperatures and humidity in this region are considerably higher than in most parts 
of Malawi.  As a downstream region of Blantyre, one of the most difficult challenges for officials 
in this region has been the effects of upland and upriver activity such as deforestation for 
charcoal.  Officials shared the perception that deforestation in areas surrounding Blantyre and 
near sensitive watershed areas has resulted in soil erosion and sediment transport into lower river 
basins resulting in persistent flooding over fragile dykes. One recent report (Booth et. al., 2006) 
stated that soil erosion is the single most serious environmental problem in Malawi - it is 
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estimated that for every inch of top-soil lost, grain yields are reduced by 6%.  Many projects 
encouraged farmers in the middle and lower shire river to create wind and water barriers around 
their farms using planted trees and elephant grass (Pennisetum purpureum).  The use of marginal 
land or areas near streams and rivers was highly discouraged.    
 While all local government officials were confident in their assertion that Chikwawa and 
Nsanje were the most vulnerable districts in Malawi.  Interviews exposed the capacity and 
coordination issues faced by district executive committees when responding to national level 
policies and supervising the implementation of NGO and IO development projects.  An 
Environmental Office official stated that the district [Chikwawa] must be better prepared to deal 
with shocks.  People are given relief items, but this type of support does not generally help 
households the next year.  When the next disaster comes, people are usually starting with less 
adaptive capacity.  One agricultural official stated that increasing the amount of livestock has the 
potential to reduce vulnerability since most households have sufficient land for crops and animals.  
It is a hedge (at the individual level) against disaster.  
 The Lower Shire Division Agricultural Development Officer (DADO) stated that he was 
confident in regarding Food Security as the major problem of climate change.  Households can 
produce food, purchase it if you have alternate income or receive it in the form of food relief.  
Despite these options, food security continues to be a major concern in the district because the 
Lower Shire's climate does not support Maize productivity.  He stated that 46% of households in 
his districts are chronically food insecure and that 68% of households ran out of food before 
December of last year [2010].  He was anticipating a decrease in maize production based on the 
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changing climate, but he stated that such a shift was complicated.  It takes two years to introduce 
high yield sorghum and millet to villages in an adequate way and this systematic approach 
requires the collective efforts of the national and local government and development organizations 
and NGOs.   
 As a measure of aid tracking and effectiveness, this researcher highlighted to the Lower 
Shire DADO that according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, there were 25 
projects on food security occurring within his district.  He acknowledged that there were at least 
20 that he was aware of and that his district office and the extension officers were in collaboration 
with nearly each one.  However, he also highlighted the challenges of working with NGOs that do 
not always consult with local government on projects.  He stated that projects are usually good 
and NGOs do meet with the executive committee where everyone decides where the project 
should be and what adjustments can be made.  In this regard, NGOs tend to complement the 
efforts of extension workers.  The DADO stated that he currently had 80 extension workers when 
he should have 124.  Some of these gaps do get filled by NGOs.  
 When asked what approach he would take to implement projects effectively, one 
agricultural extension officer stated that projects in specific villages are useful to learn on a small 
scale.  However, to truly reach every village the district government would need much greater 
resources,  and the agricultural department would need to increase coverage, build local capacity 
and create sustainability.  That way, even if there were budget cuts later, the work would become 
routine and the training would have reached more villages. Another government official stated 
that donors are good at mobilizing resources and putting strategies together.  He felt national 
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government policies must be focused on local actions, but as of right now local village structures 
are not well supported. 
 Another important issue in Malawi, pressure on the land, is the result of a combination of 
population growth and elite capture (in the form of tea, tobacco, coffee and sugar estates). The 
principal victims of the situation are smallholders on customary land and Malawi is the most 
densely populated sub-Saharan African country with a single, short annual rainy season (Booth et. 
al., 2006).  Mulanje district is one of the worst examples of this situation based on the fact that tea 
plantations in the area have pushed small-holder farmers onto dangerously small plots that can 
barely sustain an adequate amount of food per household. The population growth in Malawi is 
highest in this district and the rain shadow effect of Mount Mulanje makes the western portion of 
the district incredibly dry.  It is in this context that discussion focused on the changing climate in 
the district and the challenges to rural communities as a result. 
 In Mulanje, many of the same sentiments were expressed regarding deforestation and the 
districts proximity to Blantyre urban center as a draw for charcoal and other forestry based 
products.  However, Mulanje is in a unique position.  Much of the population has settled around 
the scenic and impressive Mulanje Massif.  An international draw for tourism, this island 
mountain chain is on the list to be considered a World Heritage Site (UNESCO).  The district 
experienced extensive colonial activity under the British as large tea plantations were established.  
Mulanje has the highest population density of the 28 districts in Malawi.  Its proximity to a major 
road to Mozambique means that migrants and sometimes refugees make Mulanje even more 
crowded while major roads now leading to Blantyre mean that forest resources are being 
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destroyed at a rapid pace.  One forestry officer said that the Thyolo Mountain Forestry Reserve 
(in a neighboring district) is now gone and that people are looking to Mulanje's reserve to provide 
new resources.  In light of these population pressures, the extent of landholding by the tea 
plantations means there is considerably less arable land per person in Mulanje (0.5 hectares per 
household according to the DADO).  This factor alone has created a situation where the amount 
of food produced per household is, in the experience of many district agricultural officials, 
inadequate.  Tea plantations have displaced people from the most productive land and villages are 
now encroaching upon the mountain forest reserve and other marginal lands and stream banks to 
create more farm land.  Additionally, small landholdings per household also limit the ability to 
sustain both crops and livestock.  Therefore, many households have fewer animals when 
compared to other districts in Malawi.  The DADO commented that government and NGO 
programs to provide animals to household are just problematic in Mulanje and reflect a poor 
understanding of the local situation.  
 Commenting specifically about the coordination with NGOs implementing projects in the 
district, the DADO had a much more negative experience than the DADO in Chikwawa.  He 
stated that there are 626 villages in Mulanje district.  His extension workers also visit them mostly 
on foot, bicycle or motorcycle.  Only 5-10% of villages are involved in NGO or IO projects (less 
than 10% was a common figure among all three districts of Chikwawa, Nsanje and Mulanje) and 
these organizations tend to go where it is easier for them to demonstrate results.  He stated that on 
the east side of the massif, there are numerous NGOs working and this baffles him.  This area, in 
his opinion, is the good, wet side of the mountain where villages have less difficulty growing 
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diverse crops.  He said that on the west, dry side, there are few NGOs and that villages there need 
the most assistance.  He also stated that NGOs sometimes bring strange agricultural or irrigation 
technology that his office and staff would not recommend.  For example, one NGO introduced pit 
planting - a seed planting technique for conserving water - on the eastern wet side of the 
mountain.  
 Another unique perspective arose from interviews regarding the challenges associated 
with sustainable development and vulnerability in the context of an urban environment.  As the 
head of one of seven departments among the city assembly, the Director of Urban Planning was 
instrumental in illustrating the problems associated with rapid urbanization of the city.  
Vulnerabilities associated with squatter developments and land tenure policies that promote 
freehold property to sit idle are but a few of the frustrations that he faces in addressing city 
planning.  In great detail he described how urban livelihoods may be uniquely vulnerable and 
subject to the effects of climate change occurring in surrounding rural communities.  He recalled 
that 10 years ago, all of the hills surrounding the city had trees.  Now they are almost all 
completely bare.  As stated earlier, Blantyre City is a large market for forestry products in Malawi 
and the problem of deforestation is multi-sectoral.  A bag of charcoal outside of town will sell for 
about 800 kwacha (or about $5), but in town it can sell for 2000 kwacha (or $13).  There are 
policies to discourage this market, but they are not enforced.  The government cannot and has not 
provided viable alternatives.  The cost of electricity is high.  The cost of appliances is high.  
Paraffin (a cooking/lighting fuel) is expensive and scarce.  Many families have these stoves, but 
they cannot afford the fuel.  So the only reliable source for cooking in the city is charcoal.  
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Another environmental issue that the city is facing is unauthorized mining.  People need bricks 
for building and cement blocks are not readily available. However people are mining the 
landscape for gravel and minerals used in local building projects. 
 Blantyre has a 5.5% annual urbanization rate which makes it one of the highest in the 
world. Malawi actually has the seventh highest urbanization rate worldwide (CIA, 2012).  Urban 
migration is a major challenge as there has been a steady increase in squatter settlements.  There 
is now little buffer between low-income high density and higher income low-density housing.  In 
these areas people need access to piped water and electricity. The roads and the housing are very 
poor, but the director stated that it is not yet on the scale of the slums outside of Nairobi.  He felt 
that NGOs do provide a valuable contribution in delivering many services that would otherwise 
be a challenge.  His department does work with many donors and NGOs (e.g. AFDB and Habitat 
for Humanity for Low Income Housing), but donors are constantly rotating in and out of Blantyre 
and he felt it was difficult to track who is doing what and where.  
 The perspectives across these three districts provide valuable insight to the frontline battle 
with environmental degradation and food security challenges.  This input was used to construct a 
household-level vulnerability index.  While there was near-consensus that the climate was 
changing and that farmers in the future will face greater uncertainty in their crop productivity, 
most of the challenges were focused on physical pressures of population, land-use change and 
environmental degradation as key drivers of vulnerability.  
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Civil Society Organizations 
 Malawi's collection of civil society organizations is large and they are becoming 
increasingly connected and more influential in the stakeholder process on disaster planning.  Civil 
society organizations (CSO) now have a seat on the technical assistance committee of the 
National Program on Climate Change, established in 2008.  These organizations play a crucial 
role in the planning and preparations for climate-related disasters as part of the new Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) framework and they are a tremendous voice on future strategies of adaptation.  
With intricate ties to communities, often through faith-based organizations, a vested interest in 
national policies on environmental stewardship, and a record of involvement in post-disaster 
response, CSOs appear to be a commanding impetus for a grassroots approach to adaptation and 
development. 
 One such powerhouse is the Civil Society Network on Climate Change (CISONECC), an 
association of 24 member organizations.  Members consist of faith-based organizations such as 
Churches Action in Relief and Development (CARD), Danish Church Aid and Norwegian Church 
Aid to environmental-based organizations such as Action Aid and Total Land Care and research 
organizations such as the International Food Policy Research Institute and Innovations for 
Poverty Action.  CSOs are typically fragmented across Malawi's landscape in their goals and 
strategies.  However, as one harmonized network, these organizations now have increasing power 
and voice in shaping public policy and influencing the direction of national strategy.  
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 At a quarterly meeting of CISONECC in July 2011, the director shared several insights 
about operating in response to increased disasters in Malawi.  He stated:  
"Climate Change has affected us in several fronts.  We are an organization that was 
formed to respond to disasters, work on rehabilitation and development.  With 
frequent disasters of the past ten or so years, this has led us to respond to huge 
disasters and frequently.  Because of the repeated frequency of disasters, civil 
society has had to refocus its mandate and activities that we do have a climate 
change lens, which we did not have in the past.  We have also changed our 
strategies to reflect the reality on the ground.  As of now, our magnitude of work 
has also changed over the years - especially the past ten years." 
 While there is a sense that coordination is improving and that organizations are properly 
refocusing mandates and strategy, one of the largest hurdles is lacking financial resources to be 
able to apply the needed interventions at the community level.  CSOs are in an excellent position 
to assist the national, district and tribal governments in this process since they operate as 
multilevel organizations, but much like the national government, these NGO groups rely heavily 
on the international community and donors for much of their funding.  With limited funds, the 
activities in place to plan for and respond to disasters are reportedly effective, but to up-scale 
these pilot projects into full programs and out-scale them to encompass more villages are 
contingent on financial resources.  As stated earlier, this limitation was echoed by many local 
government officials interviewed in Chikwawa, Blantyre and Mulanje, who stated that 
development interventions are generally occurring in less 10% of the villages at any given time.  
Such sparse coverage will continue to hinder the effectiveness of any national strategy.  
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Chapter 4 - Vulnerability Analysis  
Objective 2:  Understand complex vulnerability and locate the most vulnerable regions in 
Malawi. 
 To better understand the observable effects of climate change (from Malawi's 
perspective), this thesis compiles a composite vulnerability assessment of Malawi that will look 
temporally across Malawi‟s most recent decade of natural disasters.  These events have inspired 
much of the country‟s recent policies and strategies and a vulnerability index provides a look at 
the stratification of depleted resilience.  Focusing on the concept of complex vulnerability in 
Malawi, a sub-national complex vulnerability index was created using over 30,000 household 
surveys (of which 7,000+ were female-headed) from  Demographic and Health Surveys 
conducted in 2004 and 2010. This approach was modeled after Oxford University's 
Multidimensional Poverty index (2011).  Proxy variables for resilience were identified in four 
categories: physical exposure (floods and droughts), access (basic goods and services), assets 
(land, livestock and wealth) and livelihood sensitivity (market exposure, self-sufficient food 
production and coping strategies). A composite index of these categorized variables was 
conducted at a sub-national and traditional authority (TA) level. This index was used to generate a 
sub-national map of vulnerability based exposure and sensitivity to climate change.  This map can 
be compared to numerous assessments generated by the Government (Government of Malawi, 
2006), academia (Busby et. al., 2010) and international organizations (Maplecroft, 2011).   
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 It is a common theme in emerging literature to regard climate change vulnerability 
assessments as a new frontier of research (Downing, 2000; Kelley and Adger, 2000; Turner et. al., 
2003; Brooks et. al., 2003).  However, as Schroter et. al. (2005) suggests, it unclear how current 
assessments differ in conceptual or methodological terms from research on vulnerability before 
climate change became a central theme.  Emerging from many traditions that explored the 
concepts of disasters, food security, development, adaptive capacity, criticality, sensitivity and 
exposure, vulnerability analysis in the context of global climate change has at times represented a 
unifying purpose in a diverse field of research.  Adger and Kelley (1999) offered two main 
motivations for why the scientific community is addressing consequences of climate change.  
First, information regarding the scale of the problem is required in order to assess the magnitude 
of the threat and thus motivate policy-makers to take an appropriate level of action.  This type of 
research is still the primary driving force behind the work of the IPCC.  Second, empirical 
information regarding consequences of climate change is needed to promote political actions to 
limit the drivers of vulnerability and reduce the impacts. Vulnerability mapping attempts to 
address both of these motivations.   
Why Map Vulnerability? 
 Vulnerability indices have been applied for many purposes. Academically, they have been 
used to identify causal processes that enhance vulnerability and further explain attributes of 
vulnerable systems (Kelley and Adger, 2000).  Vulnerability analysis can help fill gaps in 
knowledge about climate change impacts and aid decision-makers in creating future strategy.  
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Mapping, ranking and comparing vulnerability across regions has been a popular approach in 
cross comparative analysis (Brooks and Adger, 2005; Busby et. al., 2010).  Developing agencies 
are keen to rank countries based on their vulnerability as a means of prioritizing international 
adaptation assistance (Fussel, 2007). However, with different policy objectives attached to 
various scales, indices range from realistic assessment of climate change risks to more causal 
constructions of social processes (Schroter et. al., 2005).  Most importantly, vulnerability analysis 
represents a starting point in the determination of effective means of promoting remedial action to 
limit impacts by supporting coping strategies and facilitating adaptation (Kelley and Adger, 
2000).  Therefore, in the context of a development based approach, vulnerability mapping can be 
used to aid the allocation of resources (Eriksen and Kelley, 2006) and monitor the progress in 
reducing vulnerability over time (Fussel, 2009; Busby et. al., 2010).  However, this latter 
approach of analysts, social scientists and development experts studying consequences of 
environmental at a global scale is not without critics.  
Why NOT Map Vulnerability? 
 In a conference at the World Bank in 2011, Dr. Thomas Downing stated that 
"vulnerability mapping was professional malpractice".  This statement is enigmatic given that Dr. 
Downing has spent a considerable part of his professional career dedicated to the prospect of 
better understanding climactic vulnerability through maps and indices (e.g. Downing et. al., 
1995).  However, there may be some truth to his statement given that nearly every organization 
with a development agenda wants to use such maps to drive and motivate future decisions on 
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resource allocation, funding redistribution and project location. Vulnerability maps at the global 
scale do have many credibility issues among top academics in this field of research.  
 Kelley and Adger (2000, p. 331), careful in their local approach to avoid an index, stated 
“we cannot be confident that all the processes that determine vulnerability can be reliably 
identified on the basis of current understanding."  They indicated that there is a dangerous 
tendency to incorporate easily identifiable variables into a composite index that over-emphasizes 
issues such as poverty.  
 Fussel (2009, p. 8), even more straightforward on concerns regarding global mapping and 
rankings based on a comprehensive review of previous attempts adds: 
"All existing indices of (social and outcome) vulnerability to climate change show 
substantial conceptual, methodological and empirical weaknesses including lack of 
focus, lack of a sound conceptual framework, methodological flaws, large 
sensitivity to alternative methods for data aggregation, limited data availability, 
and hiding of legitimate normative controversies. As a result, there is little 
agreement regarding the most vulnerable countries."  
 Eriksen and Kelley (2007, p. 496) furthered this discourse, adding that a lack of a clear 
theoretical and conceptual framework for the selection of indicators has hampered the robustness, 
transparency and policy relevance of such attempts.  Of the global level rankings that have 
become so popular, they provide evidence of the fact that they are not leading to a consensus on 
vulnerable regions. 
"Only five countries ranked among the 20 most vulnerable in two or more of the 
studies and only one country ranked among the 20 most vulnerable in all three. 
This finding firmly underlines the challenge in making objective judgments about 
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which countries are more vulnerable than others as a basis for allocating of 
funding” (Eriksen and Kelley, 2007, p. 502). 
 Creating global or continental scale maps is difficult based on unreliable  and inconsistent 
sources of cross-comparable data at a large scale.  Two recent indices purporting subnational 
characteristics highlight some of the issues discussed.  In "Locating Climate Insecurity", Busby et. 
al. (2010) map vulnerability to climate change in Africa using 21 indicators of vulnerability.  
Grouping factors between physical exposure, household vulnerability, governance indicators and 
population density, they created a security focused sub-national index of climactic vulnerability.  
However, upon closer examination only a small handful of their indicators contain truly sub-
national data (e.g. flood, drought and wildfire frequency and population density).  This 
manipulation of data to fit a more granulated scale is a conceptual problem addressed often 
(Kelley and Adger, 2000; Schroter et. al., 2005; Fussel, 2009).   
Maplecroft, a global risk management company, uses three clusters (exposure, sensitivity 
and resilience) to determine economic, social and environmental impacts of disasters. 
Vulnerability is typically described to be a function of these three overlapping elements: 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Turner et al., 2003), but there is very little 
transparency in where Maplecroft derives its data and to what extent the information is truly sub-
national.  Maplecroft serves the business and developing communities rather than vulnerable 
people and nations.  While researchers may disagree with their selections of most corrupt, most 
disaster prone or most climatically vulnerable countries, their product serves an international 
audience that is inclined to divert funding and resources based on data that may be inappropriately 
interpreted across diverse human landscapes.  The processes that determine vulnerability are 
112 
 
manifest at the local, national, regional and global level, but the state of vulnerability itself is 
associated with specific groups within societies and aggregation from one level to another is not 
appropriate. Thus, global-scale analysis of social vulnerability is not meaningful except in so far 
as it deals with the vulnerability of the global community itself (Adger and Kelley, 1999).  The 
prioritization of countries for international adaptation assistance requires disaggregated 
information on the vulnerability of countries because aggregated indices tend to hide legitimate 
political or ethical controversies (Fussel, 2007).  
Vulnerability Discourse 
 These conceptual issues have created an environment where the accuracy and realistic 
properties of vulnerability models are constantly in question; few reviewers appear satisfied with 
the results of their peers (Kelley and Adger, 2000; Schroter et. al, 2005; Fussel, 2009). As with 
any methodology emerging from disparate research traditions, vulnerability mapping has seen a 
series of compromises and innovations. In determining how to achieve a subnational vulnerability 
index in Malawi, while avoiding normative criticisms, this researcher will highlight some key 
conceptual issues.  
 Most of the approaches to date have been theory driven based on a conceptual framework 
for identifying relevant indicators and determining the strengths of their relationships through 
weighting (Fussel, 2009).  The significance of the results of this kind of study can be assessed on 
the basis of the validity of theoretical approach and assumptions, the appropriateness of the 
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selected indicators and the reliability of data (Eriksen and Kelley, 2007).  However, this has been 
no small task, especially at the global level.  
On the other hand, some researchers have used a data-driven approach based on national-
level indicators.  Brooks et. al. (2005) performed an exhaustive empirical analysis of national 
level indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity.  The outcome variable of number of deaths 
or number of affected was based on data from EM-DAT database on disasters, and they 
concluded that proxies such as sanitation, literacy, maternal mortality and caloric intake were 
most statistically significant.  Eriksen and Kelley (2007), who evaluated this study among four 
others, found serious conceptual problems with this endpoint (or outcome-based) approach.  
Databases regarding mortality and the numbers of people adversely affected by climate-related 
events have poor data coverage for certain time periods and countries (Brooks et. al., 2005). The 
lack of a well-defined vulnerability outcome that could be used for the development of inductive 
vulnerability indices is a major issue in inductive modeling (Fussel, 2007).  Vulnerability, like 
happiness, is a human state or condition that some say cannot be measured directly in any 
objective manner (Eriksen and Kelley, 2007).  Finding meaningful variables to form statistical 
relationships represents a major challenge for a data-driven approach. 
 Debates have also emerged over starting point (causal or contextual) and endpoint 
(outcome or impact) analysis.  Contextual vulnerability is rooted in political-economy (Liverman, 
1999) and seeks to determine the internal characteristic of the vulnerable system that leads to a 
propensity for frailty (Fussel, 2009).  Outcome vulnerability is an integrated approach that 
combines indicators of potential climate impacts with socio-economic data to determine coping 
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and adaptive capacity (O'Brien et. al., 2004).  The IPCC definition characterizes vulnerability to 
climate change as a function of a system‟s exposure and sensitivity to climatic stimuli and its 
capacity to adapt to their adverse effects (IPCC FAR, 2007).  This definition corresponds directly 
to endpoint (outcome) vulnerability.  End-point studies inevitably frame adaptive options in terms 
of 'fixes' that will minimize particular impacts that have been projected (Eriksen and Kelley, 
2007).  Outcome vulnerability leads to an approach which attempts to define consequences in 
terms of predictions of effects on agriculture, water supplies or ecosystem health (Adger and 
Kelley, 1999).  One problem with this outcome-based approach is that predictions rarely consider 
social, economic and political trends, making them difficult measures of social vulnerability or 
adaptive capacity.  
 In contrast, starting point analyses address the fundamental causes and drivers of 
vulnerability in an effort to strengthen the capacity of people to respond and adapt on their own 
(Eriksen and Kelley, 2007).  Adger and Kelley (1999) argue that this approach provides a robust 
and policy-relevant approach to studying processes that shape adaptive response but acknowledge 
that any assessment will rest on the combination of these approaches.  Further debates ensue over 
global versus local approaches (Adger and Kelly, 1999; Fussel, 2009), temporal scale of short 
term hazards and coping versus long term climactic observations and adaptation (Kelley and 
Adger, 2000; Eriksen and Kelley, 2007), spatial scale of indicators used to interpret vulnerability 
(Watts and Bohle, 1993; O‟Brien et. al., 2004) and processes of selecting proxy indicators of 
vulnerability (Schroter et. al., 2005; Eriksen and Kelley, 2007).   
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 In establishing a methodology for Malawi, this researcher acknowledges these challenges 
and seeks to frame an analysis based on observations of vulnerability in a framework similar to 
Adger and Kelley‟s (1999) research in villages of Vietnam.  However, the case-study approach is 
not the aim of this investigation as it offers a view too narrow to integrate development activities.  
This index will capture Malawi as a whole without extending beyond its borders.  A regional or 
continental approach common to cross comparative analysis of countries in Africa does little to 
understand processes active only within Malawi.  Existing national-level indicator studies display 
a number of weaknesses that limit their usefulness in developing adaptation policy or 
understanding vulnerability in a place-based and contextual way that Malawi needs.   
VULNERABILITY MAPPING - METHODOLOGY 
 The following vulnerability index process is adapted from Schroter et.  al.‟s (2005) 
„Assessing Vulnerabilities to the Effects of Global Change: An Eight Step Approach.‟  However, 
since this process was designed to be accomplished by a multidisciplinary team, rather than an 
individual researcher, some modifications were made.  Given the limitations of time, financial 
resources and the fact that some content did not fit into the development aid context of this 
research, this methodology does not include the last two steps of Schroter et.  al.‟s (2005) plan: 1) 
projecting future vulnerability based on coordinated scenarios with stakeholders and 2) 
communicating vulnerability creatively to stakeholders (using interactive media), although these 
are opportunities for future research.  
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1. Define the study area and choose the scale  
 The temporal scale for this research (2004 to 2010) was derived from availability of the 
robust demographic and health survey datasets discussed in step 5.  Because this is a subnational 
vulnerability index, contextual to the nation of Malawi, the spatial extent included all territories 
within Malawi and excluded all areas external.  While comparative and neighbor analysis is often 
an objective of vulnerability mapping (Eriksen and Kelley, 2008), this research was limited to the 
observations and foreign aid data within Malawi.  
 Analysis of vulnerability was conducted at the administrative scale of Traditional 
Authorities (TA) in Malawi.  While a more fine-scale analysis is possible based on the available 
data, traditional authorities offer the lowest level of meaningful administrative power.  Adaptation 
projects are commonly coordinated by development organizations through TA chiefs and 
councils.  There are approximately 350 populated TAs and wards throughout Malawi offering a 
far more detailed analysis than what is typically conducted at the district level.  Malawi is divided 
into 28 administrative districts and this was the common basis for most vulnerability assessments 
across the various sectors that include agriculture, health and education.  Districts provide more 
resources and capacity for planning, but the large geographic areas of some districts make it an 
insufficient measure of household vulnerability.  Each district contains segments and hotspots of 
vulnerable populations as well as resilient households and communities.  Using TAs affords 
district leaders and planners the ability to stratify resources within their own coverage areas.  As a 
measure of added complexity, most agricultural policies and projects are implemented across 
Agricultural Development Districts (8 in total) and these can be subdivided in to 193 extension 
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planning areas.  There is an opportunity to explore the use of these districts for food security; 
however, this delineation only suits a handful of sectors in Malawi that mostly work with 
agriculture (i.e. water and irrigation).  
 Finally, analysis was conducted of pre-established livelihoods zones created by the 
Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee and published in 2005 in partnership with the 
Famine Early Warning System Network and USAID.  These zones are geographic areas where 
populations share characteristics of farming practices, labor and hazard coping and do not follow 
any recognized administrative boundary.  The use of these zones as one component of the overall 
composite vulnerability index helped to smooth the boundaries of TAs used in majority of the 
other analysis performed.  
2. Fieldwork analysis 
 This vulnerability approach is theory-driven and derived from multi-level interviews 
conducted over two research trips.  Based on these findings, vulnerability to climatic events and 
shocks are very closely linked to the overall social vulnerability of the population (Adger and 
Kelley, 1999).  It is the state of individuals, groups, or communities defined in terms of their 
ability to cope with and adapt to any external stress placed on their livelihoods and well-being 
(Kelley and Adger, 2000).  Many indices of vulnerability have neglected the human dimension of 
exposure, resilience and sensitivity (Adger and Kelley, 1999), only including indicators of flood, 
droughts, precipitation and temperature.  Therefore, to the largest extent possible, interviews 
explored variables within a coupled human-environment. Based on literature and fieldwork 
evidence of where the concentrations of most vulnerable populations were, village and project 
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site-visits were conducted to determine what factors were responsible for susceptibility to 
climactic events.  
3. Hypothesize who is vulnerable to what 
 In order to derive indicators or proxies for climate change vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity, meta-themes (or prevailing perspectives) were drawn from an extensive literature review 
(Chapter 2) and comprehensive multi-level interviews (Chapter 3).  Issues identified included 
physical exposure to floods and droughts, access markets, food water and labor to, assets of land, 
livestock and income and livelihood sensitivity based market exposure, crop productivity and 
natural resources for coping in time of disaster.  These were categorized into four meta-themes of 
assets, access, livelihood sensitivity and exposure.  This framework loosely follows the model of 
adaptive capacity (or resilience), sensitivity and exposure that is common throughout the literature 
(Adger and Kelley, 1999; Turner et. al., 2003; Schroter et. al., 2009; Busby et. al., 2010).  
4. Develop indicators of vulnerability 
Meta-theme1: Assets 
 Assets are critical to the resilience of households that experience a shock.  Research on the 
impacts of drought in agricultural societies indicates that both income (immediately accessible 
resources) and wealth (disposable capital assets) are important to coping strategies (Adger and 
Kelley, 1999).  While many of these indicators could be easily cross-listed with indicators of 
access, in the context of climate induced disasters and shocks, these indicators represent 
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conditions that increase (or decrease in the case of 'orphans and vulnerable children' adaptive 
capacity (or resilience).  
 Arable Land: Ownership of agriculture land is an important indicator of the 
socioeconomic status of the household.  Agricultural land refers to land that is used for growing 
crops (the crops may be food for people, food for animals, or other non-food crops), raising 
animals, and grazing animals.  Common land used to graze animals but not owned by the 
household is not be included.  This variable is important because larger landholders can diversify 
crops and sell excess food, while they are also more likely to have sufficient land for both crops 
and animals. 
 Livestock: This variable captures information on whether households own any livestock, 
herds, poultry or other animals and how many they own.  This variable is also often used as an 
additional indicator of the socioeconomic status of the household (DHS, 2010).  Animals have 
historically been used as coping strategy during slow-onset disaster events such as droughts 
(MVAC, 2005; Conway, 2006; Nangoma, 2008) 
 Wealth: Wealth is a composite measure of a household's cumulative living standard.  
Wealth may be comprised of a household‟s ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and 
bicycles; materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and sanitation 
facilities.  Wealth is an important metric in determining the resilience of a household (or the 
degree to which they can retain their socioeconomic status through a disaster).  
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 Health: With 12% of the population suffering from HIV/AIDS and as one of the hotspots 
for infectious disease worldwide, retaining good health is often the difference in a good or bad 
harvest, poor or moderate income and high or low adaptive capacity.  
 Orphan Care: Orphans are a manifest result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Malawi and 
are a highly socially vulnerable subset of the population (Conroy, 2006).  It is not uncommon for 
children to lose both parents to disease and children are often cared for by the women of the 
extended family.  Orphan care adds tremendous burden to families that are predisposed poor and 
food insecure (Magrath, 2009).  The metric of the number of orphans or vulnerable children 
within a household is a negative variable on assets.  
 
Meta-theme 2: Access 
 One of the most common themes to emerge in interviews with development organizations 
and rural villages was access to markets, information and resources.  Many interviewees felt that 
by being well connected to services, basic needs (such as water) and information through radio, 
mobile technology or tribal networks, households were better prepared, informed and warned 
about disasters.  These concepts parallel many discussions of access that include access to 
resources, healthcare and education (Watts and Bohle, 1993; Kelley and Adger, 2000), access to 
markets, insurance and infrastructure (O'Brien et. al., 2004), and access to water and sanitation 
(Eriksen and Kelley, 2006).  While these present numerous excellent indicators of overall social 
vulnerability, in the context of severe crisis stemming from floods, droughts and famine, these 
variables are reduced to the following list:  
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 Fuel for Cooking:  Information on the type of fuel used for cooking is another measure 
of the socioeconomic status of the household and the use of some cooking fuels can also have 
adverse health consequences (DHS, 2010).  Additionally one of the leading causes of 
environmental degradation in Malawi is deforestation to turn fuel wood into charcoal for market 
trade.  Selling of charcoal is one of the top coping strategies during periods of food insecurity and 
market shocks in many areas of Malawi (MVAC, 2005).  This variable is an issue of access 
because only 8% of the population has access to the electrical grid (Interview with MCC, 2011).  
Further research with the next variable could reveal patterns of how populations with access to 
electricity continue to use charcoal anyway.   
 Electricity: In line with the last indicator, nearly 92% of the population in Malawi is off 
the electrical grid.  Therefore, this variable is an indicator of proximity to infrastructure and 
access to urban areas and markets as well as socioeconomic status.   
 Water (Time to source): For many households in Malawi, the source of drinking water is 
not located within the dwelling or yard or farm plot of the household.  The burden of collecting 
water (often at great distances) is a burden that often falls to women and can consume large 
amounts of time in their daily routine (Magrath, 2009).  In a time of shock or drought, this time 
can be protracted causing even greater hardship and vulnerability. 
 Market access:  Without question, this issue is on the mind of many farmers that seek to 
sell their excess crops or trade for other food commodities.  However, for some villages the 
nearest vehicle-accessible road can be several kilometers and the nearest paved road for public 
transportation to urban centers might be a days or more journey by foot.  
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 Technology Sharing- Radio and Cell phone:  The introduction of mobile technology 
was highlighted as a recent and important phenomenon in Malawi.  In 2004, less than 4% of the 
population had a mobile phone.  In 2010, 37% of the population had cell phones (DHS, 2010).  
The power of this technology to assist households in dealing with, preparing for and being warned 
of shocks is tremendous.  In the area of early warning and notification, Malawi's expansion of 
rural radio transmission towers has afforded rural regions with better access to news and 
information.  In interviews in 2011 with rural farmers conducting adaptation activities, many 
farmers indicated that they had heard of projects and activities on the radio first and sought to 
contact the development organizations to participate.  Radio programs are powerful tools for 
reaching previously inaccessible populations and over 50% of surveyed households have radios 
(DHS, 2010). 
 Head of household sex and family structure: The literature provided several indications 
that households headed by females were more vulnerable based on less access to sources of 
power, land and resources (Magrath, 2009) and greater burdens based gender inequality, risk of 
HIV/AIDS and domestic violence (Conroy, 2006; DHS, 2010).  In addition, households headed 
by only one parent or by children (encompassed in the variable of family structure) were seen as 
more vulnerable in most studies (DHS, 2004; DHS, 2010).  
 
Meta-theme 3: Livelihood Sensitivity 
 The emergence of livelihood analysis as a major theme in development has begun to 
redress this knowledge gap and the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) has 
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adopted it as an approach to analyze vulnerability.  Between May and July 2003, the MVAC 
conducted a livelihood rezoning exercise and a Household Economy Approach (HEA) baseline 
survey in 11 livelihood zones in Malawi.  The HEA is based on exchange entitlements and 
economic theories of risk.  Based on these results, livelihood zones - or areas where households 
share similar options for obtaining food and income - were mapped.  Wealth groups were 
established by dividing the population into categories of Poor, Middle and Better-Off in a process 
that was unique to each livelihood zone based on experts on the assessment committee and district 
executives.  65% of Malawi's population was considered poor (MVAC, 2005).  This analysis then 
looks at sources of food and sources of income.  From this report, indicators were created that 
identify four statistics.  The first is the amount of food that poor households receive independently 
from their own farm. The variable is an indication of the sustainability of livelihoods in various 
zones.  In many zones, Malawian‟s balance the deficit in food production with wage labor. This 
second indicator looks at the availability of labor by evaluating the percentage of income that 
poor households receive from labor.  The next two indicators evaluate shocks. The third indicator 
evaluates what percentage of labor income is susceptible to market shocks (i.e. tobacco, sugar, tea 
and coffee).  Finally, the last indicator evaluates the ecological destruction associated with 
livelihood coping strategies during time of crisis in each zone.  These four indicators are unique to 
this analysis and with more robust fieldwork could create new and improved methods of 
vulnerability analysis that more accurately portray social-ecological impacts on livelihoods that 
extend beyond subsistence farming.   
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Meta-theme 4: Physical Exposure 
 The thesis up to this point, especially Chapters 2 and 3, has covered the historical 
prevalence of natural disasters and climatic variation in Malawi.  Floods, droughts, dry-spells and 
famines all remain at the forefront of the national psyche and there are now well established 
metrics for predicting future risk based on historical occurrences of disaster.   
5. Derive credible data to fit indicators 
This vulnerability index at the Traditional Authority (TA) level is comprised in part using 
over 35,000 household surveys (of which 25,000+ are women) from Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) conducted in Malawi in 2004 and 2010.  In an approach modeled after Oxford 
University's Multidimensional Poverty index. This DHS data was disaggregated from a large-end 
dataset to the village-cluster level to create a truly subnational vantage.  Pairing observed and 
realistic perceptions of vulnerability to data that is robust, place-based and relevant is a 
considerable challenge in establishing credible indicators.  However, the DHS surveys offer a 
comprehensive dataset of questions that correspond to many of the observed processes in the 
meta-themes of assets and access.  
The livelihood sensitivity analysis discussed in the previous step explored many of the 
variables derived by the MVAC.  While this data is somewhat dated at 2003-2005, there have 
likely not been significant changes in economic associations of markets, crop production or labor 
based on cultural reluctance to adopt changes quickly and lack of private investment in industry.  
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For biophysical indicators, existing datasets from the UNEP Global Disaster Risk Platform 
offer transparent and easily interpretable data on the risks of flood and drought exposure based on 
previous events.  Table 3 provides a list of the selected indicators with the source of the data.    
Theory Indicator Source of Data 
ASSETS 
Arable land Amount of Arable land per HH DHS  
Livestock Number of Animals per HH (by type) DHS 
Money  Wealth Index (based on owned assets) DHS  
Good health  Sick in the past 12mos DHS  
Orphan Care Number of Orphans or vulnerable children DHS  
ACCESS 
Basics Electricity (Y/N) DHS  
  Cooking Fuel type DHS  
  Water (Time to source) DHS  
Market Access Rural, Peri-urban, Urban DHS  
Technology Sharing Own radio (Y/N) DHS  
Media and Information Own a cell phone (Y/N) DHS  
Power and decision making Female-Headed HH (Y/N) DHS  
LIVELIHOOD SENSITIVITY 
Income source % Poor Income from labor MVAC 
Ability to meet food needs % food intake from personal farm MVAC 
Cash crop exposure % non-food crop (cotton, tobacco, tea) MVAC 
Ecological coping effect Subjective determination MVAC 
BIOPHYSICAL EXPOSURE 
Floods and Rain Variability Flood Events UNEP 
Drought and Dry spells Drought Events UNEP 
Table 3:  Composite Vulnerability Indicators 
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6. Operationalize the model 
This subnational vulnerability index of Malawi is intended to corroborate perceptions of 
climatic hotspots and drivers of vulnerability captured in interviews and validate analysis 
previously provided by the GoM in the National Adaptation Program of Action (2006).  Table 4 
(next page) provides the hierarchy and weighting of the adaptive capacity indicators.  Each 
column represents an important meta-theme category that was identified through research and 
interviews.  Weights were assigned to each indicator based on observations through fieldwork, 
interviews and literature. Weights were also based on the confidence that indicators were 
representative of the total population, while indicators with the highest potential for co-linearity in 
explanatory power of the model or non-stationarity of processes were reduced in importance but 
not excluded.  This biased assignment of weighting values is commensurate to the techniques 
employed in numerous vulnerability studies (Brooks et. al., 2005; Busby et. al., 2010) where more 
robust applications of weighting schemes are not practical.    
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ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
ASSETS   ACCESS 
 0.20       
 
   0.20       
 
                      
# LIVESTOCK UNITS   AMT ARABLE LAND   
TIME TO WATER 
SOURCE 
  OWN CELL PHONE 
0.20 2010   0.30 2010   0.20 2010   0.20 2010 
                      
WEALTH (IN 
ASSETS) 
  SICK PAST 12 mo   ELECTRICITY   OWN A RADIO 
0.20 2010   0.15 2010   0.15 2010   0.15 2010 
                      
ORPHAN & VUL 
CHILD 
  
    
  COOKING FUEL   URBAN-PERI U-RURAL 
0.15 2010         0.10 2010   0.10 2010 
                      
            FEMALE HHH        
            0.10 2010       
Table 4: Adaptive Capacity Model -  This table represents 40% of the overall composite index score.  
Assets include five variables from DHS (2010) that are ranked based on their overall importance to the 
model from top to bottom.  Assets represent 20% of the overall composite index.  There are seven Access 
indicators that are also ranked from top to bottom and contribute to 20% of the overall index.  
Table 5 (next page) provides the indicators and weighting values in the categories of 
livelihood sensitivity and physical exposure (representing 60% of the overall index).  Because this 
is a model of complex vulnerability with a contextual focus on climate change, the weighting for 
physical exposure is high.  While livelihood sensitivity analysis provides rich data on food and 
non-food crop production, labor, market exposure and coping techniques in time of disaster, the 
data generated by the MVAC is not robust enough to attribute a higher weighting value.  
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LIVELIHOOD 
SENSITIVITY 
  PHYSICAL EXPOSURE 
0.20 
 
  0.40 
 
          
FOOD FROM OWN FARM   DROUGHT EVENTS 
0.4 2005   0.5 1980-2001 
          
ACCESS TO LABOR   FLOOD EVENTS 
0.3 2005   0.5 1999-2007 
          
Non-food Market 
Exposure 
      
0.2 2005       
          
WEAK COPING STRATEGY       
0.2 2005       
Table 5:  Livelihood Sensitivity and Physical Exposure Model - This table represents 60% of the overall 
composite index score.  Livelihood sensitivity includes four variables from the Malawi Vulnerability 
Assessment Report (2005) that are ranked based on their overall importance to the model from top to 
bottom.  Livelihood sensitivity represents 20% of the overall model.  Physical exposure is 40% of the 
overall composite index.  There are two  indicators of drought and flood exposure risk from the UNEP 
Gridded Environmental Risk Platform that are weighted equally.  
 All work was conducted using ArcGIS software to map and visualize the data.  Each 
Meta-theme was imported from database files into separate layers in ArcMAP.  Each meta-
theme layer was then converted to raster format and the overall score was calculated by adding 
rasters together.  Both adaptive capacity and livelihood sensitivity were modeled as positive 
attributes of resilience (where higher scores indicate more capacity and less sensitivity, while 
exposure was modeled as a negative attribute (where the higher score indicates greater risk of 
disasters).  The overall score is represented by the following equation.  
Vulnerability = Adaptive Capacity + Livelihood Sensitivity - Physical Exposure 
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VULNERABILITY MAPPING RESULTS 
Introduction to the Vulnerability Maps 
 The objective of vulnerability mapping is to better understand complex vulnerability and 
locate the most vulnerable regions in Malawi.  However, the vulnerability maps in this section 
represent a negotiation of several factors and limitations in order to create the best account of 
vulnerability and resilience at the household level.  As discussed in the methodology section, the 
Demographic and Health Survey data were not intended for the evaluation of climatic risk at the 
household level but were implemented to gather information on households facing a series of 
health concerns.  Based on an interpretation of complex vulnerability presented in the Literature 
Review section (Illustration 1), the indicators used as variables in these theory-driven maps are 
suitable proxies for the strengthening or weakening of household level resilience based on 
Malawi's contextual issues of assets and access to resources.  Additionally, these maps represent a 
static view of the historical situation in Malawi; they are not projections or predictions of future 
outcome.  While a temporal analysis between 2004 and 2010 is the aim of this project, these maps 
in reality only present two snap-shots in time to which inferences about changes can be derived.  
Finally, the household surveys used to derive much of this analysis should not be considered 
random.  The surveys were funded by USAID and implemented in partnership with the Malawi 
Government.  In many cases, collaboration on area of interest may have led to a higher 
concentration of interviews in one district or traditional authority compared to some others.  This 
researcher also acknowledges that while the surveys for the two time periods appear robust and 
follow a logical distribution of population density, they do have some gaps in coverage that will 
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be indicated on the map.  The aggregation of these data from points associated with geographic 
clusters of villages to traditional authorities, while at a finer scale than most related studies, has 
the potential to misrepresent these areas by including or excluding some anomalous data.   
 As stated, the objective of creating these maps is to corroborate the perceived drivers of 
vulnerability derived from interviews at multiple levels of government, development and society 
to the existing literature and development publications on vulnerability within Malawi.  By 
focusing on the causes of vulnerability and the sources of resilience, these maps offer a unique 
comprehensive analysis on a subject rarely performed by researchers in Africa at this intermediate 
national scale.   
Household Vulnerability Mapping 
In an attempt to better capture some of the household dynamics associated with high and low 
resilience, the following map (Figure 6) depicts household level adaptive capacity by Traditional 
Authority (TA) boundaries.  The data were derived using 13,658 household surveys conducted 
across Malawi in 2004 as part of the Demographic and Health Surveys funded by USAID.  This 
map includes a composite of the following variables using a simplified weighting system: amount 
of arable land per household (0 to 5 hectare), Number of livestock per household by type 
(Combined score 0 to 5), Wealth Index - a DHS measure of household assets (1 to 5), Presence of 
electricity (0 or 5), Type of cooking fuel used (i.e. LPG, wood, charcoal, etc.) (0 to 5), Type of 
toilet facility (0 to 5),Roundtrip time to water source from homestead (0 to -5),Own a radio (0 to 
5),Own a mobile phone (0 to 5), and Female-headed Household (0 or 5) 
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Figure 6: Malawi Household Resilience (2004)-  This map depicts the overall resilience of households in 
Malawi based on DHS (2004) indicators of Assets and Access. The scores indicate the average resilience 
of households divided by traditional authority. Scores were divided by 'natural breaks using ArcGIS.  
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 Figure 6 represents a baseline for the temporal scale of this research.  Adaptive capacity 
scores were calculated based on the simple indicators and weighting scale provided in the 
previous paragraph.  On a household basis, in which there are 13,665 households included, the 
resilience score ranged from the lowest of -0.80 to the highest of 39.33.  For a household to 
indicate such a low score is an indication that they were in possession of few assets, had limited 
access to basic services and the negative score is likely a combination of time to reach the source 
of drinking water and/or presence of vulnerable children.  When households were averaged to the 
Traditional Authority level, the lowest average score for one TA was 3.9 in TA Machinjili (in the 
Blantyre District) and the highest resilience score was in Sub-Chief Mposa in the district of 
Machinga (refer to Figure 4 for district names). The average household resilience score 
nationwide was 12.74.  Because not every traditional authority had surveys conducted within its 
administrative boundaries, TAs with missing information were indicated as „Areas Missing DHS 
Data‟.  No inferences were made to try and fill these areas with data.  
 Using the same exact indicators, the next map (Figure 7) depicts household level adaptive 
capacity by Traditional Authority (TA) boundaries using 24,850 DHS household surveys 
conducted across Malawi in 2010.  Because of the increase in the overall number of surveys, this 
map has slightly better coverage than 2004. The data was derived using a composite of the exact 
same access and asset variables used in Figure 6 and using the same simplified weighting system.  
Applying an equal weighting system to a set of maps allowed the researcher to get a sense of 
which variables tended to have the greatest impact on the model.  
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Figure 7: Malawi Household Resilience (2004)- This map depicts the overall resilience of households in 
Malawi based on DHS (2010) indicators of Assets and Access. The scores indicate the average resilience 
of households divided by traditional authority. Scores were divided by 'natural breaks using ArcGIS.  
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Whereas in 2004 the spatial distribution of resilience scores illustrated only minor 
clustering in the Southern districts and showed a greater diffusion overall, using the same 
indicators and weighting, the 2010 map (Figure 7) shows significant clustering in Dedza and 
Machinga on Malawi's southern lake-shore.  In addition, there is a noticeable shift in vulnerability 
to the TAs surrounding the major urban center of Blantyre, the districts of Zomba and Mangochi 
and TAs in the Lower Shire River Valley.  In 2010, the average resilience score for households 
increased from 12.74 to 17.63.  A large part of this increase may stem from the rapid increase in 
the use of cell-phones (an indicator worth 5 points in the model) from 4% of the population in 
2004 to 37% of the population in 2010.  
An unexpected finding in this research was the increase in the average amount of arable 
land and livestock per household in 2010. This researcher had expected these averages to decrease 
as a result of population growth, a trend that was explained in Booth et. al. (2006).  However, 
incentives associated with the government's Farmer Input Subsidy Program have been reported to 
motivate farmers to expand their arable land (Fisher, 2010), and encroachment of farming into 
marginal land (NAPA, 2006) could also contribute to this growth.   
Concentrations of TAs with higher resilience scores (20+) were in the northern districts of 
Rumphi, Nkhata Bay, Kasungu and Nkotakota.  Concentrations of the lowest resilience TAs were 
in districts of Mangochi, Dedza, Ntchisi and Chikwawa in central and southern Malawi.  
Accounting for the shift in vulnerability (lower resilience) to southern Malawi is difficult using 
the variables alone.  However, a major famine that occurred in 2005 (discussed in Chapter 1) was 
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reported to have had the worst effect in the south. Numerous interviews indicated that many 
households in this region had not fully recovered from the 2002 and 2005 famines.   
While the 2010 map (Figure 7) shows that many new districts in the central and southern 
regions of Malawi are vulnerable when compared to their neighbors, the overall increase in the 
resilience scores does not indicate where TAs decreased or increased actual resilience (using raw 
scores).  In an effort to better capture the temporal shifts from 2004 to 2010, Figure 8 (next page) 
depicts the actual change in the average household resilience score by TA.  Most TA's exhibit a 
pronounced increase in the average resilience score, while in the southern half of the country there 
are noticeable concentrations of decreased average resilience scores.  These areas, while not 
specifically named in interviews or reports by TA are commensurate to recent and perceived 
hotspots of vulnerability.  These areas indicated in orange and red are perhaps better indicators of 
independently evaluated vulnerability (each TA is evaluated against itself) rather than Figure 7 
which evaluate resilience scores against a national average.  
With an informative model built to evaluate indicators of assets and access using DHS 
data available, Figure 9 (in two pages) depicts the livelihood zones created by the Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee to group areas of shared crop production, labor and post-
disaster coping strategies.  There are 19 zones that evaluate economic and household indicators of 
livelihood. This component was added to the model to target sensitivity of households based on 
food and non-food crop production, access to labor, market exposure (based on farming and 
labor) and environmental impact based on common coping strategies of the poor.  Zones were 
independently evaluated and data was compiled into an index of sensitivity scores.  
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Figure 8: Malawi Changes in Household Resilience (2004-2010) - This map depicts the change in 
resilience scores in Traditional Authorities between 2004 and 2010 based on DHS indicators of assets and 
access.  Blue scores indicate increased resilience. Orange indicates little or no change. Red indicators 
traditional authorities that decreased resilience.  
137 
 
 
Figure 9: Malawi Economic Livelihood Zone Map - This map depicts the subnational zoning of Malawi 
based on livelihood profiles assessed by the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee in 2005. The 
scores reflect indicators of food security, available labor, market vulnerability and environmental impact of 
coping strategies.  Higher scores indicate areas with livelihoods that are less sensitive external market and 
environmental stressors.   
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 In trying to complete a vulnerability index model that would encompass the many facets 
of Malawian life and place it in the context of climatic uncertainty, Figure 11 combines the meta-
theme elements of access and assets (as resilience or adaptive capacity in Figure 7), livelihood 
sensitivity based on zone data (Figure 9), and physical exposure (Figure 10 on next page) (risk of 
floods and droughts developed by UNEP) to arrive at a composite index of Malawi's current 
climate change vulnerability.   
What was expected based on interviews and literature was that the most at-risk 
populations in Malawi are in the Lower Shire River Valley in the districts of Chikwawa and 
Nsanje.  The majority of the planned and anticipated projects from the national government, civil 
society groups, NGOs and donors appear to be concentrated in this region.  There was also 
tremendous consensus that this area would continue to experience environmental shocks, food 
insecurity and diminished adaptive capacity and this area does show minor clustering of 
vulnerability in this area.  Karonga, a district on Malawi‟s northern border with Tanzania, is also 
mentioned as another area of high vulnerability. This district has continually experienced flooding 
with a most recent event affecting over 3000 people and washing away 120 homes in April 2011.  
Disaster risk in Malawi is widespread, but concentrations of vulnerability appear to have shifted 
to Malawi's southern districts in 2010 from the baseline in 2004. In the complex vulnerability 
map, it was expected that these elements of assets, access, livelihood and exposure would 
corroborate the evidence and observations from fieldwork and interviews.  
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Figure 10: Physical Exposure to Floods and Droughts - This map depicts exposure risk to the 
hydrometeorological events of floods and droughts as assessed by the UNEP Global Risk Data Platform 
using data collected from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory and Gridded Precipitation index. Darker 
colors of orange and blue indicate higher risk of exposure to drought and flood.  
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Figure 11: Malawi Composite Vulnerability Index- This map depicts subnational vulnerability to climate 
variability and change based on socioeconomic components of assets, access and livelihood sensitivity 
reduced by the risk of exposure to floods and droughts.  The darker orange areas indicate places of a 
combination of low adaptive capacity and high exposure to hydrometeorological events.  
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 To a large degree, the mapped complex vulnerability was as expected.  The cluster of 
vulnerable TAs surrounding the southern city of Blantyre was significant because they represent 
peri-urban areas where underdeveloped settlements and unchecked deforestation have put 
increased pressure in these geographic zones.  The households in these surrounding villages tend 
to be poorer, with less wealth, fewer assets and virtually no arable land or livestock.  Peri-urban 
households are generally trapped between food rich and income poor rural communities and 
income rich urban areas.  In the southeast corner of Malawi to the east of Blantyre is the area of 
Thyolo and Mulanje.  The higher vulnerabilities in these areas were reflective of the low amount 
of arable land per household stemming from the large tea plantations that have dominated this 
landscape since colonization.  As expected, numerous districts along the upper and lower Shire 
River exhibited higher vulnerability, and the districts of Chikwawa and Nsanje exhibited near 
continuous high vulnerability scores.   
 Unexpected elements of this map were clustering of vulnerability along the southern 
lakeshore area in the districts of Mangochi (just south of Lake Malawi) and Dedza (south of 
Lilongwe).  While there is no doubt that these are poor and vulnerable areas of Malawi (based  on 
indicators of assets and access explored in Figure 7), these areas were not identified through 
interviews or the literature as being the most vulnerable.  This omission is perhaps based on the 
fact that there are less occurrences of droughts and floods in this area.  However, the southern 
lakeshore region was highlighted in an OXFAM report (Magrath, 2009) as an area of 
vulnerability due to overfishing - an issue that was captured in the model - and Dedza was 
highlighted in Malawi‟s NAPA as an area for wildfires.  These districts are excellent areas of 
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future research because their identification in this map either highlights unknown interacting 
processes, problems with the methodological use of expert interviewing or an over-emphasis on 
certain proxy variables such as arable land and livestock.    
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Chapter 5 - Foreign Aid Evaluation   
 Objective 3:  Determine if climate change adaptation projects are focused in the most 
climatically vulnerable regions of Malawi. 
 The purpose of this objective is to assess the effectiveness of project activities and the 
broader implications based on the stakeholders observations.  As a measure of aid effectiveness, 
this project includes granted access to over 900 multilateral and bilateral active development 
project documents from the Malawi Ministry of Finance and AidData- an independent aid 
tracking database.  Projects from the 27 donors were geo-referenced in a process developed by 
AidData and Development Gateway and climate-coded using a process developed as part of a 
research team at the University of Texas‟ Climate Change and African Political Stability 
(CCAPS) program.  The results are compared to the created vulnerability map to determine if the 
most vulnerable regions are receiving the most aid directed towards climate change adaptation. 
Fine-scale mapping of the adaptation projects and activities in Malawi gives an appraisal of the 
existing efforts by the government and international organizations to put adaptation theory into 
practice.  This thesis will reveal that such projects are not perfect but represent the initial stage of 
potentially dozens of future projects that follow with an increase in adaptation aid.  Subnational 
mapping of adaptation projects represents one of the most comprehensive spatial analyses of 
subnational foreign aid constructed.   
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 Where adaptation theory gains teeth and is employed to produce outcomes is through 
projects.  The use of the term „project‟ to describe the on-the-ground approaches by international 
organizations, high-level donors, non-governmental actors, civil society groups and even private 
companies is perhaps a purposefully vague label. However, in the exploration of organizational 
documents, project documents are often the lowest and most detailed source of information 
available.  Projects are conceived and implemented at multiple levels.  There may be an 
international or regional approach to adaptation such as the African Adaptation Program, funded 
through contributions by the Government of Japan, managed by UNDP and supporting small 
grants to village-level initiative across the continent (UNDP, 2012).  A project can also be the 
initiative of one small NGO in one village to diversify crops.  However, when seeking to evaluate 
what adaptation activities and initiatives are occurring within the study area of Malawi, a project 
document is usually the best - if not the only - source of information.  
 Problematically, project documents are rarely public record or open-source.  Only the 
World Bank and recently the African Development Bank provide access to their full 
documentation online.  Other donors such as the European Commission (EC), USAID or NORAD 
provide intermittent coverage of their projects. Finally, there are several donors - the majority in 
Malawi - that do not make their documents available online or through any searchable database.  
This lack of transparency was highly problematic to conducting a thorough survey of the 
activities in Malawi.  This methodology section highlights the many steps required to procure 
project documents, catalog them, analyze the projects for adaptation activities and geocode the 
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project locations - often occurring in 10 or more distinct locations per project- in order to provide 
the most through appraisal of Malawi's recent climate change response. 
Uncovering Project Documents 
 This section highlights the many steps required in tracking projects down to the remote 
corners of Malawi in order to later assess those impacted by the projects.  Every researcher wants 
good data in their research, but the question of where to find such data rarely produces easy 
answers. As short as four years ago, the best source of project-level information for official 
development assistance was the Creditor Reporting System of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD-CRS).  This open database - in existence since 1967- 
covered most of the bilateral activities of the 24 member countries of the OECD's Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as the multilateral development banks, United Nations 
agencies and some non-DAC donors (OECD, 2012).  However, while this database contains 
records of over US$2 Trillion in aid since 1967, the reporting is voluntary and the descriptions of 
the projects are usually less than 250 words.  This database alone was insufficient.  
 The next option was to search for donor literature and online disclosures (grey literature) 
on the website of each donor.  This exhaustive process turned up few documents that could 
adequately describe what was happening and where it was happening in Malawi. AidData was 
formed as an independent, open-source database for tracking international development finance in 
2009.  It nearly doubled the amount of tracked aid from US$2.3 under the OECD-CRS to US$4 
trillion.  Through this system, researchers can access a higher degree of project level data (to 
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filter, sort, and export it as needed) and many of the projects include valuable expanded 
descriptions.  This database was a significant improvement over previous tracking systems and 
exclusively included some of the smaller donors like Poland, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Latvia, Kuwait, 
and China.  Over 1 million projects are listed on the database, which includes not only official 
development assistance but also loans (which the OECD database does not).  While AidData is 
truly a useful research tool, it remains difficult to get a clear picture of Malawi's activities using 
data derived solely from the donors themselves.  Donor self-reporting is a major consideration in 
the context of adaptation, because donors have been found to exaggerate their activities as being 
related to climate change (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010).     
 The Government of Malawi (GoM) has made commendable progress towards making 
foreign aid in their country transparent, presenting a unique opportunity to examine the complex 
network of development aid using documents provided by the recipient rather than the donor.  
With an overall objective to better understand how the scramble climate adaptation projects is 
impacting the population in Malawi, tracking aid down to a sub-national level was required to 
determine if it is, in fact, reaching the country‟s most vulnerable populations.  Malawi has been 
on the cusp of improving their aid transparency.  In 2009,  they became an end-user of the Aid 
Management Platform (AMP)- a recipient-driven initiative that is currently implemented in about 
twenty countries and is sponsored by the  parent organization of AidData: Development Gateway.  
It allows recipient governments to better anticipate the disbursements from donors by creating a 
compulsory system of reporting.  After three years of use in Malawi, the Ministry of Finance is 
better able to track, predict and coordinate the aid streaming into the country.  Obtaining this 
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information from a government could be difficult as it is not open-source.  However, many 
governments as a measure of transparency in the future may provide access to this illuminating 
side of development aid. Working closely with the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in Malawi, this 
researcher - as part of a multidisciplinary team - secured over 800 documents related to ongoing 
and active development projects.  However, some of the documents provided by the MoF were of 
very poor quality and provided insufficient information.  
 It is in this context that an on-the-ground approach in Malawi was necessary to fill in as 
many gaps in knowledge as possible.  As discussed in a previous sections, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 6 multilateral aid organizations, 9 bilateral donors, 6 ministries 
and departments of the national government, 8 agencies of local government and over 20 non-
governmental and civil society organizations.  This final step in project document collection 
requiring extensive resources and time spent in Malawi was necessary to achieve the level of 
detail provided on the maps in the next section.  
 Leaving Malawi with 800+ project documents after the first research trip in March 2011, 
organizing the project level information was like filling in the pieces of a puzzle. Documents 
varied in length and quality.  Some provided information on the financial transactions some 
provided detailed descriptions and some described the villages and communities where projects 
were occurring.  However, like a puzzle, when pieces are missing it is becomes very obvious.  
This researcher estimates that at least a third of the aid occurring in Malawi remains unknown.  
While nearly every multilateral and bilateral donor activity is accounted for, there is sparse 
information on non-governmental, governmental, faith-based charities and private organizations 
148 
 
providing assistance in Malawi.  While the maps in the next sections represent some of the most 
thorough subnational analysis of aid flows and coverage ever produced, technology and 
coordination have not yet reached a point that can adequately capture the complex landscape of 
foreign aid.  
 Through the Aid Management Platform, there were 882 projects being tracked in July 
2011 by the Malawi MoF representing almost $7 billion in promised (or committed aid) to which 
$4.2 billion had been received by the Government of Malawi. Aid was allocated across 17 sectors 
of development with an average cost of $7.2 million per project. At the time of this reporting, 79 
projects had received no funding.  
METHODOLOGY 
Climate-coding Methodology  
 In 2010, Axel and Katharina Michaelowa – a husband and wife team from the University 
of Zurich – published an article that found of the 636,962 projects worldwide they investigated 
using the OECD-CRS, only 10,414 were identified by donors as being climate relevant.  
However, according to their climate coding methodology, only 4,321 projects actually contributed 
to adaptation or mitigation (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010).  Some of the spurious projects 
identified as climate change, included projects titled "Savannah elephant vocalization (US)", 
"Uniforms for park guardians in Central America (Spain)" and "Earthquake safety (Switzerland)" 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010).  Their conclusion was that climate reporting by donors was 
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indeed influenced systematically by political factors.  An independent approach to climate coding 
is essential to an unbiased examination of climate finance distribution. 
As part of a collaborative research group studying the allocations of adaptation through 
foreign aid in Africa, the team used AidData‟s open source database to evaluate projects to Africa 
from 2005 to 2008 and 'climate-coded' each project against seven selected official definitions of 
adaptation (Weaver and Peratsakis, 2010). Based on this analysis, Table 6 depicts the top ten 
recipient countries for both international development aid and the top ten recipients of climate 
change adaptation.   
Five of the recipients appear in both lists with Ethiopia getting the largest share of 
adaptation funding.  Of a total $184 billion in international development aid and 130 thousand 
projects in Africa between 2005 and 2008, the research identified just over $1 billion and 763 
projects as aid for adaptation to climate change.  In Malawi, climate finance followed a 
continental trend allocation of less than 1% of total aid towards adaptation (see figure 12).   
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          Table 6: Total and Adaptation Foreign Aid to Africa 
        Figure 12: Adaptation Aid to Malawi 
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 Given that the country is traditionally concerned with food security, it was no surprise to 
discover that almost all of the $23 million in adaptation aid was directed to agricultural projects.  
However, the precision of this initial research was constrained by the limited information 
available about each project through the AidData database. Reevaluating the level of aid for 
adaptation in Malawi using the project documents acquired by the MoF and donor organizations 
produced far superior results, highlighted in the next section. 
Geocoding Methodology 
 Geocoding of all 800 projects active in Malawi was conducted through the same 
collaborative effort with CCAPS in order to facilitating further research on the complex 
distribution of aid, distribution of aid by sector, temporal links to crisis and if aid reaches the most 
vulnerable communities for which it is intended.  Geocoding may be simply defined as assigning 
exact coordinates to a place or event.  However, there is nothing simple about geocoding 
development aid projects.   
"Geocoding is the process of tagging aid activity records with precise geographical 
information rather than simply specifying the country where a project is being 
implemented.  It requires identifying the district, town, or even latitude and 
longitude where a project is active (and in many cases, a single project can be 
implemented in many separate locations across a country).  Geocoding allows a 
wide range of stakeholders to easily understand where aid activities are taking 
place, to monitor implementation, and to evaluate their effectiveness."  
(Development Gateway Website, 2012) 
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 The geocoding process has been recently streamlined by AidData and they have partnered 
with the World Bank to make all their projects in the future available for spatial analysis.  
However, in geo-coding aid in general, there are still methodological concerns that must be 
addressed.  For example, it is difficult to display national, sub-national and government level 
project information on a continuous map.  Only more transparent project information can lead to a 
better map, and even then there is a need to actually get on the ground and see if what donors and 
other organizations report is happening is true. 
Ground-truth Methodology 
 Numbers on paper and points on a map rarely convey what is truly happening on the 
ground of development projects. Of the over 850,000 projects in an AidData's database (in 2011), 
320,000 projects are in Africa and 6,300 are in Malawi over the period of the past 60 years.  Of 
these 6300 projects, only 8 projects use „climate adaptation‟ in their description.  However, this is 
not to say that donors are not implementing adaptation projects.  On the contrary, several donors 
indicated that in Malawi, adaptation is empirically linked to food security and that they are as a 
result doing adaptation projects.  On the other hand, when donors indicate that their projects are 
related to climate change, it may be an overstatement on the number of activities that are actually 
related to adaptation.  This possible misreporting is an issue that cannot be solved remotely using 
search-engines and databases; it requires a diligent researcher to take to the field and confirm 
whether the data is in fact accurate.  
 Ground-truth is a term used in the geographic sciences in which data gathered from 
remote (or indirect sources) is verified by physically travelling to the point of interest.  
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Cartographers may use this to verify the accuracy of their maps by evaluating such things as 
elevations, distances or contours.  Remote sensing researchers may use this step to confirm 
infrared or near-infrared spectral information obtained through satellite imagery.  Through 
collecting physical information 'on-location', this process is usually employed to assess the 
accuracy or reliability of the data or enable it for further calibration. 
 In the context of adaptation projects, the goal of ground-truthing is two-fold.  First, it will 
test the reliability of the project-level information provided by donors.  If donors are prone to 
exaggerate their climate-related benefits, then it should be verified by project site-visits.  
Additionally, if donors are doing activities related to adaptation without adopting the rhetoric, 
then this commitment to livelihoods too should be identified in order to make the climate-coding 
methodology more inclusive.  Second, few studies are evaluating what activities related to 
adaptation look like or consist of.  This research was an opportunity to see what projects look like 
on the ground.  However, time, money and human-power are critical factors that limit the 
extensiveness of this phase of analysis.  
 The ground-truthing of aid projects in Malawi was conducted solely by this researcher.  
Therefore, in an effort to stratify the projects evaluated, a random selection was not employed.  
Rather, projects were systematically selected based on the following criteria.  Only a few projects 
in Malawi are explicitly targeting the effects of climate change and clearly indicate in their project 
documents that the activities are to help people adapt to those affects.  However, there are a 
handful of projects that employ many of the same project-level activities without the explicit use 
of the terms climate change and adaptation.  The first criterion is to answer the research question; 
154 
 
do projects have to state they are related to climate change in order to be effective towards 
mitigation?  The second criterion is to answer the question; does it matter who is funding or 
implementing the projects?  Projects might be funded by large multilateral organizations such as 
the European Commission or World Bank, or projects might be in the form of small grants to 
NGOs that have complete control over their activities.  Evaluating both types of projects may 
illuminate whether externally designed development is more effective community-led initiatives.  
The third criterion is an extension of this logic where the amount of money towards the project or 
the availability of key resources such as agriculture inputs (such as seed and fertilizer) or 
subsidies is an important factor of effectiveness.  This criterion answers the question; do large and 
well-funded projects spread over many villages provide a better 'per capita' impact than smaller 
projects in fewer locations?  The fourth criterion seeks to answer the research question; do 
projects by organizations with higher levels of transparency perform better than projects where 
the implementing agency provides almost no information?  This criterion seeks to determine 
whether a large amount of documentation on a project is beneficial to a researcher, or whether the 
on-ground picture of the project deviates largely from this documentation by the time the 
documentation is in place.  Additionally, it can be assumed that development organizations 
operating at a higher level of transparency are interested in the accuracy and effectiveness of their 
projects as opposed to organizations that are not required to provide as much information.  
Finally, the projects selected were meant to have a mix of villages in rural and peri-urban settings.  
Among the rural communities, some villages had better market access than others and this was a 
parameter for further research in to adaptation activities. 
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RESULTS 
Introduction to the Development Project Maps 
 The objectives of this development project mapping were to determine if climate change 
adaptation projects are located in the most climatically vulnerable regions of Malawi identified in 
Chapter 4 and explore the broader implications based on the results derived compared to 
stakeholder observations on aid effectiveness.  However, just like the vulnerability maps in the 
previous sections, aid maps also represent a negotiation of several factors and limitations.  The 
data represented is contingent on the accurate availability of high quality information and as 
discussed in the methodology section does not and possibly can never include all development aid 
activities occurring in the country of Malawi.  Just as with vulnerability mapping, the aid maps 
are also a static representation of events in a defined time period that stems from 2003 to present 
with most projects starting after 2007 and completing by 2012.  
 These maps correspond to the best available and most spatially-relevant information. For 
example, projects that do not have some subnational component (i.e. projects implemented at a 
national or policy level) are not included in these maps because a disproportionate amount of aid 
would appear in the capital city of Lilongwe.  What these maps do illustrate is the degree to which 
aid is dispersed in the country.  This information can be measured by donor organization, sector 
or development or by some administrative boundary applied.  As with any dataset, there are 
certainly gaps in analysis.  As will be presented in this section, this static view of project 
documents, typically at their formation period, often presents a distorted view of aid activities that 
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does not necessarily correspond to actual locations or activities on the ground.  Many of these 
documents are proposals for projects, and just like most academic research proposals, on-the-
ground forces can shift the direction of even the best laid plan.  However, these maps are 
informative to stakeholders at multiple-levels that might have an interest in planning, 
coordinating, tracking, evaluating or discovering the activities occurring in their area of interest.  
For example, a donor might seek to introduce an education project in an area that has had little 
intervention in the past decade.  A government department might seek to close the gaps in 
coverage where aid projects are less dense, or a community official may seek to connect with an 
implementing agency in a nearby village for assistance or training.  The value in these aid maps is 
in their potential, not in their end-state.  Finally, the maps do not convey whether aid locations or 
activities are effective.  As useful as this information would be, the technology and methodology 
outlined in this project does not support this ability.  
Aid Maps and Analysis 
 The following map (Figure 13) depicts all active aid in Malawi organized by development 
sectors. These are projects that have a subnational component, and of the development projects 
tracked by the Malawi Ministry of Finance, 548 of the 889 projects occurred at a level below 
national as determined by the geocoding methodology. This map represents the first time that the 
activities of so many donors have been mapped together and these data were recently presented at 
a World Bank conference on aid transparency.  As a stand-alone document, the map is not very 
informative, but it represents an important step in increasing aid transparency and accountability.  
It is allowing the government of Malawi to better track the activities of donors and NGOs and it 
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allows decision makers some degree of spatial interpolation regarding aid sectors.  There are also 
initiatives underway to connect this type of information to villages and communities through 
mobile technology and solicit their feedback on aid activities through crowd-sourcing (AidData, 
2012). 
 Figure 14 depicts these same projects and locations, but the colors are arranged by the 
development organizations (or donors) operating in Malawi. It becomes obvious that the 
European Union has the largest number of projects in Malawi, and this is unsurprising given that 
they are the largest contributor of foreign aid.  Their projects (and associated road signs) have a 
very extensive and visible impact on the landscape on Malawi. Their approaches from Income 
Generating Public Works and Rural Feeder Road Projects to the Farm Income Diversification 
Program are dotted all over Malawi.  In contrast, Norway also has many projects, but they tend to 
be clusters in the central area of Malawi and USAID projects tend to cluster in District 
headquarter cities.  The geocoding of these projects is opening up a window of opportunity for 
geographers and researchers to study patterns and distributions of foreign aid while considering 
organizational dynamics, political economy and land use change.  
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Figure 13: Development Projects in Malawi by Sector(2005-2011) - This map depicts 548 subnational 
development aid projects to 2451 locations in Malawi organized by development sector. Agriculture, 
Roads and Rural Development were the sectors with the most projects.  
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Figure 14: Aid Projects in Malawi by Donor (2004-2011) -  This map depicts 548 subnational 
development aid projects to 2451 locations in Malawi organized by donor organization.  The European 
Union is the top contributor of aid as well as the donor with the most project locations.   
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 While tremendous time and effort could be given to the study of all development projects 
in Malawi, the focus of this thesis is on projects related to climate adaptation.  As this thesis has 
reiterated, there are not clearly defined definitions in the development community. Therefore, one 
approach to identifying and classifying these projects was to search for explicit use of 
terminology in the projects that refers to climate change or adaptation.  Only five separate donors 
have active project (nine projects total) with activities related to climate change adaptation. They 
are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Norway, DFID (U.K.), UNDP and The World 
Bank through the Global Environmental Facility.   Figure 15 depicts the locations of the projects 
by project name.  
 While these projects obviously have climate change adaptation as their principle objective, 
there were numerous projects highlighted in the climate coding that had some climate change 
adaptation component despite project descriptions that did not use climate change or adaptation 
rhetoric.  These projects can be generally thought to include activities that would increase 
household resilience (such as promotion of crop diversity or natural resource co-management) 
without having a primary objective of adaptation.  Concentric circles on Figure 16 are presented 
as an alternative view that depicts (generally) the number of projects and the amount of funding at 
each location - each project circle size is proportionate to the funding received.  An X is placed on 
the physical location of the project to highlight projects where funding is too small to see.  While 
these data only represent 47 projects in 368 locations, it becomes obvious that individual 
development projects are fragmented to numerous districts, but concentrations of projects at 
district headquarters reflect a potential bottleneck in the distribution of aid funds.  
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Figure 15:  'Explicit' Adaptation Projects in Malawi by Project Title - This map depicts ten projects 
explicitly titled and coded as adaptation. Projects are occurring in  67 discreet locations between 2005 and 
2011.  
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Figure 16:  Broad Adaptation Projects in Malawi-  This map depicts projects in Malawi that included 
identified adaptation activities based on the climate-coding methodology. While these projects do not 
explicitly address climate change, the projects may have serendipitous adaptation benefits.  There were 47 
projects to 368 discreet locations between 2005 and 20011.  
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Another way to analyze the development projects is to look at the amount of aid and the 
amount of projects occurring in each district or Traditional Authority (TA).  Because the 
vulnerability analysis conducted in Chapter 4 was done at the TA level, this analysis then 
aggregates projects to these boundaries to determine where the aid projects are located and how 
much financial assistance money is targeted to each TA.  Figure 17 depicts total amount of aid 
disbursed to projects by Traditional Authority.  While this analysis is comprehensive, the data are 
derived from multiple sources and do not include NGO or private financing.  Therefore, TAs with 
no active aid disbursements received may have support through other unseen channels of delivery 
such as private or governmental sources.   However, it is interesting to note the amount of aid that 
is directed toward northern districts that exhibited lower vulnerability in the complex 
vulnerability map (Figure 11).  It could be argued that these districts exhibit less vulnerability as a 
result of the presence of more aid, but this conclusion would be premature.  Over 300 projects that 
were considered to be national in scope were excluded from this analysis in order to better capture 
on-the-ground activities.  Despite this, the areas receiving the most aid are Lilongwe (the capital 
city) and Blantyre (the country‟s financial center).   Lilongwe city also has the greatest number of 
projects geocoded to its location, which could reflect an error in the geocoding methodology or 
may highlight the fact that nearly every government department or donor headquarters receives 
some incentive from development projects (such as a hired expert, equipment or assembled 
research team). 
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Figure 17:  Total Amount of Active Aid Disbursements Received by Traditional Authority  
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GROUND-TRUTHING RESULTS  
With extensive analysis of development projects through documents and interviews 
leading to thorough and fine-scale aid mapping, attention was transitioned to ground-truthing aid 
projects.  Project site-visits were conducted in Malawi over two separate research trips (March 
2011 and July-August 2011) to better understand what adaptation activities look like on the 
ground, how they are introduced to communities and if these activities appear (at least in the 
short-term) to be effective.  Using the criteria highlighted in the methodology, Table 7 provides 
information on how the seven selected projects met the conditions. 
Explicit Adaptation Projects: 
1. Managing Adaptation to Climate Change (MACC) [Total Land Care & Norway], 
March 24, 2011- 4 Village sites in Kanyenda Authority, Nkota Kota.  
2. Climate Change Adaptation in Africa  [IDRC/DFID(UK)]  
a. August 2, 2011 - Mpaso Village, Chikwawa District.  
b. August 4, 2011 - Nessa Village, Mulanje 
3. Climate Adaptation for Rural Livelihoods and Agriculture (CARLA) – [Global 
Environmental Facility / GoM NAPA], August 3, 2011  – Moses Village, Chikwawa 
District. 
4. Climate Change Adaptation and Development Initiative [UNEP GEF Small Grant] 
August 8, 2011- Lundu Authority, Blantyre.   
Projects where adaptation is not a principle objective: 
5. Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust [USAID/World Bank], August 4, 2011 - 
Mulanje Village, Malawi.    
6. Community Vitalization and Afforestation in Middle Shire [Forestry Department and 
Japan International Cooperation Agency], July 27, 2011- 5 Village cites in Kapeni 
Authority, Blantyre.   
7. Reforestation of the Soche Mountain Forest Reserve [Sustainable Rural Growth and 
Development Initiative (SRGDI) and Global Environmental Facility], August 1, 2011 - 
Chilobwe and Somba Villages, Blantyre  
 
166 
 
  
Projects 
Condition 
 
MACC CCAA CARLA 
CC-
DARE MMCT    COVAM 
Soche 
Mount 
1 
Adaptation Explicit               
Serendipitous Adaptation               
2 
Large Parent Organization               
Small Parent Organization               
3 
Unconstrained Resources               
Resources Constrained               
4 
High Transparency               
Low Transparency               
Table 7: Ground Truthing Project Criteria 
One of the primary objectives of this fieldwork was to help establish what adaptation 
looks like on the ground.  While there is a tremendous literature on theories of adaptation, few if 
any documents provide explicit information about the actual activities and strategies being 
employed to physically help communities and households adapt to existing or predicted climatic 
changes.  This research served to identify these activities by meeting with project implementers 
(mostly NGOs) to discuss activities and community leaders to discuss project effectiveness, 
perceptions of climate change and drivers of vulnerability. The next section highlights three 
projects visited to provide an overview of how adaptation is occurring from multiple perspectives.    
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Managing Adaptation to Climate Change 
Also known as the Chia Lagoon Project (See Figure 14), this five year $4.3 million project 
was funded by Norway and implemented by Total Land Care (TLC), a Malawian NGO.  It is 
Norway‟s flagship adaptation project, and it is the most explicit adaptation project active in 
Malawi.  This project illustrates the extent to which climate change adaptation strategies in 
Malawi are mainly targeted at improving food security.  Even this project that is meant to 
explicitly address climate change is still doing so within the framework of food security.  It also 
demonstrates the obstacles that food security projects must overcome in order to effectively 
address vulnerability to climate change.  This project encourages farmers to adopt new agriculture 
technologies that reduce long-term vulnerability to climate change.  However, before farmers use 
these new technologies on a large scale they will want to see evidence that these technologies 
produce sufficient yields in the short term as well. This approach requires inputs of hybrid maize 
seeds and fertilizer to be issued to the farmers as an incentive to change their farming practices. 
The project is currently being implemented in ten Extension Planning Areas (EPAs).  While in 
Malawi in March of 2011, a site visit to one of the EPAs where TLC is implementing the project 
was conducted in four different communities that are using a variety of strategies to adapt to 
climate change.  Each community worked directly with TLC to decide which project was the 
most appropriate for them. 
 Two communities visited were implementing conservation agriculture projects. 
 Conservation agriculture has three principles: minimum tillage to reduce rainfall runoff, residue 
retention, and crop rotation.  TLC promotes planting “on contour” as opposed to planting on 
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ridges (which is the most common farming technique used in Malawi).  Planting “on contour” 
helps to reduce runoff (Interview with TLC, 2011).  TLC also encourages farmers to bury the old 
vegetation in their fields instead of burning it because this technique increases the nutrients in the 
soil.  In one farmer‟s field, there were newly planted “fertilizer trees” – Faidherbia albida. These 
trees have a reverse cycle from most other plants and shed their leaves during the planting season, 
which then act as a natural fertilizer for crops.   
 The third community visited was doing an afforestation project.  Before the project began, 
the women of the community had to rely on a protected forest area for firewood.  Since this 
activity was illegal, the women were often detained while bringing back wood.  TLC has helped 
the community plant trees, and taught them how to use the new trees in a sustainable way so that 
they no longer have to resort to deforesting the protected areas.  TLC has also encouraged 
community members to switch to new types of ovens that are much more fuel-efficient.  The 
amount of wood that would last for the traditional oven for only three or four days now lasts for 
over a month when using the new, more efficient oven. 
 In the last community was a farmer who raised livestock as a form of enterprise 
development and income diversification.  The farmer heard about TLC on a radio program and 
began working with the organization.  The farmer used to rely solely on maize but now he has 
several goats, which he can sell or use their milk to feed his family.  He also uses the animal 
manure to make organic fertilizer.  In addition to this new venture, the farmer was also using 
some conservation agriculture techniques in his maize fields.  He diversified his crops in one field 
and was also experimenting with contour planting in another field to see how effective it was. 
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 This situation reiterated the fact that convincing farmers to change their traditional ways of 
planting would not be an easy task.  Many farmers need to see results for themselves before fully 
embracing new farming techniques.  This is one challenge to addressing climate change 
adaptation through food security projects in a country where information travels slowly and 
farmers are reluctant to make sweeping technological changes.  
Climate Change Adaptation in Africa 
The Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (CCAA) Program is funded in part by IDRC 
(Canada) and DFID (U.K.).  There are over 300 projects across Africa and this one is a regional 
project across Tanzania and Malawi focused on Agriculture and Food Security.  The project 
encompasses two ecological zones:  semi-arid (Chikwawa and Karonga) and Highland (Mulanje 
and Zimba).  The adaptive capacity varied from village to village and an  institutional evaluation 
of where to implement these projects focused on access to institutions (NGOs, churches, 
Extension services, and Government) and access to infrastructure (markets, health).  These factors 
were determined to have a lot of influence on coping mechanisms and adaptation. In completing 
this institutional framework analysis, they used the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework to 
identify and evaluate communities starting with districts. The program managers met with district 
executive committees in each vulnerable district and presented the criteria for the CCAA program 
and the criteria for selecting study areas.  They also looked at socioeconomic indicators that might 
predict vulnerability, but it was stated that all households in Malawi are vulnerable, just some to a 
larger degree.  Poverty and access to markets and labor were some of the largest predictors.  In 
170 
 
addition to agricultural practices, adaptive capacity and vulnerability, they also looked at people's 
perceptions of climate change and vulnerability.   
The project‟s research team examined opportunities for new technologies and looked at 
constraints to adaptation (that might include access to market, irrigation, etc). They asked each 
village to come up with their own adaptation plans (a list of strategies) and then helped them to 
prioritize their goals. Villages have different strategies and the CCAA was helping create the 
building blocks to achieve them in a model of participatory development.  When they first went to 
the village, they had to explain that they were not bringing in money and projects 'to save the day' 
but were there just to help facilitate some strategies and work through some constraints.   
They do work with some government officials and NGOs, but when they invited major 
donors to their meetings and conferences, they did not come. They used the NAPA as a guide for 
project designs and policies for agriculture and rural livelihoods. They worked with the 
Department of Meteorological Services and Climate Change, the government entity that reports 
CCAA's activities to the rest of the government, as well as the Environmental Affairs Department.  
In Chikwawa the current problem is a persistent drought and the future of irrigation in 
some areas here is in question.  There was actually already an irrigation project taking place by 
the Evangelical Association of Malawi, so when asked how CCAA could help the village with 
their strategies, they wanted more equipment for irrigation (essentially expanding the EAMs 
project).  They also wanted to access more water, but their water source is from an outflow from a 
sugar company.  CCAA worked with the sugar company to make the outflow more regular, but 
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there are periods where drought affects even them. So the project worked to deepen the channel 
from the company to the village and now there is a plan to build a new channel.  To achieve some 
of these goals, the EAM actually used the CCAA project goals to seek more funding. Another 
Chikwawa village was worse off because it is very poorly accessed, but they also wanted 
irrigation and had no previous support.  EAM will now expand to helping them.  [This was made 
possible through a grant from Irish Aid to EAM titled 'Strengthening Resilience through 
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes'.  They are in T/A Lundu and T/A 
Ndakwera in Chikwawa District.] 
In Karonga (a site not visited), irrigation is less feasible based on distance to rivers. So 
innovations are constrained to rain-fed crops, diversification and finding the right variety for each 
season. In Chikwawa and  Karonga, it was mentioned that livestock is an important coping 
mechanism, while in Mulanje there is a problem of access to livestock.  One of the villages they 
are working with in Mulanje is producing large quantities of pineapples, but they have no market 
for selling them. Their soil is acidic due to erosion and flooding, so growing pineapples and 
bananas is a coping mechanism.   The CCAA is trying to train them in some basic marketing 
skills so they can try to process the pineapples and sell them locally or export them to another 
village.  Mulanje plants both drought-resistant and normal variety maize every year as a coping 
strategy. This approach worked well last year when an early dry spell allowed the fast growing 
hybrid to harvest, and then when the rains came the normal maize came.  
In each of these villages, the program goals were to identify the right crops for the region 
with different varieties for wet and dry seasons and semi-arid or highland areas.  One program 
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manager noted that when these crops are advertised to farmers by seed distributors, nobody is 
explaining to farmers the variety that is best for them. The program also seeks to improve 
agricultural systems through conservation agriculture and irrigation.  Since the project has limited 
funding, researchers try to help farmers receive subsidies from the government for seed and 
fertilizer.  The end-state goal of this project was to up-scale this strategy to include more villages, 
share lessons learned and have farmers speak about their new technologies, but at the time of the 
interview (August, 2011) these efforts were unsuccessful based on a lack of incentives to draw 
new participation.   
The Community Vitalization and Afforestation of the Middle Shire  
This project began in early 2000's when the forestry department asked for assistance from 
JICA, which at the time was conducting watershed management research in the Middle Shire 
region.  The project started with just seven villages and evolved in 2004 to 24 villages (for a three 
year phase of the project).  In this newest phase, which now includes up to 240 villages, there is a 
new approach. The initial phase of the project was in just a handful of villages, but there was a 
supply of afforestation products to the villages, such as saplings, tools and seeds.   They were also 
given some resources for income generating activities, such as and equipment to make hives for 
bee keeping.  In the pilot study, they taught the villages goat-rearing in an effort to expand the use 
of livestock among many households, but in a dry-spell all of the goats were sold as a coping 
strategy and now there are no more goats.  
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In this newest phase, nothing is provided except for the training (no inputs). The project 
does not even provide free sodas to farmers that attend the training, which was once a common 
incentive that had surprisingly positive effects on attendance.  The forestry official managing the 
projected stated that this presents a huge challenge.  The logic is that it should decrease 
dependency and bolster self-reliance in the villages. However, the reality is that one cannot expect 
farmers to simply receive some training and then go off on their own to change their farms and 
gardens. They need the incentive of inputs and they need to see the benefits of such a change. 
The program is highly diversified among activities to improve rural livelihoods and while 
there are many parallels to climate adaptation projects, the forestry official did not see this as the 
motivation of such activities. Some of the activities include income generating strategies such as 
bee-keeping and fish-farming.   Mostly, all of these activities are conducted through extension 
offices from Community Development, Forestry or Agriculture extension offices depending on 
the activity.  These extension workers go to each village and the village will select one lead 
farmer. That lead farmer will use his garden as an example for others to follow.  Extension 
officers (working for various government offices) visit a few villages daily and each village is 
visited often to touch base and monitor lead farmers.  However the COVAMS project itself only 
has three coordinators and they do not go to the villages often.  
This project is expected to phase-out next year because JICA is interested in expanding 
something similar, but in more districts.   The villages were originally selected in TA Kuntaja and 
Kapeni based on the erratic rainfall received in these areas and they were highlighted in the early 
study that was the JICA master plan.   There are soil erosion projects and check-dams designed to 
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limit the current degree of erosion, but the forestry officer admitted that this overall projects is too 
small of a scale to stop the soil erosion that is impacting the three hydroelectric dams in the area 
(one component of the original project design).  JICA is looking to expand to seven districts along 
the Shire River.  
The program manager reiterated that it is counterproductive to train farmers with 
absolutely no resources to provide.  He stated that agroforestry takes too long for farmers to be 
able to reap the benefits and afford new materials and inputs to expand the techniques that are 
taught.  However, he did conclude the bee-keeping is a self-sustaining income generating activity. 
He also said that people forget that Blantyre has its own rural communities and problems.   People 
are now starting to see the importance of the forests in their tribal boundaries and they are now 
protecting and properly managing them in Village Forestry Areas (VFA).  
Ground-Truthing Key Findings 
 Adaptation is more pronounced and mainstreamed in development than this researcher 
realized prior to visiting the projects.  Nearly all development organizations ground-truthed had a 
similar idea that in order to enhance well-being in rural and peri-urban livelihoods, activities must 
address agriculture, environmental degradation and alternative sources of income simultaneously. 
This project sought to evaluate what adaptation looks like on the ground.  For many villages, the 
focus was on afforestation.  Projects such as COVAMS, MACC and Soche Mountain adopted this 
strategy for long-term adaptation. Typically seen as mitigation, these trees will become critical to 
Malawi's future in 20-30 years to meet the demand of fuel wood.  While adaptations should seek 
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to move beyond the use of forestry products for day to day cooking, there are few viable 
alternatives currently available. Conservation agriculture is another very common approach 
across nearly every project.  This new technology will aid farmers in achieving more with less. 
Moving away from the traditional practice of collecting and burning organic matter in the post-
harvest, by burying it in the soil and allowing the soil to gain the composted nutrients, farmers can 
start decreasing dependence on expensive fertilizers. Crop diversification was another common 
and important adaptation. maize is food in Malawi. Without maize incorporated into their diet, 
Malawians do not feel they have had a proper meal. However, maize is highly rain sensitive and a 
farmer that relies solely on maize has very little adaptive capacity during natural disasters. 
Farmers are starting to realize this and they are incorporating more drought-resistant crops into 
their fields through segregated plots, intercropping or relay cropping.  Income diversification is a 
broad development approach that is especially necessary in a country like Malawi where 85% of 
the population is rural. Reduction of poverty is arguably one of the best techniques for increasing 
adaptive capacity. People can then diversify their diets, better prepare their homes, and purchase 
assets that can be used in the event of a disaster.  Depending on the region and project, Livestock 
Farming was regarded as an important adaptive strategy.  A farmer can use livestock manure as 
fertilizer to improve crop yields or as a hedge against natural disasters and bad harvests by selling 
them.  Finally, Small-scale Irrigation is an emerging paradigm of many development 
organizations and especially the National Government.  A farmer relying on rain-fed agriculture 
will get one harvest that is contingent on nature. A farmer that has access to sources of water for 
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irrigation can achieve as many as four harvests.  This increased productivity on the same plot of 
land can go a long way to increasing adaptive capacity and reducing poverty. 
 What becomes increasingly obvious is that adaptation in Malawi is tantamount to food 
security in rural and peri-urban areas where subsistence livelihoods dominate.  This conveys the 
contextual vulnerabilities at work in developing countries that global strategies might miss.  
While all of the aforementioned activities are arguably good adaptation strategy, this does not 
mean that the projects themselves were effective or beneficial.  In fact, there are numerous 
multifaceted issues that were revealed about development and adaptation projects.  First is the 
issue of Coordination.  From sharing lessons learned and new technologies to working with 
nearby organizations or government offices, there was virtually no coordination between donors.  
Two projects occurring within ten kilometers of each other with the primary objective of climate 
adaptation had no knowledge of each other‟s existence.  Nearly every organization was asked 
what others were doing in the area and no responses were encouraging.  This is definitely one area 
that aid mapping will have tremendous impact.   Another issue was Project Implementation.  
There were some organizations that seemed to provide everything and do everything for the 
beneficiaries.  Little effort, coordination or sacrifice was required by the villagers.  On the other 
hand, some organizations (such as COVAMS discussed earlier) sought to reduce all dependency 
and provide very few resources other than shared-knowledge.   The villages where people were 
given numerous inputs were impressive to visit. Their fields were well-kept and the evidence was 
in the tall stalks of maize.  In the COVAMS villages, there was very little to observe.  However, 
the greatest concern to the villagers in villages where a lot of inputs were provided was what they 
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would do when the project runs out (of time or money).  This leads to another critical issue of 
Project Scaling.  The only projects that demonstrated an ability to move beyond pilot-projects 
studies was the very well-funded Norway MACC and Japan COVAMS.  These projects had 
expanded to numerous villages, yet in terms of adaptation, development projects occur in less 
than 10% of the villages in most districts.   For the other projects, expansion was not an option. 
Nearly every other project was phasing-out (CCAA, COVAMS, Soche Mountain, CC-Dare) or 
still embroiled in pilot studies (CARLA).  The effect of a project ending in villages appeared 
more severe (in the perspectives of community leaders) than if the project never occurred in their 
village.  This transition leads to the next important issue of Post-Project Maintenance.  Many 
village leaders conveyed disappointment and surprise upon learning that the project in their 
village was „phasing-out‟.  This highlights that many projects do not create an exit-strategy to 
prepare villages to act independently.  Several villagers expressed seeing the benefits of hybrid 
seeds and fertilizer, but did not know how they could afford these on their own.  One villager 
actually stated that her number one fear was that she would not receive free fertilizer. There were 
also no plans in most projects to maintain project equipment past the first mechanical failure. In 
one village a water project that was one year old was already in disrepair, but there was no money 
to fix the broken PVC piping.   The reality is that many NGOs implementing these projects are 
living from grant to grant and they cannot predict whether they will be in any village long term.    
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion  
 This thesis sought to examine vulnerability to climate change in the unique and specific 
context of Malawi.  This country-focused approach was in an effort to position this research 
against the trend of global cross-comparative analysis that determines which countries are most 
vulnerable to climate change.  While tremendous evidence has been presented in the literature to 
substantiate Malawi's position among these most vulnerable countries, this independent and 
subnational evaluation corroborates this evidence with carefully researched perceptions and 
observations of climatic change within Malawi.  In an effort to create an index of vulnerability to 
the perceived threat of climate change and evaluate the utility of climate vulnerability modeling in 
general, this thesis employed an original approach to household vulnerability using evidence-
based variable selection.  This thesis serves as a proof of concept to an approach that uses 
interview-derived indicators of vulnerability to compare against perceptions of locations of 
vulnerable areas in Malawi.  Finally, in an effort to thoroughly examine the role of foreign aid and 
development within Malawi and how this arrangement has shaped strategies and policies related 
to climate change and adaptation, over 890 original source documents were collected, analyzed 
and catalogued to provide one of the best snapshots of foreign aid to a developing country. This 
thesis sought to assess whether foreign aid for climate adaptation is going to the most vulnerable 
places in Malawi.  While a true measure of aid effectiveness would involve an evaluation of 
project-level coordination, localization, and appropriateness of scale, profound observations about 
adaptation projects emerged from a series of ground-truthed projects that reveal several 
challenges to adaptation as a meaningful development strategy.   
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Vulnerability 
 Based on extensive research, climate change was perceived to be present, significant and 
hazardous in over 90% of the interviews.  Observations involving greater variation in 
precipitation and increased frequency and intensity of disasters are corroborated by scientific 
observations both internal and external to the Government of Malawi.  While perceptions of 
vulnerability to climate change (as a future stimulus) are highly correlated to the social memory 
of past natural disasters, Malawians - even in remote rural villages - are attuned to the negative 
effects that hydrometeorological events have on household level food production and resilience. 
This is a dominant theme in Malawi's climate change discourse and rarely is climate change 
discussed outside of existing parameters of food security, land degradation or rainfall variability.  
However, when asked what was causing climate change, nearly every respondent stated that 
deforestation was a major cause of Malawi‟s climate change, to include Western donors.  
 Deforestation is by far Malawi's greatest looming tragedy, rampant because of the many 
uses for forestry products.  Beyond charcoal or simple fuel wood, Malawi's forests are burned in 
the production of bricks for building material (using inefficient kilns and production techniques).  
Charcoal is also used in industrial activities that include tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee and even beer 
production.  Another source of deforestation is to gain access to new sources of arable land (often 
in marginal and protected areas) or to gain access to river banks to construct rudimentary 
irrigation schemes.  The fact that Malawi is losing its forest at appalling rates is well substantiated 
in the literature (Booth et. al., 2006; Magrath, 2009; Fisher, 2010), but the processes leading to 
this destruction and strategies to curb this trend have not been very effective.  Districts on the 
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outskirts of Blantyre, where the major roads come into the city, are lined with Malawians carrying 
stacks of charcoal to the market.  Many of the organizations planning or implementing adaptation 
activities have discussed incorporating afforestation and reforestation into their framework, but 
this alone is not a long-term strategy to combat the central issue of deforestation.  
Another source of environmental degradation often tied to climate change discourse 
within Malawi is soil degradation.  New technologies being introduced in the name of adaptation 
are addressing soil degradation (example from Japan's project Community Vitalization and 
Afforestation of the Middle Shire).  In reality, these programs are pairing soil-conservation 
strategies, such as changing the contours of planting ridges and incorporating peripheral use of 
elephant grass to adaptation strategies of conservation agriculture.  Many of the local government 
officials and civil society organizations cited over-tilling and improper husbandry practices for 
loss of soil fertility.  Conservation agriculture has been introduced to smallholder farmers as a 
necessary future technology.  However, farmers are reluctant to adopt new technologies without 
seeing the immediate and beneficial results.  Long term strategies of organic and input-free 
conservation agriculture are being paired with free seed and fertilizer to incentivize farmers to 
adopt new technologies.  Where the resources and inputs are high, there are many early-adopters, 
but where organizations lack or decide not to offer inputs, there is less participation.  While the 
effects of natural resource exploitation and environmental degradation must be a separate 
discussion from climate change in terms of sources of vulnerability, many adaptation projects and 
strategies attempt to address both drivers in a holistic approach to vulnerability that is both 
necessary and prudent.   
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 While interviews substantiate many of the claims that Malawi is a highly vulnerable 
country, many of the perceived effects of climate change are based on fluctuations in rainfall that 
are a more proximate indication of climate variability than change.   The frequency of floods and 
droughts weigh heavily on the minds of many officials whose job it is to help households and 
individuals respond, prepare and adapt to shocks.  Rhetorical use of climate change has presented 
an opportunity for organizations and governments to seek funding to directly address these issues.  
This conflation of these separate issues also occurred quite frequently in the literature 
(Government of Malawi, 2006; Magrath, 2009).  
 In Malawi, the most common issue tied to the effect of climate change is food security and 
the production of Malawi's most popular crop - maize.  What a lot of the literature has failed to 
capture is the politics and culture behind the spread of maize in Malawi.  Maize has been 
introduced to many areas (such as Chikwawa and Nsanje) where households should not rely on it 
based on one short and erratic rainy season.  One CSO would comment that crops are political 
and that certain governments become attached to a certain crop.  Looking at the U.S. production 
of corn, this attachment does not appear illogical.  An official in local government stated that 
Chikwawa used to grow cassava and millet, but now people in this region have a stronger taste for 
maize.  Many organizations converged on the perception that farmers need to diversify their crops 
away from maize to act as insurance.  They encourage farmers to grow drought-resistant crops 
such as cassava, soy beans, pigeon peas and groundnuts.  However, in some cases drought-
resistant crops are low-yield and thus it can be challenging to convince farmers to plant them 
instead of high-yield maize. With the memory of recent shocks, farmers are beginning to move to 
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drought-resistant crops based on perceived changing weather conditions.  Most organizations 
stated that the biggest challenge is getting the seeds, fertilizer and other subsidized inputs 
necessary to keep farmers engaged in new technologies such as conservation agriculture.   
 The troubling aspect is that many of the efforts of IOs and NGOs to promote participation 
include subsidized inputs, which runs parallel to the policies of the National Government and the 
promotion of the Farmer Input Subsidy Program (FISP). The FISP is considered by many to be 
Malawi's green revolution (Denning et. al., 2011; Doward and Chirwa, 2010; Sachs, 2012) and it 
is the government‟s strategy for feeding a population that continues to increase. Promotion of 
hybrid maize seed and subsidized distribution of fertilizers is also common to Norway's Managing 
Adaptation to Climate Change project, The UN Millennium Village Project and several other 
multi-million dollar projects where demonstrating results creates a conflict of interest with the 
long-term sustainability of communities.  One Malawian environmental professor indicated, the 
FISP program and other high-input projects are not sustainable because they do not have an exit 
strategy.  The United Kingdom, is even conducting an environmental impact assessment of FISP 
concerning the increase in fertilizer use and its spread into Lake Malawi.  When projects lose 
funding or lose interest and leave villages and communities, households often do not have the 
ability to sustain the purchase of permanent fixtures of seed, pesticides and fertilizer.  
 Meanwhile, food security in the country remains a problem.  As of June 2011, there were 
250,000 people identified as food insecure - mostly in the southern districts.  This deficit - 
according to experts with the national government – required 4.8 thousand metric tons of food aid 
to provide adequate relief.  Malawi currently has a maize surplus and is planning ahead for future 
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disasters through internal redistribution of food aid.  The government conducts post-harvest 
estimates several times each year to predict how long food will last in given districts and whether 
people can make it to the next harvest. However, as an agricultural officer in the lower Shire 
River valley stated, "food aid does not solve the problem of food security” (Interview, 2011).  In 
his district of Chikwawa (a disaster-prone and vulnerable district in the lower Shire), food 
redistributions only delay the full impacts.  Farmers are very rational and they know that the rain 
is erratic.  They used to plant the first week in November, and now it might be as late as the end 
of December.  They are diversifying their crops and building assets in preparation for the next 
disaster, but Chikwawa was a district where Maize was only recently promoted.  They were 
originally growing drought resistant crops (such as millet, cassava and sweet potato).  However, 
in the 1990s, government policies and programs started advocating that everyone should start 
growing maize to bolster national production (Interview, 2011).  'Professionals' grow attached to a 
certain crop and people start to grow into tastes that are not indigenous; now people do not like 
the taste of millet compared to maize (Interview, 2011).    
Interviews with organizations and individuals at nearly every level of Malawian society 
were a tremendous asset to understanding how Malawians perceive their own vulnerability and 
threats from external stimuli, such as climate change.  What becomes clear is that they have 
tremendous difficulty in describing climate change as a threat without including other issues of 
food security, health and poverty. This highlights the complexity of vulnerability and the need to 
fully set climate change within the context of other socio-environmental processes occurring 
within a given study area.  Nearly unanimously, the Lower Shire River Valley was cited as the 
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most vulnerable location in Malawi.  From constant flooding and droughts (the area is in a three 
year dry spell) to unpredictable rains and the promotion of maize monocropping, the southern 
area of Malawi is often considered the epicenter for future adaptation projects and government 
activities.  However, the threshold of vulnerability from the best regions to the worst is very slight 
and the country as whole is quite vulnerable with 85% of the population being rural subsistence 
farmers.  
 Mapping vulnerability is a challenging process that involves an incredible amount of data, 
observations and expertise.  Removing subjectivity from this process would be ideal, but as 
Brooks et. al. (2005) make clear even in their data-driven inductive approach, this becomes nearly 
impossible. From selection of indicators that proxy actual social and environmental process to 
weighting techniques that reflect the model builder‟s own biases.  Maps can be powerful tools, 
but attention must be paid to how they are used to affect policy. It was with this warning in mind 
that a proof of concept approach to modeling vulnerability was undertaken.  
 The approach presented in this section attempted to overcome some of this bias by using 
evidence-derived indicators of vulnerability that were drawn from multi-level interviews and 
observations.  Using DHS data, some important and less-biased information was conveyed 
regarding the assets, wealth and access of households aggregated to the Traditional Authority 
level.  There was a clear increase in numerous areas that include arable land ownership, 
possession of livestock and use of mobile technology.  However, as the 2010 map shows, this 
increase in what is regarded as resilience factors did not occur evenly across the 173 TAs for 
which there was temporal data. Some TAs on average were less resilient after the 6 year study 
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period and some TAs (mostly in the South) grew assets, but at a rate that was slower than the 
national average.  These are powerful findings that can lead to future research.   
 The resultant complex vulnerability map did corroborate the information provided through 
interviews and literature with only minor exceptions or unexpected results. It accurately reflects 
the perceptions of what drives vulnerability to climate change in Malawi, and it corroborates 
where the most vulnerable locations are in Malawi based on interviewee perceptions and existing 
literature. With an expectation that the districts in the southern portion of the country would be 
the most vulnerable, the resilience maps created in this research offer evidence that there was a 
shift in vulnerability to the south following the devastating 2005 famine where nearly 40% of the 
country required food aid.  It is no surprise that the agricultural officer in this area stated that 45% 
of the households are food insecure every year and that for these households their produced food 
will only last 9 months.  Additionally, despite an increase in the country's overall resilience in 
2010 over 2004 (based on raw scores), several traditional authorities were identified that had not 
surfaced in the literature or interviews and these areas may serve as future research.  Finally, the 
unexpected increase in the amount of arable land in many districts is worth further research as 
many organizations commented about the expansion of farming into marginal lands as a result of 
promoted increase in maize production.  
Foreign Aid 
 This thesis concludes that the role of foreign aid in Malawi is indeed pervasive.  
Development discourse permeates nearly every aspect of national and local governments and 
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roads across Malawi's landscape are littered with NGO and IO signs for ongoing or completed 
projects.  As one national government official would state, the donors want to give aid and the 
government wants to receive aid.  The actors in the business of giving and receiving aid were all 
proponents for this system of international goodwill and exchange.  However, one director of an 
aid organization - a Malawi citizen - stated that “each donor has their own agenda.”  In terms of 
aid projects this creates fragmentation.  For example, if several donors are working to build 
schools and implement primary school education, this is a good thing, but what if each donor is 
promoting different text books, strategies or curriculums.  This is common in Malawi.  He stated 
that donors are now promoting the use of genetically-modified or hybrid maize.  However, there 
is not a good cultural understanding on how Malawians use maize. The hybrid maize does not 
stand-up well to the hard-boiling process of making Nsima (Maize porridge common throughout 
Malawi).  This lack of cultural understanding is common with development projects.  When solar 
cookers were introduced in villages, this same lack of understanding about the Nsima cooking 
process (fast boiling) was ignored and this project also failed. In final example, a Danish water 
project placed bore-hole pumps in geologically surveyed locations where there were no villages 
nearby. The thought was that people would move to be near water, which ignored hundreds of 
years of traditional landholding entitlements.  These are Malawi-specific examples where 
development organizations bring pre-conceived notions and packages of aid to solve local and 
contextual problems.  If the rapid increase in funding for adaptation follows this trajectory, then 
this new development strategy will have the same questionable success of policies over the past 
sixty years.  
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 Therefore, ground-truthing was a logical and imperative step in the evaluation of 
adaptation aid projects, strategies and activities within Malawi.  Selecting from a robust set of 
project selection conditions, the seven projects visited offered an important mix of explicit 
adaptation projects versus projects that did not adopt any rhetoric.  Some projects where very 
large and well-funded (covering numerous villages), and some were small.  Some projects were 
very transparent in their documents as to where the projects would occur, what activities would 
take place and who the beneficiaries were.  Other projects were far less forthcoming with 
information.  Traveling with the organizations implementing these projects rounded out the 
perspectives on development and adaptation to offer some of the most revealing and enlightening 
findings.  
 There were some areas where projects were clearly effective. Mulanje Mountain 
Conservation Trust (MMCT) is the envy of every national NGO in Malawi.  With a primary focus 
on protecting the biodiversity of the Mulanje Massif, this project is very well funding from 
numerous donors that include USAID, Norway, DFID and the World Bank (MMCT, 2011).  This 
project, with little or no explicit adaptation activities highlights a novel approach to foreign aid.  
The money used to establish the NGO sits in an investment trust and the project is self-sustaining 
based on the dividends acquired.  As such, this project has more staying power than many of the 
other projects visited.  The Malawi Endowment for the Environment Trust is another example of 
this approach. However, the representative from MEET stated that reliance on dividends from 
investments in the recent economy resulted in far less predictable funding for projects.  
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 With  MMCT on the richer end of the spectrum  of NGOs, the Soche Mountain project 
implemented by the Sustainable Rural Growth and Development Initiative (SRGDI) NGO  (now a 
one-man operation) is on the other end.  Four graduates from the agricultural degree program at 
the University of Malawi started this NGO as a means of addressing the natural resource and 
environmental degradation issues in Malawi.  As one of the smallest and least funded NGOs 
ground-truthed, there was considerable discussion about the NGO application process for grants 
from donors and the challenges of implementing projects under a constrained budget.  Occurring 
in both rural and peri-urban areas, the project director conveyed how vulnerabilities and adaptive 
strategies varied between the four project villages.  In addition, he described challenges in 
motivating villagers to plant trees or adopt new technologies with very limited resources given to 
the villages.  Despite these challenges, it was amazing to observe what this NGO was able to 
accomplish in four villages by getting households to help themselves.  If donors (grantors) did not 
lose interest in small projects like this one, this NGO could help far more people.  
 In terms of the mapped results of adaptation projects, there appears to be good distribution 
of climate-related aid to the vulnerable areas in Malawi identified through interviews and 
mapping, but simply having a lot of projects does not necessarily translate into household level 
effectiveness.  The aid maps presented in this research illustrate the complexity of foreign aid, the 
sheer volume of donors working in small geographic areas. This points to a lack of coordination 
between donors and the governments at various levels, which was confirmed through groun-
truthing.  Despite the impressive number of subnational project locations included in this analysis 
(2451), development organizations operate in fewer than 10% of villages in the most vulnerable 
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districts.  Therefore, this again calls into question the effectiveness of the aid model in helping 
vulnerable populations realize appropriate measures of adaptation, when the aid clearly cannot 
reach all of the people. This situation parallels the severe conceptual challenge of the Millennium 
Village Project, where out-scaling or up-scaling to other villages seems improbable given the 
millions of dollars spent in just the one village of Mwandama (Carr, 2008).  
This research highlights the fact that foreign aid is currently operating on an endless scale, 
meaning there is no timeline for withdrawal or aspiration by development organizations to be 
replaced by organic institutions in the future.  There is no discussion on how or when Malawi 
could achieve an aidless path forward.  This is a concerning aspect of foreign aid that is rarely 
discussed in the literature produced by development organizations, but in the wake of recent 
political unrest in Malawi, many local government officials and Malawi citizens expressed a 
desire to pursue such a course of action.  For them, the promise of aid is often disappointing and 
the legacy of aid has not been a good one. The effect of aid on policy-making, capacity and 
governance is an area of future research that proved dynamic in Malawi's current context.  The 
adage modified to 'no representation without taxation' rings true for many Malawians that feel 
their interests in the political process are superseded by the relationship between the government 
and the donor community.  
Capacity, Coordination and Governance 
This research confirms the importance of interpersonal contact with a variety of 
organizations to get beyond the guarded release of information by development and bureaucratic 
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organizations.  In examining the capacity and governance associated in a process that is 
sometimes chaotic, this methodical survey of key actors through process tracing was an essential 
step toward rare clarity in development.  The rhetorical publications of development agencies, 
international organizations and governments have done little to reveal the actual challenges, 
solutions and best practices that are a part of climate change adaptation strategy. Unfortunately, in 
Malawi, the knowledge required to advance meaningful strategies is not yet institutionalized and 
rests with only a few critical key actors.  These experts, while elusive in the literature, were 
revealed early in the interviewing process.  There are only a handful of donor organizations and 
government departments active in developing a national strategy for adaptation, but as the 
interviews reveal, Malawi's battle with climate related exposure and sensitivity are not new and 
climate change is an introduced concept that offers increased opportunity for development 
finance, an opportunity that was recently threatened.    
 In the past three years, there was a rising concern over the rhetoric being employed 
between Malawi's president and the international community.  In the most recent example, 
President Bingu Wa Mutharika gave a speech where he stated, "If donors say this is not 
democracy, to hell with you... yes, I'm using that word, tell them to go to hell" (BBC, 2012).   The 
political uncertainty and social unrest in Malawi at this time was threatening to destabilize all 
democratic and development progress achieved in the country to date.  With the passing of 
President Mutharika in April 2012 and the successful transfer of power to Joyce Banda, Malawi 
demonstrated that their democracy and their constitution are stronger than IOs would give them 
credit for in interviews just prior to this transition.  With a more cooperative leader of the country, 
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IOs will again seek to capitalize on a relationship where the government depends on aid, and 
those in the business of giving aid remain engaged.  There is no doubt that this will have 
immediate and positive effects on the average Malawian.  The African Development Bank 
immediately committed $45 Million to President Banda's government to 'revive the struggling 
economy' (Reuters, 2012).   The hope is that Malawi's first female president will avoid what has 
been called 'the big man syndrome' (Booth et. al., 2006) - autocratic tendencies common to the 
three previous presidents - while developing long-term solutions to Malawi's many and complex 
vulnerabilities with a goal of new independence in mind: independence from foreign aid.  
In evaluating who are clear winners in the use of foreign aid to address climate change 
vulnerability in Malawi, government ministries, development organizations and NGOs receiving 
increased funding, equipment, and personnel are clear candidates.  Whether the money is effective 
in reaching the most vulnerable households is still uncertain.  The goal of this thesis was to 
evaluate whether adaptation is an effective global development strategy in Malawi, with the 
following conditions: it should be contextual to local problems and solutions, well-coordinated, 
focused on long-term solutions rather than short-term development indicators, it should empower 
governments and it should have an aid exit strategy (refer to details on page 10).   
Through extensive research, interviews and ground-truthing, there is evidence that 
projects do address the local and contextual vulnerabilities in Malawi, but that these are not 
constrained to vulnerability to climate change. In fact, most projects are focused on issues of food 
security, uncheck deforestation, land degradation and rainfall variability.  While donors 
organizations recently formed the Joint Resilience Unit in Lilongwe in order to better harmonize 
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their efforts, most donors stated that this meeting accomplished very little. This new coordination 
unit does not include the government, who should ideally take the lead, and a UNDP official 
stated that he had to plead to join the JRU.  The government department meant to track and 
coordinate all climate-related activities within the country was actually a UNDP representative 
that reported little success in working with other donors. At the local government and 
implementation level, there was little evidence of coordination, knowledge-sharing or even 
recognition that similar and relevant activities were occurring nearby.  These organizations 
(typically CSOs) cited the failure as one of national government leadership and direction.  Few 
organizations were clear on which government department had the lead role, and their confusion 
is valid given that this shifted from the Ministry of Mines, Natural Resources and Energy to the 
Ministry of Development Planning Coordination in 2008.  The Department of Environmental 
Affairs within the Ministry of Mines at the time of an interview in August 2011 still claimed to be 
leading all climate change activities.   
 Many of the strategies discussed as adaptation by IOs and NGOs do seek to have long-
term positive effects.  Afforestation, conservation agriculture and irrigation projects all have the 
potential to sustainably reinforce rural livelihoods.  However, these activities are being 
compromised by the use of seed and fertilizer incentives to produce short-term results that are 
two-fold.  First, they entice farmers to join the programs and second, fields full of tall and healthy 
looking maize present well to visiting aid officials and other dignitaries sent to evaluate the 
project.  There is little doubt that farmers benefit from this intervention, but the use of such 
subsidies is ephemeral and based on budget constraints, the practice is waning.  Once the flow of 
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free seeds and fertilizer stops, farmers are left in a precarious situation where they cannot afford 
them.  One farmer stated that her number one fear was losing the free fertilizer provided by an 
NGO.  
 While the National Program on Climate Change is a donor-led initiative to build capacity 
within Malawi's government (at a cost of $4 Million contributed by Norway, U.K., Spain, Ireland 
and World Bank through the One UN fund) there is some speculation that this is a pacification of 
the government in an effort to continue implementing climate-related projects (worth over $50 
Million) outside of government purview. This situation may change with the transfer of power to 
President Joyce Banda.  There is little evidence that projects are empowering governments at 
district and lower levels or allowing the national government to assume leadership and 
coordination responsibilities.  While communities and villages still held the government 
accountable for addressing vulnerabilities associated with climate, actual responsibility appears 
more connected to the development organizations part of the Joint Resilience Unit.     
 Understanding foreign aid and its influence in Malawi is paramount to understanding how 
policies and strategies are transmitted and received at various levels. This thesis reveals that 
dependence on foreign aid has created a myriad of capacity issues within the central government. 
Malawi now lacks sufficient domestic resources and institutional capacity to address many of its 
internal challenges effectively, and a competitive nature between ministries has recently created 
corruption and capacity concerns.  Is foreign aid to blame for this, or can more aid solve it?  This 
thesis also reveals that donors have tremendous influence on national government decision-
making based on this aid relationship.  As recently as 2011, donors withdrew funding to influence 
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domestic policies in Malawi. This thesis concludes that the introduction of global adaptation 
development strategies to address climate change is likely to exacerbate Malawi‟s capacity and 
governance issues and make transparency and coordination of effective strategies more difficult.  
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